This illustration has been created by AI to use only in this article.
The unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia has changed the European Union’s foreign policies in many ways. The invasion came as a shock to many Europeans, as war on European soil had seemed unimaginable. The outcome was that it reshaped European foreign policy — from arms supplies to full-scale sanctions— policies that were previously unimaginable in 2014.
Prior to the war in Ukraine, the European Union had several gaps in its foreign policy. During the crisis in Crimea and Donbas in 2014, EU countries refused to supply arms to Ukraine, instead relying on limited sanctions and negotiations with Russia. The lack of arms meant that Ukraine was unable to ramp up its defenses prior to the 2022 invasion due to insufficient deterrence, which Russia saw as an opportunity to launch an invasion. Due to a lack of deterrence, Russia saw few costs in escalating its aggression in Ukraine, as the EU’s diplomatic approach failed to pressure Putin, who, like many authoritarian leaders, only responds to strength.
The limited and targeted sanctions during the Crimea and Donbas invasions were also designed to have limited effects on European exports, which in turn meant the pressure put on Russia was insufficient. By prioritizing its commercial interests, the EU overlooked geopolitical threats, allowing Russia to continue its invasion of Crimea and Donbas while maintaining semi-normal trade relations with the EU due to the sanctions being targeted and symbolic rather than impactful. By allowing Russia to have escalation dominance in Ukraine, the EU effectively signaled to Russia that it did not see Ukraine as a vital interest and would not take action to prevent Russian coercion.
The soft-touch approach to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and Donbas also led to an increased reliance on Russian gas, as the government of Angela Merkel in Germany supported the building of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. As a result, the EU failed to diversify its energy sources prior to the invasion and was left scrambling for new energy sources after imposing sanctions on Russia. The lack of a domestic energy supply chain and domestic investments was a key foreign policy shortcoming, as it meant the EU lacked energy security and therefore had to rely on authoritarian states that are hostile to the liberal international order that the EU upholds.
The unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia has changed the European Union’s foreign policies in many ways. The invasion came as a shock to many Europeans, as war on European soil had seemed unimaginable. The outcome was that it reshaped European foreign policy — from arms supplies to full-scale sanctions— policies that were previously unimaginable in 2014.
Prior to the war in Ukraine, the European Union had several gaps in its foreign policy. During the crisis in Crimea and Donbas in 2014, EU countries refused to supply arms to Ukraine, instead relying on limited sanctions and negotiations with Russia. The lack of arms meant that Ukraine was unable to ramp up its defenses prior to the 2022 invasion due to insufficient deterrence, which Russia saw as an opportunity to launch an invasion. Due to a lack of deterrence, Russia saw few costs in escalating its aggression in Ukraine, as the EU’s diplomatic approach failed to pressure Putin, who, like many authoritarian leaders, only responds to strength.
The limited and targeted sanctions during the Crimea and Donbas invasions were also designed to have limited effects on European exports, which in turn meant the pressure put on Russia was insufficient. By prioritizing its commercial interests, the EU overlooked geopolitical threats, allowing Russia to continue its invasion of Crimea and Donbas while maintaining semi-normal trade relations with the EU due to the sanctions being targeted and symbolic rather than impactful. By allowing Russia to have escalation dominance in Ukraine, the EU effectively signaled to Russia that it did not see Ukraine as a vital interest and would not take action to prevent Russian coercion.
The soft-touch approach to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and Donbas also led to an increased reliance on Russian gas, as the government of Angela Merkel in Germany supported the building of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. As a result, the EU failed to diversify its energy sources prior to the invasion and was left scrambling for new energy sources after imposing sanctions on Russia. The lack of a domestic energy supply chain and domestic investments was a key foreign policy shortcoming, as it meant the EU lacked energy security and therefore had to rely on authoritarian states that are hostile to the liberal international order that the EU upholds.
The evolving Sino-Russian relationship is shaped by a blend of strategic cooperation and cautious diplomacy. Historic tensions and modern geopolitical challenges, such as the Ukraine conflict and Taiwan issue, compel both nations to navigate a complex landscape of mutual economic reliance and guarded foreign policies.
In the race for Global South leadership, India’s ambitions and China’s strategies clash, unraveling a tapestry of power, promise, and profound contradictions.
Putin faces triple threats: re-election, a deadly terrorist attack, and mounting opposition at home, testing his regime’s survival amidst international pressures.
The absence of strategic autonomy is also evident in the EU’s reliance on the U.S. for defense, leading to a lack of strategic autonomy. Prior to the war in Ukraine, defense spending in many EU countries, such as Germany, was quite low, meaning that the EU relied on arms imports from the U.S. to maintain its military strength. This left the EU vulnerable to political shifts in the U.S., notably the rise of Donald Trump, as reliance on the U.S. threatens the EU’s security due to its dependence, which could, in turn, be exploited by an administration in the U.S. that is potentially hostile to the EU. As the future of NATO is now under threat, EU member states should form a European army, which would become the EU’s answer to NATO, in order to establish a reliable forum for security where the EU could operate autonomously.
As a result of the invasion of Ukraine, many EU countries and the European Union itself drastically increased defense spending, as the war on European soil was, in many ways, a wake-up call for countries to take security matters into their own hands. In 2022, Germany, which had been criticized for its low defense spending, approved a fund of €100 billion for the Bundeswehr, intended to provide a range of new equipment, including air defense, cyber defense, and various weapons, ammunition, and drones. This is an important part of the EU’s shift in defense strategy, as the less-committal stance from the U.S. in aiding Ukraine showed European countries that matters of European defense require strategic autonomy and self-reliance, rather than dependence on an alliance with the U.S.. In addition, to make the EU’s strategy on Ukraine less dependent on the U.S., the European Peace Facility was formed to aid Ukraine, with €6.1 billion being transferred to Ukraine between 2022 and 2024 to address the beleaguered nation’s defense needs.
This is an important step for European strategic autonomy, as it enables the EU to reduce its risk exposure to potentially isolationist currents in the U.S.. With the return of Trump to the U.S. presidency, initiatives such as the European Peace Facility are now critical to the EU’s security, as Trump’s isolationist views pose significant geopolitical risks to the EU, and EU-level initiatives allow the EU to distance itself from a potentially unfriendly administration in the U.S.. As a result of Trump’s more isolationist policies, the EU has a budget plan to drastically increase defense spending by around €840 million to boost European security. Such actions strengthen European strategic autonomy, as they allow the EU to gain security guarantees from within its own borders.
Unlike the 2014 Ukraine crisis, when European countries continued to import Russian gas, the war in Ukraine saw a great reduction in reliance on Russian gas. After sanctions were imposed, imports of pipeline gas from Russia diminished drastically, while volumes of LNG imports from reliable partners like the U.S. (until Trump) or Norway have been increasing. The importance of such policy shifts is that by reducing reliance on Russian gas, the EU gains more leeway for assertive and confrontational policies to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty. This also reduces the leverage that Russia has over the EU, as Moscow has historically used gas as a bargaining chip in geopolitics. The Net Zero Industry Act was also passed in response to the Inflation Reduction Act being passed in the U.S., aiming to build a European-based supply chain and reduce reliance on imports, thereby weakening the leverage that other countries have over the EU. The Net Zero Industry Act mandates that the EU must produce at least 40% of its annual deployment needs for key clean technologies like solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, heat pumps, and hydrogen electrolyzers by 2030.
The absence of strategic autonomy is also evident in the EU’s reliance on the U.S. for defense, leading to a lack of strategic autonomy. Prior to the war in Ukraine, defense spending in many EU countries, such as Germany, was quite low, meaning that the EU relied on arms imports from the U.S. to maintain its military strength. This left the EU vulnerable to political shifts in the U.S., notably the rise of Donald Trump, as reliance on the U.S. threatens the EU’s security due to its dependence, which could, in turn, be exploited by an administration in the U.S. that is potentially hostile to the EU. As the future of NATO is now under threat, EU member states should form a European army, which would become the EU’s answer to NATO, in order to establish a reliable forum for security where the EU could operate autonomously.
Europe’s Next Step
As a result of the invasion of Ukraine, many EU countries and the European Union itself drastically increased defense spending, as the war on European soil was, in many ways, a wake-up call for countries to take security matters into their own hands. In 2022, Germany, which had been criticized for its low defense spending, approved a fund of €100 billion for the Bundeswehr, intended to provide a range of new equipment, including air defense, cyber defense, and various weapons, ammunition, and drones. This is an important part of the EU’s shift in defense strategy, as the less-committal stance from the U.S. in aiding Ukraine showed European countries that matters of European defense require strategic autonomy and self-reliance, rather than dependence on an alliance with the U.S.. In addition, to make the EU’s strategy on Ukraine less dependent on the U.S., the European Peace Facility was formed to aid Ukraine, with €6.1 billion being transferred to Ukraine between 2022 and 2024 to address the beleaguered nation’s defense needs.
This is an important step for European strategic autonomy, as it enables the EU to reduce its risk exposure to potentially isolationist currents in the U.S.. With the return of Trump to the U.S. presidency, initiatives such as the European Peace Facility are now critical to the EU’s security, as Trump’s isolationist views pose significant geopolitical risks to the EU, and EU-level initiatives allow the EU to distance itself from a potentially unfriendly administration in the U.S.. As a result of Trump’s more isolationist policies, the EU has a budget plan to drastically increase defense spending by around €840 million to boost European security. Such actions strengthen European strategic autonomy, as they allow the EU to gain security guarantees from within its own borders.
Unlike the 2014 Ukraine crisis, when European countries continued to import Russian gas, the war in Ukraine saw a great reduction in reliance on Russian gas. After sanctions were imposed, imports of pipeline gas from Russia diminished drastically, while volumes of LNG imports from reliable partners like the U.S. (until Trump) or Norway have been increasing. The importance of such policy shifts is that by reducing reliance on Russian gas, the EU gains more leeway for assertive and confrontational policies to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty. This also reduces the leverage that Russia has over the EU, as Moscow has historically used gas as a bargaining chip in geopolitics. The Net Zero Industry Act was also passed in response to the Inflation Reduction Act being passed in the U.S., aiming to build a European-based supply chain and reduce reliance on imports, thereby weakening the leverage that other countries have over the EU. The Net Zero Industry Act mandates that the EU must produce at least 40% of its annual deployment needs for key clean technologies like solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, heat pumps, and hydrogen electrolyzers by 2030.
This will reduce the need to import materials from countries like the U.S. and China, which helps the EU’s strategic autonomy ambitions, as it makes the Union less beholden to foreign powers, removing their political leverage over the European Union. This will help the EU pursue more autonomous foreign policies independent of the U.S., as self-reliance means there is less need to concede to other countries on foreign policy, making them less able and therefore less likely to put the EU’s supply chain at risk. Having a domestic energy supply chain also prevents other countries from manipulating the EU’s politics by using energy as leverage. The Net Zero Industry Act also assists in reducing oil imports. This allows the EU to pursue a more assertive policy, as oil-producing states are often authoritarian states like Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical and ideological positions do not align with the EU and which has cut oil production to increase prices as a tool of leverage. Therefore, the Net Zero Industry Act will remove the ability of countries like Saudi Arabia to exercise political influence within the EU and will provide energy security that is independent of authoritarian states.
Europe’s Fight for Ukraine
One notable shift in the European Union’s strategy after the Ukraine war is the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Russia. During the Crimea and Donbas crisis, the EU, especially Germany, relied on a mixture of sanctions and diplomacy, hoping to contain the conflict through diplomatic means. This failed, as it gave Russia escalation superiority and sent the message that it could get away with further escalation, as the EU did not consider Ukraine a vital interest. This set the stage for the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as the weakness of responses unintentionally signaled to Russia that it could escalate the conflict further without concerns about a strategic backlash leading to its defeat.
Therefore, the sanctions imposed on Russia marked a departure from allowing Russian escalation superiority through de facto appeasement, as such sanctions attempted to pressure Russia by imposing negative impacts on its economy rather than serving simply as a negotiation tool. In addition, it allowed the EU to move away from Russian gas, which many countries, namely Germany, still imported. The sanctions against Russia, the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, and the invasion of Crimea in general were considered weak and allowed Russia to commit its actions with impunity, as they put insufficient pressure on Moscow, ultimately leading to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Therefore, sanctions marked a departure from the non-confrontational foreign policy of the 2010s, in which the EU tried to use a mixture of limited sanctions and diplomacy. Such new attempts aim to ramp up pressure on Russia to abandon its invasion of Ukraine and return the occupied territories.
This affirms the shift in the EU’s strategy towards a more active promotion of liberal values, as the sanctions were aimed at achieving a favorable political outcome for the liberal international order outside the borders of the traditional West and its longstanding allies, thereby shifting its interests from protecting the geopolitical status quo to actively defending the liberal order in regions and countries where its values are threatened. Unlike its approach to the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the EU now follows a policy of sending military aid to Ukraine and even providing security guarantees in the absence of the U.S., whose foreign policy has shifted to an isolationist stance under Trump.
Sanctions marked a departure from the non-confrontational foreign policy of the 2010s, in which the EU tried to use a mixture of limited sanctions and diplomacy.
In 2022, most Western European countries sent military aid to Ukraine to assist the threatened democracy in its defense against the Russian invasion. This means the EU shifted its strategy from containing the conflict, as it did in Donbas and Crimea, to attempting to prevent Russia from reshaping the international order through more active means. The military aid provided to Ukraine has largely been effective in preventing Russia from imposing its political and geopolitical will on Ukraine. In October 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged €1.4 billion in military aid to Ukraine, aimed at ensuring continuity in aid given the uncertainties surrounding the U.S. election.
This highlights the EU’s shift to a more assertive strategy on Ukraine, as the aid serves as a security guarantee for Ukraine in times of geopolitical uncertainty and enhances the Ukrainian military’s ability to at least maintain the status quo on the battlefield against Russia.This also underscores the European Union’s commitment to defending the liberal order, as the increase in military aid is a clear repudiation of Russia’s attempts to shape the world based on spheres of influence rather than self-determination. Even in Germany, which has historically been averse to arms shipments to conflict zones, the country has become the second-largest supplier of arms to Ukraine, second only to the U.S. before Trump’s return to the presidency.This highlights a shift in the EU’s strategy from viewing Ukraine as a peripheral issue to one of strategic and ideological importance, as its approach now focuses on countering authoritarian aggression and defending threatened democracies.
After Trump’s return to power and a rapid shift in U.S. foreign policy away from arming Ukraine, the EU has sped up military aid for Ukraine and increased the amount of assistance, as protecting the liberal international order is an important part of the EU’s global strategy. The EU has accelerated military aid to Ukraine to replace the U.S. aid that was cut off by Trump. This highlights upholding the liberal international order as an integral component of the EU’s global strategy, as such moves aim to prevent illiberal actors from influencing the order through illegitimate means. The importance of such strategic policies toward the liberal international order is that EU-supplied arms will enable Ukraine to resist being forced by Trump and Putin into a deal against its consent, which would be a severe violation of the liberal international order, where states’ self-determination is paramount.
The EU’s strategy, therefore, has shifted away from maintaining the balance of power to actively pushing back against authoritarian aggression, as the war in Ukraine demonstrated that if Ukraine fell, many EU member states would be under threat from Russia, and it would provide a blueprint for other authoritarian countries to reshape the order through illegitimate means. Moreover, the EU, in doing this, is supporting Ukraine’s self-determination and Western aspirations, as the arms supplied serve as a bulwark against the rise of increasingly populist leaders across the world and will strengthen or at least maintain Ukraine’s ability to avoid defeat.
In addition, the plan to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, should a ceasefire deal be agreed upon as a security guarantee, also serves to defend Ukraine’s self-determination, as it would allow Ukraine to remain a free and independent state while preventing Russia from asserting political and military dominance over Ukraine. Furthermore, this highlights a shift in the EU’s strategy from treating Ukraine as a peripheral issue to one central to European security, as the EU is aware of the threats that Russia poses, especially to EU members that border Russia, if Ukraine is defeated. In addition, the pledges of arms and peacekeepers to Ukraine amount to upholding the liberal international order, as they reject changes to borders and countries’ internal policies through external coercion and illegitimate means.
EU vs. Authoritarianism
While the EU has historically viewed China primarily in terms of commercial and economic interests, the invasion of Ukraine, including China’s response, has led many EU countries—at least on paper—to adopt a more assertive stance on China. Prior to the Ukraine crisis, the EU had an approach of strategic ambiguity toward China, in which they were not aligned but, as Merkel stated, would try to avoid Cold War-style blocs in geopolitics. The prioritization of commercial interests led the EU to become dependent on China for raw materials and left its China strategy unclear. However, since the invasion of Ukraine is seen as a matter of democracy vs. authoritarianism, the EU views a potential conflict between China and Taiwan through a similar lens, with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stating that the EU’s aim is to deter China from invading Taiwan.
This highlights a shift from a foreign policy based on commercial interests to one more focused on the battle between democracy and authoritarianism, as the EU views Taiwan as a democracy while seeing China as a hostile authoritarian state. This entails the return of liberal democratic ideology to the central role of European foreign policy, as it sees authoritarianism and authoritarian states’ efforts to reshape the world order through coercive or illiberal means—which violate the self-determination of other states—as a threat to the liberal international order, which is central to a free and just world. Due to the Ukraine war, the EU now sees Taiwan and Ukraine as part of the same battle and has therefore strengthened ties with Taiwan to further support democracies and uphold the sovereignty and self-determination of democratic societies.
The EU’s increasingly vocal support for Taiwan was evident when French President Emmanuel Macron stated in 2023 that the EU should not choose between the U.S. and China over Taiwan and that Europe should “steer clear of crises that are not ours.” European politicians were quick to clarify that Macron did not speak for the EU and that the EU supports the Cross-Strait status quo and opposes any attempts by China to change it by force. The backlash against Macron reflects the EU’s commitment to defending and strengthening democracy, as Macron attempted to undermine the EU’s liberal internationalist policy by aligning with autocrats and faced criticism for comments that were perceived as an embrace of great power realism. The responses of many EU leaders, including Germany, point to the EU’s commitment to preventing authoritarian aggression, as it views Taiwan as an important democracy and a bulwark against Chinese authoritarianism.
The EU’s strategy has shifted away from maintaining the balance of power to actively pushing back against authoritarian aggression.
This will reduce the need to import materials from countries like the U.S. and China, which helps the EU’s strategic autonomy ambitions, as it makes the Union less beholden to foreign powers, removing their political leverage over the European Union. This will help the EU pursue more autonomous foreign policies independent of the U.S., as self-reliance means there is less need to concede to other countries on foreign policy, making them less able and therefore less likely to put the EU’s supply chain at risk. Having a domestic energy supply chain also prevents other countries from manipulating the EU’s politics by using energy as leverage. The Net Zero Industry Act also assists in reducing oil imports. This allows the EU to pursue a more assertive policy, as oil-producing states are often authoritarian states like Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical and ideological positions do not align with the EU and which has cut oil production to increase prices as a tool of leverage. Therefore, the Net Zero Industry Act will remove the ability of countries like Saudi Arabia to exercise political influence within the EU and will provide energy security that is independent of authoritarian states.
Europe’s Fight for Ukraine
One notable shift in the European Union’s strategy after the Ukraine war is the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Russia. During the Crimea and Donbas crisis, the EU, especially Germany, relied on a mixture of sanctions and diplomacy, hoping to contain the conflict through diplomatic means. This failed, as it gave Russia escalation superiority and sent the message that it could get away with further escalation, as the EU did not consider Ukraine a vital interest. This set the stage for the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as the weakness of responses unintentionally signaled to Russia that it could escalate the conflict further without concerns about a strategic backlash leading to its defeat.
Therefore, the sanctions imposed on Russia marked a departure from allowing Russian escalation superiority through de facto appeasement, as such sanctions attempted to pressure Russia by imposing negative impacts on its economy rather than serving simply as a negotiation tool. In addition, it allowed the EU to move away from Russian gas, which many countries, namely Germany, still imported. The sanctions against Russia, the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, and the invasion of Crimea in general were considered weak and allowed Russia to commit its actions with impunity, as they put insufficient pressure on Moscow, ultimately leading to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Therefore, sanctions marked a departure from the non-confrontational foreign policy of the 2010s, in which the EU tried to use a mixture of limited sanctions and diplomacy. Such new attempts aim to ramp up pressure on Russia to abandon its invasion of Ukraine and return the occupied territories.
This affirms the shift in the EU’s strategy towards a more active promotion of liberal values, as the sanctions were aimed at achieving a favorable political outcome for the liberal international order outside the borders of the traditional West and its longstanding allies, thereby shifting its interests from protecting the geopolitical status quo to actively defending the liberal order in regions and countries where its values are threatened. Unlike its approach to the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the EU now follows a policy of sending military aid to Ukraine and even providing security guarantees in the absence of the U.S., whose foreign policy has shifted to an isolationist stance under Trump.
In addition, the EU has made increasingly strong statements on Taiwan, with high-level documents praising the island nation’s democracy and strengthening ties with Taiwan. An example of this is Taiwan’s inclusion in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Cooperation Strategy, which reflects the EU’s efforts to build ties with democracies. Ties with Taiwan are also shaped by the fact that states often align with Ukraine or Russia based on their political systems, meaning the EU now sees over-reliance and excessive cooperation with authoritarian states as counterproductive to its interests, as those states prop up Russia’s economy. This reflects the rise of certain neo-idealist elements, which seek to promote democracy against authoritarianism. Even if neo-idealism is not fully adopted, such policies highlight the importance of cooperating with democracies, especially those under threat from authoritarianism.
The Battle for EU Leadership
The challenge to unity in the European Union is the rule requiring unanimity, which allows rogue members to unilaterally block resolutions they oppose. Regarding Ukraine, this is evident with Hungary, which obstructs the European Peace Facility due to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s support and close ties with Russia. This makes strategic autonomy difficult, as it allows dissenting members to veto resolutions, which in turn prevents action. During the war, Orbán vetoed military aid for Ukraine, which meant that, in many cases, military aid had to come from individual member states rather than the EU, undermining the Union’s resolve. This poses challenges for the European Union regarding the situation in Ukraine, as it hampers the EU’s decision-making abilities as a bloc and limits its capacity to act unitedly on Ukraine.
As a policy recommendation, the EU should remove Hungary’s veto powers by invoking the “nuclear option,” which would eliminate Hungary’s veto powers through a series of processes that would not necessarily involve Hungary. This would allow the EU to streamline the process of arms shipments to Ukraine, potentially replacing the weapons from the U.S. that are lost and preventing rogue governments from obstructing Ukraine’s fight for sovereignty. Therefore, removing Hungary’s veto powers is crucial to EU leadership, as it would enable the EU to take an assertive stance on Ukraine without being obstructed by a single member state.
In economic terms, a critical challenge to the EU’s push for strategic autonomy and self-reliance is its continued reliance on foreign sources of energy, even after distancing itself from Russian energy sources. The dependence on oil and liquefied natural gas from Norway and the U.S. presents the EU with strategic vulnerabilities, as Donald Trump’s presidency is largely unfavorable toward the transatlantic alliance. The EU’s reliance on U.S.-based energy sources could become a tool for leverage by the Trump administration. This also prevents strategic autonomy, as it would require the EU to seek favor with an unfriendly administration. Therefore, it restricts the EU’s ability to autonomously pursue foreign policies formulated by the bloc alone, as it must maintain good relations with a potentially hostile administration in the U.S.
In addition, Russia still accounts for 17.3% of natural gas in the EU and 17.7% of liquefied natural gas supplies, thereby weakening the EU’s sanctions, as continued Russian gas imports allow Russia to continue profiting from its energy resources. This prevents the EU from being more effective in its leadership on Ukraine, as even a reduced reliance on one of Russia’s most strategic industries means the EU is unable to significantly impact Putin’s regime’s finances. Therefore, it is crucial for the EU to transition to clean energy, as it lacks substantial fossil fuel resources within its own borders. A transition to clean energy will diminish reliance on any foreign power and remove external leverage over the EU in terms of strategic policy. If the EU can achieve a clean energy transition, its strategic role will strengthen, as it will have a secure supply chain independent of the political dynamics of other countries.
The lack of military industry capabilities will also hinder the EU’s ability to replace the U.S. aid to Ukraine that Trump cut, as the U.S. possesses more advanced weapons than EU countries. A top European official has stated that Europe is unable to produce the weapons Ukraine needs. This will limit the EU’s ability to replace the lost U.S. aid to Ukraine, as the inability to replace U.S. weapons means Ukraine will find it more difficult to remain effective in its battle to retain sovereignty. This also means the EU lacks the hard power capability to support Ukraine in the absence of the U.S., therefore restricting its ability to become a fully decisive player in the conflict. One immediate solution is for the EU to agree to buy weapons from the U.S. to arm Ukraine, which would substitute for the lost U.S. aid under Trump, at least in the short term, providing Ukraine with the necessary military capabilities. However, the risk of this strategy is continued dependence on the now-unfriendly U.S., which would give the Trump administration more leverage over the EU’s foreign policy strategy. This means Trump could impose additional conditions on selling arms to the EU, further limiting the EU’s ability to take full leadership on Ukraine.
In 2022, most Western European countries sent military aid to Ukraine to assist the threatened democracy in its defense against the Russian invasion. This means the EU shifted its strategy from containing the conflict, as it did in Donbas and Crimea, to attempting to prevent Russia from reshaping the international order through more active means. The
military aid provided to Ukraine has largely been effective in preventing Russia from imposing its political and geopolitical will on Ukraine. In October 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged €1.4 billion in military aid to Ukraine, aimed at ensuring continuity in aid given the uncertainties surrounding the U.S. election.
This highlights the EU’s shift to a more assertive strategy on Ukraine, as the aid serves as a security guarantee for Ukraine in times of geopolitical uncertainty and enhances the Ukrainian military’s ability to at least maintain the status quo on the battlefield against Russia.This also underscores the European Union’s commitment to defending the liberal order, as the increase in military aid is a clear repudiation of Russia’s attempts to shape the world based on spheres of influence rather than self-determination. Even in Germany, which has historically been averse to arms shipments to conflict zones, the country has become the second-largest supplier of arms to Ukraine, second only to the U.S. before Trump’s return to the presidency.This highlights a shift in the EU’s strategy from viewing Ukraine as a peripheral issue to one of strategic and ideological importance, as its approach now focuses on countering authoritarian aggression and defending threatened democracies.
After Trump’s return to power and a rapid shift in U.S. foreign policy away from arming Ukraine, the EU has sped up military aid for Ukraine and increased the amount of assistance, as protecting the liberal international order is an important part of the EU’s global strategy. The EU has accelerated military aid to Ukraine to replace the U.S. aid that was cut off by Trump. This highlights upholding the liberal international order as an integral component of the EU’s global strategy, as such moves aim to prevent illiberal actors from influencing the order through illegitimate means. The importance of such strategic policies toward the liberal international order is that EU-supplied arms will enable Ukraine to resist being forced by Trump and Putin into a deal against its consent, which would be a severe violation of the liberal international order, where states’ self-determination is paramount.
The EU’s strategy, therefore, has shifted away from maintaining the balance of power to actively pushing back against authoritarian aggression, as the war in Ukraine demonstrated that if Ukraine fell, many EU member states would be under threat from Russia, and it would provide a blueprint for other authoritarian countries to reshape the order through illegitimate means. Moreover, the EU, in doing this, is supporting Ukraine’s self-determination and Western aspirations, as the arms supplied serve as a bulwark against the rise of increasingly populist leaders across the world and will strengthen or at least maintain Ukraine’s ability to avoid defeat.
In addition, the plan to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, should a ceasefire deal be agreed upon as a security guarantee, also serves to defend Ukraine’s self-determination, as it would allow Ukraine to remain a free and independent state while preventing Russia from asserting political and military dominance over Ukraine. Furthermore, this highlights a shift in the EU’s strategy from treating Ukraine as a peripheral issue to one central to European security, as the EU is aware of the threats that Russia poses, especially to EU members that border Russia, if Ukraine is defeated. In addition, the pledges of arms and peacekeepers to Ukraine amount to upholding the liberal international order, as they reject changes to borders and countries’ internal policies through external coercion and illegitimate means.
EU vs. Authoritarianism
While the EU has historically viewed China primarily in terms of commercial and economic interests, the invasion of Ukraine, including China’s response, has led many EU countries—at least on paper—to adopt a more assertive stance on China. Prior to the Ukraine crisis, the EU had an approach of strategic ambiguity toward China, in which they were not aligned but, as Merkel stated, would try to avoid Cold War-style blocs in geopolitics. The prioritization of commercial interests led the EU to become dependent on China for raw materials and left its China strategy unclear. However, since the invasion of Ukraine is seen as a matter of democracy vs. authoritarianism, the EU views a potential conflict between China and Taiwan through a similar lens, with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stating that the EU’s aim is to deter China from invading Taiwan.
This highlights a shift from a foreign policy based on commercial interests to one more focused on the battle between democracy and authoritarianism, as the EU views Taiwan as a democracy while seeing China as a hostile authoritarian state. This entails the return of liberal democratic ideology to the central role of European foreign policy, as it sees authoritarianism and authoritarian states’ efforts to reshape the world order through coercive or illiberal means—which violate the self-determination of other states—as a threat to the liberal international order, which is central to a free and just world. Due to the Ukraine war, the EU now sees Taiwan and Ukraine as part of the same battle and has therefore strengthened ties with Taiwan to further support democracies and uphold the sovereignty and self-determination of democratic societies.
The EU’s increasingly vocal support for Taiwan was evident when French President Emmanuel Macron stated in 2023 that the EU should not choose between the U.S. and China over Taiwan and that Europe should “steer clear of crises that are not ours.” European politicians were quick to clarify that Macron did not speak for the EU and that the EU supports the Cross-Strait status quo and opposes any attempts by China to change it by force. The backlash against Macron reflects the EU’s commitment to defending and strengthening democracy, as Macron attempted to undermine the EU’s liberal internationalist policy by aligning with autocrats and faced criticism for comments that were perceived as an embrace of great power realism. The responses of many EU leaders, including Germany, point to the EU’s commitment to preventing authoritarian aggression, as it views Taiwan as an important democracy and a bulwark against Chinese authoritarianism.
In addition, the EU has made increasingly strong statements on Taiwan, with high-level documents praising the island nation’s democracy and strengthening ties with Taiwan. An example of this is Taiwan’s inclusion in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Cooperation Strategy, which reflects the EU’s
efforts to build ties with democracies. Ties with Taiwan are also shaped by the fact that states often align with Ukraine or Russia based on their political systems, meaning the EU now sees over-reliance and excessive cooperation with authoritarian states as counterproductive to its interests, as those states prop up Russia’s economy. This reflects the rise of certain neo-idealist elements, which seek to promote democracy against authoritarianism. Even if neo-idealism is not fully adopted, such policies highlight the importance of cooperating with democracies, especially those under threat from authoritarianism.
The Battle for EU Leadership
The challenge to unity in the European Union is the rule requiring unanimity, which allows rogue members to unilaterally block resolutions they oppose. Regarding Ukraine, this is evident with Hungary, which obstructs the European Peace Facility due to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s support and close ties with Russia. This makes strategic autonomy difficult, as it allows dissenting members to veto resolutions, which in turn prevents action. During the war, Orbán vetoed military aid for Ukraine, which meant that, in many cases, military aid had to come from individual member states rather than the EU, undermining the Union’s resolve. This poses challenges for the European Union regarding the situation in Ukraine, as it hampers the EU’s decision-making abilities as a bloc and limits its capacity to act unitedly on Ukraine.
As a policy recommendation, the EU should remove Hungary’s veto powers by invoking the “nuclear option,” which would eliminate Hungary’s veto powers through a series of processes that would not necessarily involve Hungary. This would allow the EU to streamline the process of arms shipments to Ukraine, potentially replacing the weapons from the U.S. that are lost and preventing rogue governments from obstructing Ukraine’s fight for sovereignty. Therefore, removing Hungary’s veto powers is crucial to EU leadership, as it would enable the EU to take an assertive stance on Ukraine without being obstructed by a single member state.
In economic terms, a critical challenge to the EU’s push for strategic autonomy and self-reliance is its continued reliance on foreign sources of energy, even after distancing itself from Russian energy sources. The dependence on oil and liquefied natural gas from Norway and the U.S. presents the EU with strategic vulnerabilities, as Donald Trump’s presidency is largely unfavorable toward the transatlantic alliance. The EU’s reliance on U.S.-based energy sources could become a tool for leverage by the Trump administration. This also prevents strategic autonomy, as it would require the EU to seek favor with an unfriendly administration. Therefore, it restricts the EU’s ability to autonomously pursue foreign policies formulated by the bloc alone, as it must maintain good relations with a potentially hostile administration in the U.S.
In addition, Russia still accounts for 17.3% of natural gas in the EU and 17.7% of liquefied natural gas supplies, thereby weakening the EU’s sanctions, as continued Russian gas imports allow Russia to continue profiting from its energy resources. This prevents the EU from being more effective in its leadership on Ukraine, as even a reduced reliance on one of Russia’s most strategic industries means the EU is unable to significantly impact Putin’s regime’s finances. Therefore, it is crucial for the EU to transition to clean energy, as it lacks substantial fossil fuel resources within its own borders. A transition to clean energy will diminish reliance on any foreign power and remove external leverage over the EU in terms of strategic policy. If the EU can achieve a clean energy transition, its strategic role will strengthen, as it will have a secure supply chain independent of the political dynamics of other countries.
The lack of military industry capabilities will also hinder the EU’s ability to replace the U.S. aid to Ukraine that Trump cut, as the U.S. possesses more advanced weapons than EU countries. A top European official has stated that Europe is unable to produce the weapons Ukraine needs. This will limit the EU’s ability to replace the lost U.S. aid to Ukraine, as the inability to replace U.S. weapons means Ukraine will find it more difficult to remain effective in its battle to retain sovereignty. This also means the EU lacks the hard power capability to support Ukraine in the absence of the U.S., therefore restricting its ability to become a fully decisive player in the conflict. One immediate solution is for the EU to agree to buy weapons from the U.S. to arm Ukraine, which would substitute for the lost U.S. aid under Trump, at least in the short term, providing Ukraine with the necessary military capabilities. However, the risk of this strategy is continued dependence on the now-unfriendly U.S., which would give the Trump administration more leverage over the EU’s foreign policy strategy. This means Trump could impose additional conditions on selling arms to the EU, further limiting the EU’s ability to take full leadership on Ukraine.
Karn Anutarasoti, graduated from MSc International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His expertise lies in Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy, U.S. Foreign Policy, Chinese Foreign Policy.
