In November, U.S. voters will choose between resurrecting the “America First” doctrine or maintaining a foreign policy based on alliances and multilateralism.
The events of the past two months have seen the 2024 United States presidential race entirely upended. After President Joe Biden’s disastrous debate performance in late June and the failed assassination attempt on former President Trump at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, in early July, the overwhelming sentiment reflected in many pundit forecasts and betting markets was that Trump’s victory had been all but sealed. Biden crawled from the rubble of the June debate looking like he wasn’t fit to govern for the next few months, let alone the next four years; Trump emerged from the failed assassination attempt looking downright heroic.
That has all changed seemingly overnight now that Biden has dropped his bid for re-election and Kamala Harris has ascended to the top of the 2024 Democratic ticket. What was once looking to be a Trump-led Republican landslide in the making has shaped up to be a highly competitive race, with Kamala quickly closing the polling gap with Trump in key battleground states and entirely overtaking him in others. Now, Kamala is ahead in the key battlegrounds of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin in the latest polling. As the race currently stands, Trump and Harris remain in a close contest, but Harris’s success in erasing Trump’s polling lead and overcoming his fundraising advantage is a remarkable achievement.
While the Democratic candidate and the trend of the race may have changed in dramatic fashion, the fundamental choice Americans face in this election in terms of policy remains essentially the same. This is especially true in the realm of foreign policy. Harris differs slightly from Biden on some issues, but the overall posture and vision for the U.S. role in the world that Harris stands by will likely follow the same course set by Biden. It is markedly at odds with Trump’s vision for U.S. foreign policy.
Until 2015, there was broad bipartisan consensus between Republicans and Democrats on the U.S.’s role in global affairs, particularly in upholding the post-World War II liberal international order through multilateralism, institutions, and military/economic alliances. Of course, this consensus did not preclude debate on specific foreign policy issues. For instance, Democrats and Republicans often clashed over trade agreements, military interventions, and the degree of emphasis on human rights in foreign policy. These debates, though significant, did not fundamentally challenge the shared belief in U.S. global leadership. This changed with the emergence of Trump and his America First doctrine, which shifted the Republican Party toward a more unilateral, nationalistic approach.
During his first term, Trump viewed international relationships in myopic financial and transactional terms, often hyper-focusing on the cost to the United States of various security arrangements and paying seemingly little attention to the strategic value of America’s long-standing alliances. He also shocked allies and partners by repeatedly praising autocratic rulers such as Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin.
In polling, Republican support for an active global role for the U.S. was recorded as lower than that of Democrats for the first time in 2016, and the disparity has grown since then. Demonstrative of this shift solidifying over time is survey data from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs which shows that for the first time in nearly five decades of polling on this topic, a majority of Republicans in 2023 preferred that the U.S. stay out of world affairs. Notably, the data also revealed that Trump Republicans are “much more negative” than other non-Trump Republicans about the U.S. role in the world, the U.S. alliance system with Europe, and defending allies in general.
The world has lived through the ramifications of four years of Trump at the reins of U.S. foreign policy and nearly four with Biden at the helm. Given the highly divergent governing styles and worldviews that each president represents, along with the track records of their respective administrations, what are the implications of four more years of Bidenesque foreign policy under Harris versus that of America First 2.0 under Trump? This article aims to explore how the 2024 election will shape outcomes in terms of U.S. leadership in the world, particularly concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict, the U.S.-China strategic competition, the Taiwan Strait, the Russo-Ukrainian war, and North Korea.
Over the past four years, Biden has had to deal with a number of thorny international issues. He oversaw the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021; early 2022 saw Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the U.S. has since been Ukraine’s primary arms and ammunition supplier; and on October 7th, 2023, Hamas launched a major incursion into Israeli territory, leading to a massive U.S.-backed retaliation from Israel and a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
No doubt one of the weakest points of Biden’s foreign policy track record is the withdrawal from Afghanistan from July to September 2021, a highly chaotic operation that left 13 American service members killed in action, stranded U.S. citizens and Afghan allies, and left behind $7 billion of military equipment. Both Trump and Biden were bent on ending “America’s longest war,” and the Trump administration set in motion the withdrawal from Afghanistan through a withdrawal agreement it negotiated with the Taliban in February 2020. Under Trump, the U.S. reduced troop levels from 13,000 to 2,500, even amid continued attacks by the Taliban on Afghan forces.
Although Biden simply followed through on the withdrawal plans set out by Trump, his administration’s decision to execute the withdrawal on a timeline only slightly delayed from the original—despite the Taliban’s noncompliance with the agreement and U.S. intelligence assessments that the Afghan government would likely collapse—proved to be disastrous. While working to end the 20-year failed exercise in militarized nation-building may have been the right move in the long run, the logistical failures and the sense that America was abandoning Afghan translators and supporters on the ground could nonetheless prove to be an indelible stain on U.S. credibility and Biden’s legacy.
On the other hand, Biden will no doubt get a lot of credit for bringing back a more traditional internationalist approach to U.S. foreign policy after four years of Trump’s unconventional and recalcitrant posture. Under the Biden administration, the U.S. rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement, led a massive effort to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression following its invasion, and ushered in a new era of multilateralism in Asia to counter China via AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation. The U.S.-South Korea alliance also received a major upgrade under Biden via the Washington Declaration, a joint statement that announced the creation of a Nuclear Consultative Group and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence against the North Korean nuclear threat. U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere have welcomed a more amicable Washington that is committed to collective defense under NATO Article 5 and that stands strongly against challenges to the liberal international order.
Given that Biden and Harris have thus far presented themselves as being in virtual lockstep on foreign policy, Harris will no doubt have to fend off attacks tying her to Biden’s missteps. However, unlike an incumbent, she may have more of an opportunity to chart a new course and distinguish herself from her current boss on some issues. One potential area for distinction was thought to be the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has caused growing frustration among younger and progressive voters in particular.
Harris has not yet outlined a detailed policy plan on the issue, but she has called for a ceasefire and expressed more concern over the humanitarian crisis than Biden has, reportedly urging the White House to be more sympathetic toward Palestinians. Even so, her national security advisor has stated that she does not support an arms embargo on Israel, signaling that significant policy shifts may be unlikely. Harris’s record also suggests continuity with mainstream Democratic support for Israel, as she consistently backed military aid during her time in the Senate. Protesters have repeatedly interrupted Harris’s speeches at campaign events in recent weeks, underscoring the challenges she will face in balancing pressure from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and the longstanding U.S. foreign policy stance to which the general electorate is more sympathetic. Harris would also clash with Netanyahu on the issue of Iran, given her previous stance of supporting a return to the JCPOA, the deal that previously halted Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for unfreezing Iranian assets and which Trump abandoned during his first term.
A second Trump administration would also be solidly pro-Israel, but Trump’s recent statements have been mixed (calling on Israel to “finish up your war”), and he has yet to offer any specific steps he would take to bring about peace in the region. When interviewers or commentators press Trump on his plans to address the conflict, he falls back on his typical refrain that “only he” can solve the conflict and that the war wouldn’t have happened in the first place if he had been in office (a baseless claim he also repeats with regard to the war in Ukraine). Trump has shown no compassion for Palestinians, and he has pledged to cut off all U.S. aid to Palestine should he win back the White House (he previously cut more than $20 million in aid during his first term). Other policies during his first term were also unabashedly pro-Israel, from relocating the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem to withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. A second Trump term would likely see a return to this style of policy, with an emphasis on backing Netanyahu’s right-wing nationalist plans for the region.
A hypothetical Harris administration would also be unlikely to diverge significantly from Biden on China policy. As Vice President, Harris has been tasked with traveling throughout Southeast Asia to shore up support from Indo-Pacific allies amid the U.S.-China strategic competition. During a trip to the Philippines in 2022, she reiterated the United States’ “unwavering commitment” to defend the archipelago nation in the event of Chinese attacks in the South China Sea. She also struck a combative tone when speaking on the issue of China’s intellectual property violations and dumping during the 2019 primary campaign.
A Harris administration’s approach to China would likely maintain the Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” doctrine: upholding targeted sanctions, implementing friendshoring strategies in critical industries, maintaining continuity on Trump-era tariffs, and adopting a “tough on human rights issues” stance vis-à-vis Xinjiang. Given Harris’s record of championing human rights, she may be even tougher than Biden when it comes to Xinjiang and other related issues. The downside to this approach is that it makes it more difficult to address global issues that have traditionally required a working relationship with Beijing, namely climate change and the North Korea nuclear problem.
China is one area where there is little daylight between America First Republicans and internationalist Democrats, as both sides have tried to one-up each other in showing who can be tougher or more competitive against the Asian power. For his part, Trump has said that he would double down on the policies of his first-term trade war by increasing tariffs to 60-100% on all Chinese imports to the U.S. Trump has long been obsessed with the trade deficit and sought to gain an advantage for America through tariffs and trade war tactics (in practice, the tariffs have resulted in a bilateral reduction in the deficit with China but an increase in the deficit with other trading partners like Mexico and South Korea). Trump would also bring a hardline approach to China policy, but his focus would be more on the economic dimension of the great power competition.
When it comes to Taiwan, Biden has on multiple occasions broken with the official U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” by suggesting that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Given the hit that U.S. credibility took regarding its security commitments during the Trump presidency, what U.S. allies and partners in Asia really want is strategic clarity, not ambiguity. Taiwan will be watching closely to see what kinds of statements Harris and Trump make regarding a commitment to Taiwan’s defense, and whether the U.S. is indicating that it will militarily intervene or merely arm the island while sending warning signals to Beijing. Given Harris’s record of strengthening alliances with ASEAN and other Asian partners as VP, and her statements pledging to deepen “unofficial ties” with the island, a continuation of the Biden administration’s approach of supporting Taiwan and opposing unilateral actions to change the status quo would likely be on the horizon.
For his part, Trump made waves in Taipei last month after complaining that “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything” and suggesting that Taiwan compensate the U.S. for its defense (Taiwan spends millions of dollars on U.S.-made arms every year). Trump’s record on Taiwan was mixed during his first term—initially drawing praise from the Taiwanese after taking a call from President Tsai Ing-wen as president-elect, but later reverting to recognizing the “One China” policy while speaking to Chinese President Xi Jinping. Ultimately, the pro-Taiwan advisors in Trump’s orbit steered the administration toward more support for the island nation, and his administration approved major arms sales to Taiwan, including dozens of F-16 fighter jets. Given Trump’s recent statements on Taiwan and the influence of his advisors on previous decisions, it’s unclear whether a similarly supportive approach toward Taiwan would be undertaken in a second Trump presidency.
The China hawks who previously influenced Trump’s foreign policy, like John Bolton, have mostly left his orbit, and more isolationist figures elevated in a second term may enable Trump’s more transactional approach to the island. His insistence that Taiwan should “pay us for defense” underscores his view of the relationship as a business deal, suggesting that his support for Taiwan’s defense may depend on perceived economic gains for the U.S. rather than security or geopolitical considerations. Notably, he has repeatedly refused to commit to defending the island in the event of an attack from China. Additionally, some speculate that Trump could use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China on trade and high-tech competition, potentially scaling back support once he extracts concessions from Beijing. Whether Trump would defend Taiwan in a crisis remains unclear, with his decisions likely to be influenced by internal cabinet dynamics.
The war in Ukraine is an area where significant policy differences exist between the Biden-Harris administration and Trump. Since the start of the conflict, Biden has overseen the provision of tens of billions of dollars in military aid, including advanced weapons systems like HIMARS rocket launchers and Patriot air defense systems. His administration has also been instrumental in rallying NATO allies to support Ukraine and imposing wide-ranging sanctions on Russia. Assuming cooperation from Congress, a President Harris would likely be able to maintain this level of military and financial assistance to Kyiv. Harris, who has aligned herself with Biden’s foreign policy throughout their time in office, would likely focus on continuing to strengthen the international coalition supporting Ukraine while holding Russia accountable for war crimes and human rights violations.
The GOP, traditionally the more hawkish party on Russia and Vladimir Putin, is now divided over the extent of U.S. support for Ukraine going forward. Some in the conservative think tank sphere have argued that supplying Ukraine with military equipment dilutes U.S. warfighting capabilities and would make it harder for the U.S. to prevent China from taking Taiwan. Other more traditional Republican internationalist voices on the right have made the case for balancing both theaters and increasing military spending to restock depleted and thinly spread U.S. assets. Trump’s VP pick, JD Vance, has argued for European nations like Germany to support Ukraine on their own without U.S. assistance, and Trump himself has long been skeptical of funding for Ukraine.
In June, Trump threatened to cut U.S. aid to Ukraine if reelected, leading Kyiv’s allies to scramble to secure long-term funding amid the uncertainty the 2024 election poses for Ukraine’s ability to continue to ward off Russian assaults. Trump advisors also reportedly presented the former president with a plan that would have the U.S. withhold funding for Kyiv unless it enters peace talks with Russia. It is unlikely Kyiv would accept such a proposal, given that its position is that peace can only be sought when Russia withdraws from Ukrainian territory. Ukraine is also in a better position than it was a few months ago, having successfully captured territory in the Russian Kursk region—territory that, if held, could serve as a useful bargaining chip in future negotiations.
Whoever is sworn in on January 20th next year will face a changed and more volatile international landscape than the one that existed when Biden took office just three and a half years ago. The first hot war in Europe since World War II has exacerbated the bifurcation in the international system, where liberal democracies and authoritarian nations increasingly find themselves at odds on security and economic issues. Cooperation across these ideological divides—essential for addressing critical global challenges—has been harder to come by since Russia’s February 2022 invasion and amid intensified U.S.-China competition.
One such issue is North Korea, where progress toward denuclearization and any related diplomatic processes has traditionally required the participation of China, which keeps the Kim regime afloat by engaging in sanctions-skirting trade and providing aid. The war in Ukraine and the U.S.’s preoccupation with countering China in other areas have provided ideal cover for North Korea to hunker down and accelerate its weapons development and military modernization programs. Russia’s global pariah status has elevated North Korea’s importance to Putin (or rather lowered Putin’s status to that of the DPRK), and the two countries have deepened their cooperation since Russia’s winter 2022 invasion. North Korea is believed to have sent Russia nearly 5 million artillery shells as well as dozens of ballistic missiles to aid in its conflict with Kyiv. In exchange, the DPRK has received technology to help it deploy spy satellites, along with other conventional military vehicles like tanks and aircraft.
Biden’s policy approach to North Korea—telegraphing an openness to renewed dialogue with the DPRK with “no preconditions” while simultaneously focusing on pressure and sanctions—has failed to produce any positive results. The next administration would be well-positioned for a long-overdue course correction on this issue. Unfortunately, given the tendency for other more “pressing” geopolitical conundrums to overshadow the Korean Peninsula, a Harris administration would most likely continue Biden’s approach to Pyongyang, which is itself simply a copy-and-paste of Obama’s “strategic patience,” rather than take an active approach toward finding a diplomatic avenue forward.
Obama famously warned Trump about the urgency of the North Korean nuclear threat shortly after the 2016 election. This warning motivated Trump to take DPRK weapons development seriously, and he prioritized the issue as president despite it being a non-issue during his campaign. Trump deserves credit for breaking with the status quo of U.S. policy on North Korea and pursuing aggressive top-down diplomacy with the Kim regime in 2018 and 2019. But his strategy, too, ultimately failed. The summits in Hanoi and Singapore produced little in the way of substantive results, with the same vague promises of denuclearization that had been given by previous North Korean leaders.
Despite these diplomatic efforts, North Korea remained defiant, showcasing its largest ICBM ever, the Hwasong-17, in 2020 and continuing on a path of accelerated nuclear weapons development. Trump’s approach may have failed to achieve lasting results, but he could still pursue further diplomacy if he returns to the presidency. However, such a strategy could put him at odds with South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol, who favors a policy of containment and deterrence over engagement with Pyongyang. Yoon has strengthened South Korea’s alliance with the U.S., focusing on isolating North Korea diplomatically and economically unless there is tangible progress toward denuclearization.
A second Trump term might also see renewed tensions over the U.S. military presence in South Korea. During his first term, Trump demanded a significant increase in South Korea’s financial contribution to U.S. forces stationed there—a demand that could resurface and strain the alliance. Trump has also made nonchalant comments in support of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons (presumably to get the U.S. off the hook as a defense partner), a dangerous proposition that risks upending the NPT based international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Additionally, Trump’s more hawkish stance on China could widen the gap between U.S. and South Korean policies, particularly as South Korea attempts to balance its security ties with the U.S. against its economic relationship with China.
North Korea may see a potential Trump return as an opportunity to restart nuclear negotiations. According to high-ranking North Korean defector Ri Il Kyu, Pyongyang is preparing a strategy aimed at securing sanctions relief and economic aid if Trump is re-elected. North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, particularly in missile technology, and the further deterioration of U.S.-China relations have also reduced its need to pressure the U.S. to lift sanctions, potentially complicating future negotiations and weaking American leverage. Ultimately, while Trump might be inclined to pursue more diplomacy with North Korea, the challenges and dynamics in the region suggest that any new approach will face significant hurdles.
The 2024 U.S. presidential election is set to be a pivotal moment in determining the direction of American foreign policy. The race presents a stark contrast between Kamala Harris’s commitment to multilateralism and alliances—reflective of the Biden approach thus far—and Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, which prioritizes national interests and often takes a unilateral path.
Harris, building on Biden’s record, would likely continue to emphasize rebuilding and strengthening alliances, supporting global institutions, and addressing international challenges through cooperation. Her administration would maintain strong ties with NATO, push back against authoritarian regimes, and engage in multilateral efforts to counter universal threats like climate change and global pandemics. Harris’s potential foreign policy would be marked by strategic partnerships, particularly in Asia, and a sustained commitment to Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression.
On the other hand, Trump’s return to the presidency would likely bring a reassertion of the America First ideology that characterized his first term. His approach often involved withdrawing from international agreements, pressuring allies to bear more financial burdens, and prioritizing direct deals that served immediate U.S. interests. While this may resonate with voters seeking a focus on domestic concerns, it risks alienating allies and reducing America’s influence on the global stage. The long-term consequence of such a course would likely be an emboldened and more influential China and Russia, who would not hesitate to fill the void left by the U.S. Trump’s unpredictable stance on issues like Taiwan, Ukraine, and relations with North Korea and China could lead to significant shifts in global dynamics, especially if he follows through on his isolationist tendencies.
Ultimately, the election will determine whether the U.S. continues to engage with the world through the lens of shared responsibilities and global leadership for the rules based liberal international order, or pivots toward a more insular, transactional approach. The implications of this choice will be far-reaching, affecting not only American foreign policy but also the broader international order for potentially decades to come.
In November, U.S. voters will choose between resurrecting the “America First” doctrine or maintaining a foreign policy based on alliances and multilateralism.
The events of the past two months have seen the 2024 United States presidential race entirely upended. After President Joe Biden’s disastrous debate performance in late June and the failed assassination attempt on former President Trump at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, in early July, the overwhelming sentiment reflected in many pundit forecasts and betting markets was that Trump’s victory had been all but sealed. Biden crawled from the rubble of the June debate looking like he wasn’t fit to govern for the next few months, let alone the next four years; Trump emerged from the failed assassination attempt looking downright heroic.
That has all changed seemingly overnight now that Biden has dropped his bid for re-election and Kamala Harris has ascended to the top of the 2024 Democratic ticket. What was once looking to be a Trump-led Republican landslide in the making has shaped up to be a highly competitive race, with Kamala quickly closing the polling gap with Trump in key battleground states and entirely overtaking him in others. Now, Kamala is ahead in the key battlegrounds of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin in the latest polling. As the race currently stands, Trump and Harris remain in a close contest, but Harris’s success in erasing Trump’s polling lead and overcoming his fundraising advantage is a remarkable achievement.
While the Democratic candidate and the trend of the race may have changed in dramatic fashion, the fundamental choice Americans face in this election in terms of policy remains essentially the same. This is especially true in the realm of foreign policy. Harris differs slightly from Biden on some issues, but the overall posture and vision for the U.S. role in the world that Harris stands by will likely follow the same course set by Biden. It is markedly at odds with Trump’s vision for U.S. foreign policy.
Until 2015, there was broad bipartisan consensus between Republicans and Democrats on the U.S.’s role in global affairs, particularly in upholding the post-World War II liberal international order through multilateralism, institutions, and military/economic alliances. Of course, this consensus did not preclude debate on specific foreign policy issues. For instance, Democrats and Republicans often clashed over trade agreements, military interventions, and the degree of emphasis on human rights in foreign policy. These debates, though significant, did not fundamentally challenge the shared belief in U.S. global leadership. This changed with the emergence of Trump and his America First doctrine, which shifted the Republican Party toward a more unilateral, nationalistic approach.
During his first term, Trump viewed international relationships in myopic financial and transactional terms, often hyper-focusing on the cost to the United States of various security arrangements and paying seemingly little attention to the strategic value of America’s long-standing alliances. He also shocked allies and partners by repeatedly praising autocratic rulers such as Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin.
In polling, Republican support for an active global role for the U.S. was recorded as lower than that of Democrats for the first time in 2016, and the disparity has grown since then. Demonstrative of this shift solidifying over time is survey data from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs which shows that for the first time in nearly five decades of polling on this topic, a majority of Republicans in 2023 preferred that the U.S. stay out of world affairs. Notably, the data also revealed that Trump Republicans are “much more negative” than other non-Trump Republicans about the U.S. role in the world, the U.S. alliance system with Europe, and defending allies in general.
The world has lived through the ramifications of four years of Trump at the reins of U.S. foreign policy and nearly four with Biden at the helm. Given the highly divergent governing styles and worldviews that each president represents, along with the track records of their respective administrations, what are the implications of four more years of Bidenesque foreign policy under Harris versus that of America First 2.0 under Trump? This article aims to explore how the 2024 election will shape outcomes in terms of U.S. leadership in the world, particularly concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict, the U.S.-China strategic competition, the Taiwan Strait, the Russo-Ukrainian war, and North Korea.
Over the past four years, Biden has had to deal with a number of thorny international issues. He oversaw the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021; early 2022 saw Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the U.S. has since been Ukraine’s primary arms and ammunition supplier; and on October 7th, 2023, Hamas launched a major incursion into Israeli territory, leading to a massive U.S.-backed retaliation from Israel and a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
No doubt one of the weakest points of Biden’s foreign policy track record is the withdrawal from Afghanistan from July to September 2021, a highly chaotic operation that left 13 American service members killed in action, stranded U.S. citizens and Afghan allies, and left behind $7 billion of military equipment. Both Trump and Biden were bent on ending “America’s longest war,” and the Trump administration set in motion the withdrawal from Afghanistan through a withdrawal agreement it negotiated with the Taliban in February 2020. Under Trump, the U.S. reduced troop levels from 13,000 to 2,500, even amid continued attacks by the Taliban on Afghan forces.
Although Biden simply followed through on the withdrawal plans set out by Trump, his administration’s decision to execute the withdrawal on a timeline only slightly delayed from the original—despite the Taliban’s noncompliance with the agreement and U.S. intelligence assessments that the Afghan government would likely collapse—proved to be disastrous. While working to end the 20-year failed exercise in militarized nation-building may have been the right move in the long run, the logistical failures and the sense that America was abandoning Afghan translators and supporters on the ground could nonetheless prove to be an indelible stain on U.S. credibility and Biden’s legacy.
On the other hand, Biden will no doubt get a lot of credit for bringing back a more traditional internationalist approach to U.S. foreign policy after four years of Trump’s unconventional and recalcitrant posture. Under the Biden administration, the U.S. rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement, led a massive effort to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression following its invasion, and ushered in a new era of multilateralism in Asia to counter China via AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation. The U.S.-South Korea alliance also received a major upgrade under Biden via the Washington Declaration, a joint statement that announced the creation of a Nuclear Consultative Group and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence against the North Korean nuclear threat. U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere have welcomed a more amicable Washington that is committed to collective defense under NATO Article 5 and that stands strongly against challenges to the liberal international order.
Given that Biden and Harris have thus far presented themselves as being in virtual lockstep on foreign policy, Harris will no doubt have to fend off attacks tying her to Biden’s missteps. However, unlike an incumbent, she may have more of an opportunity to chart a new course and distinguish herself from her current boss on some issues. One potential area for distinction was thought to be the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has caused growing frustration among younger and progressive voters in particular.
Harris has not yet outlined a detailed policy plan on the issue, but she has called for a ceasefire and expressed more concern over the humanitarian crisis than Biden has, reportedly urging the White House to be more sympathetic toward Palestinians. Even so, her national security advisor has stated that she does not support an arms embargo on Israel, signaling that significant policy shifts may be unlikely. Harris’s record also suggests continuity with mainstream Democratic support for Israel, as she consistently backed military aid during her time in the Senate. Protesters have repeatedly interrupted Harris’s speeches at campaign events in recent weeks, underscoring the challenges she will face in balancing pressure from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and the longstanding U.S. foreign policy stance to which the general electorate is more sympathetic. Harris would also clash with Netanyahu on the issue of Iran, given her previous stance of supporting a return to the JCPOA, the deal that previously halted Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for unfreezing Iranian assets and which Trump abandoned during his first term.
A second Trump administration would also be solidly pro-Israel, but Trump’s recent statements have been mixed (calling on Israel to “finish up your war”), and he has yet to offer any specific steps he would take to bring about peace in the region. When interviewers or commentators press Trump on his plans to address the conflict, he falls back on his typical refrain that “only he” can solve the conflict and that the war wouldn’t have happened in the first place if he had been in office (a baseless claim he also repeats with regard to the war in Ukraine). Trump has shown no compassion for Palestinians, and he has pledged to cut off all U.S. aid to Palestine should he win back the White House (he previously cut more than $20 million in aid during his first term). Other policies during his first term were also unabashedly pro-Israel, from relocating the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem to withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. A second Trump term would likely see a return to this style of policy, with an emphasis on backing Netanyahu’s right-wing nationalist plans for the region.
A hypothetical Harris administration would also be unlikely to diverge significantly from Biden on China policy. As Vice President, Harris has been tasked with traveling throughout Southeast Asia to shore up support from Indo-Pacific allies amid the U.S.-China strategic competition. During a trip to the Philippines in 2022, she reiterated the United States’ “unwavering commitment” to defend the archipelago nation in the event of Chinese attacks in the South China Sea. She also struck a combative tone when speaking on the issue of China’s intellectual property violations and dumping during the 2019 primary campaign.
A Harris administration’s approach to China would likely maintain the Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” doctrine: upholding targeted sanctions, implementing friendshoring strategies in critical industries, maintaining continuity on Trump-era tariffs, and adopting a “tough on human rights issues” stance vis-à-vis Xinjiang. Given Harris’s record of championing human rights, she may be even tougher than Biden when it comes to Xinjiang and other related issues. The downside to this approach is that it makes it more difficult to address global issues that have traditionally required a working relationship with Beijing, namely climate change and the North Korea nuclear problem.
China is one area where there is little daylight between America First Republicans and internationalist Democrats, as both sides have tried to one-up each other in showing who can be tougher or more competitive against the Asian power. For his part, Trump has said that he would double down on the policies of his first-term trade war by increasing tariffs to 60-100% on all Chinese imports to the U.S. Trump has long been obsessed with the trade deficit and sought to gain an advantage for America through tariffs and trade war tactics (in practice, the tariffs have resulted in a bilateral reduction in the deficit with China but an increase in the deficit with other trading partners like Mexico and South Korea). Trump would also bring a hardline approach to China policy, but his focus would be more on the economic dimension of the great power competition.
When it comes to Taiwan, Biden has on multiple occasions broken with the official U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” by suggesting that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Given the hit that U.S. credibility took regarding its security commitments during the Trump presidency, what U.S. allies and partners in Asia really want is strategic clarity, not ambiguity. Taiwan will be watching closely to see what kinds of statements Harris and Trump make regarding a commitment to Taiwan’s defense, and whether the U.S. is indicating that it will militarily intervene or merely arm the island while sending warning signals to Beijing. Given Harris’s record of strengthening alliances with ASEAN and other Asian partners as VP, and her statements pledging to deepen “unofficial ties” with the island, a continuation of the Biden administration’s approach of supporting Taiwan and opposing unilateral actions to change the status quo would likely be on the horizon.
For his part, Trump made waves in Taipei last month after complaining that “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything” and suggesting that Taiwan compensate the U.S. for its defense (Taiwan spends millions of dollars on U.S.-made arms every year). Trump’s record on Taiwan was mixed during his first term—initially drawing praise from the Taiwanese after taking a call from President Tsai Ing-wen as president-elect, but later reverting to recognizing the “One China” policy while speaking to Chinese President Xi Jinping. Ultimately, the pro-Taiwan advisors in Trump’s orbit steered the administration toward more support for the island nation, and his administration approved major arms sales to Taiwan, including dozens of F-16 fighter jets. Given Trump’s recent statements on Taiwan and the influence of his advisors on previous decisions, it’s unclear whether a similarly supportive approach toward Taiwan would be undertaken in a second Trump presidency.
The China hawks who previously influenced Trump’s foreign policy, like John Bolton, have mostly left his orbit, and more isolationist figures elevated in a second term may enable Trump’s more transactional approach to the island. His insistence that Taiwan should “pay us for defense” underscores his view of the relationship as a business deal, suggesting that his support for Taiwan’s defense may depend on perceived economic gains for the U.S. rather than security or geopolitical considerations. Notably, he has repeatedly refused to commit to defending the island in the event of an attack from China. Additionally, some speculate that Trump could use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China on trade and high-tech competition, potentially scaling back support once he extracts concessions from Beijing. Whether Trump would defend Taiwan in a crisis remains unclear, with his decisions likely to be influenced by internal cabinet dynamics.
The war in Ukraine is an area where significant policy differences exist between the Biden-Harris administration and Trump. Since the start of the conflict, Biden has overseen the provision of tens of billions of dollars in military aid, including advanced weapons systems like HIMARS rocket launchers and Patriot air defense systems. His administration has also been instrumental in rallying NATO allies to support Ukraine and imposing wide-ranging sanctions on Russia. Assuming cooperation from Congress, a President Harris would likely be able to maintain this level of military and financial assistance to Kyiv. Harris, who has aligned herself with Biden’s foreign policy throughout their time in office, would likely focus on continuing to strengthen the international coalition supporting Ukraine while holding Russia accountable for war crimes and human rights violations.
The GOP, traditionally the more hawkish party on Russia and Vladimir Putin, is now divided over the extent of U.S. support for Ukraine going forward. Some in the conservative think tank sphere have argued that supplying Ukraine with military equipment dilutes U.S. warfighting capabilities and would make it harder for the U.S. to prevent China from taking Taiwan. Other more traditional Republican internationalist voices on the right have made the case for balancing both theaters and increasing military spending to restock depleted and thinly spread U.S. assets. Trump’s VP pick, JD Vance, has argued for European nations like Germany to support Ukraine on their own without U.S. assistance, and Trump himself has long been skeptical of funding for Ukraine.
In June, Trump threatened to cut U.S. aid to Ukraine if reelected, leading Kyiv’s allies to scramble to secure long-term funding amid the uncertainty the 2024 election poses for Ukraine’s ability to continue to ward off Russian assaults. Trump advisors also reportedly presented the former president with a plan that would have the U.S. withhold funding for Kyiv unless it enters peace talks with Russia. It is unlikely Kyiv would accept such a proposal, given that its position is that peace can only be sought when Russia withdraws from Ukrainian territory. Ukraine is also in a better position than it was a few months ago, having successfully captured territory in the Russian Kursk region—territory that, if held, could serve as a useful bargaining chip in future negotiations.
Whoever is sworn in on January 20th next year will face a changed and more volatile international landscape than the one that existed when Biden took office just three and a half years ago. The first hot war in Europe since World War II has exacerbated the bifurcation in the international system, where liberal democracies and authoritarian nations increasingly find themselves at odds on security and economic issues. Cooperation across these ideological divides—essential for addressing critical global challenges—has been harder to come by since Russia’s February 2022 invasion and amid intensified U.S.-China competition.
One such issue is North Korea, where progress toward denuclearization and any related diplomatic processes has traditionally required the participation of China, which keeps the Kim regime afloat by engaging in sanctions-skirting trade and providing aid. The war in Ukraine and the U.S.’s preoccupation with countering China in other areas have provided ideal cover for North Korea to hunker down and accelerate its weapons development and military modernization programs. Russia’s global pariah status has elevated North Korea’s importance to Putin (or rather lowered Putin’s status to that of the DPRK), and the two countries have deepened their cooperation since Russia’s winter 2022 invasion. North Korea is believed to have sent Russia nearly 5 million artillery shells as well as dozens of ballistic missiles to aid in its conflict with Kyiv. In exchange, the DPRK has received technology to help it deploy spy satellites, along with other conventional military vehicles like tanks and aircraft.
Biden’s policy approach to North Korea—telegraphing an openness to renewed dialogue with the DPRK with “no preconditions” while simultaneously focusing on pressure and sanctions—has failed to produce any positive results. The next administration would be well-positioned for a long-overdue course correction on this issue. Unfortunately, given the tendency for other more “pressing” geopolitical conundrums to overshadow the Korean Peninsula, a Harris administration would most likely continue Biden’s approach to Pyongyang, which is itself simply a copy-and-paste of Obama’s “strategic patience,” rather than take an active approach toward finding a diplomatic avenue forward.
Obama famously warned Trump about the urgency of the North Korean nuclear threat shortly after the 2016 election. This warning motivated Trump to take DPRK weapons development seriously, and he prioritized the issue as president despite it being a non-issue during his campaign. Trump deserves credit for breaking with the status quo of U.S. policy on North Korea and pursuing aggressive top-down diplomacy with the Kim regime in 2018 and 2019. But his strategy, too, ultimately failed. The summits in Hanoi and Singapore produced little in the way of substantive results, with the same vague promises of denuclearization that had been given by previous North Korean leaders.
Despite these diplomatic efforts, North Korea remained defiant, showcasing its largest ICBM ever, the Hwasong-17, in 2020 and continuing on a path of accelerated nuclear weapons development. Trump’s approach may have failed to achieve lasting results, but he could still pursue further diplomacy if he returns to the presidency. However, such a strategy could put him at odds with South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol, who favors a policy of containment and deterrence over engagement with Pyongyang. Yoon has strengthened South Korea’s alliance with the U.S., focusing on isolating North Korea diplomatically and economically unless there is tangible progress toward denuclearization.
A second Trump term might also see renewed tensions over the U.S. military presence in South Korea. During his first term, Trump demanded a significant increase in South Korea’s financial contribution to U.S. forces stationed there—a demand that could resurface and strain the alliance. Trump has also made nonchalant comments in support of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons (presumably to get the U.S. off the hook as a defense partner), a dangerous proposition that risks upending the NPT based international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Additionally, Trump’s more hawkish stance on China could widen the gap between U.S. and South Korean policies, particularly as South Korea attempts to balance its security ties with the U.S. against its economic relationship with China.
North Korea may see a potential Trump return as an opportunity to restart nuclear negotiations. According to high-ranking North Korean defector Ri Il Kyu, Pyongyang is preparing a strategy aimed at securing sanctions relief and economic aid if Trump is re-elected. North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, particularly in missile technology, and the further deterioration of U.S.-China relations have also reduced its need to pressure the U.S. to lift sanctions, potentially complicating future negotiations and weaking American leverage. Ultimately, while Trump might be inclined to pursue more diplomacy with North Korea, the challenges and dynamics in the region suggest that any new approach will face significant hurdles.
The 2024 U.S. presidential election is set to be a pivotal moment in determining the direction of American foreign policy. The race presents a stark contrast between Kamala Harris’s commitment to multilateralism and alliances—reflective of the Biden approach thus far—and Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, which prioritizes national interests and often takes a unilateral path.
Harris, building on Biden’s record, would likely continue to emphasize rebuilding and strengthening alliances, supporting global institutions, and addressing international challenges through cooperation. Her administration would maintain strong ties with NATO, push back against authoritarian regimes, and engage in multilateral efforts to counter universal threats like climate change and global pandemics. Harris’s potential foreign policy would be marked by strategic partnerships, particularly in Asia, and a sustained commitment to Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression.
On the other hand, Trump’s return to the presidency would likely bring a reassertion of the America First ideology that characterized his first term. His approach often involved withdrawing from international agreements, pressuring allies to bear more financial burdens, and prioritizing direct deals that served immediate U.S. interests. While this may resonate with voters seeking a focus on domestic concerns, it risks alienating allies and reducing America’s influence on the global stage. The long-term consequence of such a course would likely be an emboldened and more influential China and Russia, who would not hesitate to fill the void left by the U.S. Trump’s unpredictable stance on issues like Taiwan, Ukraine, and relations with North Korea and China could lead to significant shifts in global dynamics, especially if he follows through on his isolationist tendencies.
Ultimately, the election will determine whether the U.S. continues to engage with the world through the lens of shared responsibilities and global leadership for the rules based liberal international order, or pivots toward a more insular, transactional approach. The implications of this choice will be far-reaching, affecting not only American foreign policy but also the broader international order for potentially decades to come.
Chris Gowe is a MA candidate at the Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies. His research interests include the U.S. ROK Alliance and security, nuclear proliferation issues pertaining to North Korea and the greater Northeast Asian region.
