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The decline of the so-called “liberal” international order is an increasingly prevalent theme in today’s international affairs. Alarmed by the geopolitical challenges from politically “illiberal” regimes and the domestic political crises among “liberal democracies,” multiple international commentaries have warned that the world is entering a period of crises and instability. As the “liberal” consensus and rules that have facilitated the establishment and enforcement of international cooperation face setbacks and even repudiation worldwide, pessimistic international predictions include the return of a “new cold war,” “global anarchy,” or even a “global apocalypse” from environmental- or military-related catastrophes.
There are indeed geopolitical trends shifting the international system away from the aspired goals and policies of the “liberal” international order. What, then, is emerging as an alternative international system? For now, the international order appears to be evolving into a “less liberal,” “more eclectic,” yet still U.S.-led order where the superpower imposes restraints against its lesser geopolitical rivals, albeit with changed ideological priorities and strategies. Paradoxically, such geopolitical trends suggest the continuity of the “order” over the increasing “disorder” in the contemporary international system.
Liberal International Order
What constitutes “liberal” in the features of an international order has often been the subject of debates and controversies. Generally, the liberal international order has been defined by the set of principles promoted by Western democracies, chiefly the United States, at the end of World War II: state sovereignty, multilateral institutions, international trade, and political democracy. The aspired goals of a “liberal” order were for sovereign states (including former colonies that would gain independence from colonial powers) to participate in international institutions to establish collective rules for regulating international behavior, such as deterring military conflicts.
International institutions (supported by member states) would enforce these rules and promote the integration of the global economy (lowering state barriers to the movement of goods, services, finance, and even people) to provide positive incentives for international cooperation. They would also promote political democracy among their member states to bolster individual states’ commitment and credibility in supporting international rules and partnerships. The United States provided a leadership role in the maintenance of a “liberal” international system. Despite criticisms of inconsistencies and failures in performing such leadership, U.S. administrations in the post-WWII period have generally justified their foreign policies through claims of adherence to a “rules-based” international order and partnerships.
Challenges and Discord
At the end of the Cold War, the liberal international order appeared to be ascendant in the convergence of economic interests and political values among individual states. With former communist bloc countries (even remaining “official” communist regimes such as China and Vietnam) seeking integration into the global market economy, and with increases in the number of countries in the Global South affirming political democracy, the international system based on free trade, political democracy, and multilateral institutions appeared to have expanded into a truly global order. Paradoxically, however, the liberal order’s expansion may have contributed to its growing internal discord.
The decline of the so-called “liberal” international order is an increasingly prevalent theme in today’s international affairs. Alarmed by the geopolitical challenges from politically “illiberal” regimes and the domestic political crises among “liberal democracies,” multiple international commentaries have warned that the world is entering a period of crises and instability. As the “liberal” consensus and rules that have facilitated the establishment and enforcement of international cooperation face setbacks and even repudiation worldwide, pessimistic international predictions include the return of a “new cold war,” “global anarchy,” or even a “global apocalypse” from environmental- or military-related catastrophes.
There are indeed geopolitical trends shifting the international system away from the aspired goals and policies of the “liberal” international order. What, then, is emerging as an alternative international system? For now, the international order appears to be evolving into a “less liberal,” “more eclectic,” yet still U.S.-led order where the superpower imposes restraints against its lesser geopolitical rivals, albeit with changed ideological priorities and strategies. Paradoxically, such geopolitical trends suggest the continuity of the “order” over the increasing “disorder” in the contemporary international system.
Liberal International Order
What constitutes “liberal” in the features of an international order has often been the subject of debates and controversies. Generally, the liberal international order has been defined by the set of principles promoted by Western democracies, chiefly the United States, at the end of World War II: state sovereignty, multilateral institutions, international trade, and political democracy. The aspired goals of a “liberal” order were for sovereign states (including former colonies that would gain independence from colonial powers) to participate in international institutions to establish collective rules for regulating international behavior, such as deterring military conflicts.
International institutions (supported by member states) would enforce these rules and promote the integration of the global economy (lowering state barriers to the movement of goods, services, finance, and even people) to provide positive incentives for international cooperation. They would also promote political democracy among their member states to bolster individual states’ commitment and credibility in supporting international rules and partnerships. The United States provided a leadership role in the maintenance of a “liberal” international system. Despite criticisms of inconsistencies and failures in performing such leadership, U.S. administrations in the post-WWII period have generally justified their foreign policies through claims of adherence to a “rules-based” international order and partnerships.
Challenges and Discord
At the end of the Cold War, the liberal international order appeared to be ascendant in the convergence of economic interests and political values among individual states. With former communist bloc countries (even remaining “official” communist regimes such as China and Vietnam) seeking integration into the global market economy, and with increases in the number of countries in the Global South affirming political democracy, the international system based on free trade, political democracy, and multilateral institutions appeared to have expanded into a truly global order. Paradoxically, however, the liberal order’s expansion may have contributed to its growing internal discord.
From the Declaration of Independence to today, America’s core values have shaped its foreign policy, balancing cultural ideals with practical strategies on the global stage.
In complex multilateral negotiations (such as responses to climate change, standardization of labor, and regulatory standards), it became increasingly difficult to establish rules and policies perceived as fair and equitable by individual countries from the Global North and the Global South. Furthermore, a number of countries were accused of selectivity in their participation, seeking benefits from the international system while rejecting the rules and values that were contrary to their own political and economic preferences. Domestic resentment within major stakeholder states posed another source of discord.
In the West, growing segments of the populace protested the costs and burdens of supporting the liberal order. These burdens included trade losses in noncompetitive economic sectors, socioeconomic challenges in accepting foreign migrants and refugees, entrapment in overseas security conflicts and humanitarian crises, and the sacrifice of national interests for compliance with multilateral agreements and rules. Subsequently, populist politics have become prominent in a number of Western democracies, espousing distrust and resistance toward political institutions (domestic and international) perceived as “elitist” or “globalist” in their disconnection from the concerns and preferences of the domestic populace. Donald Trump’s election to the U.S. presidency in 2016 was a reflection of political shifts taking place in the West.
With the slogan “America First,” the Trump administration withdrew from international agreements and institutions, such as the Paris Climate Accord and the WHO, which Trump perceived as not fulfilling U.S. national interests. Trump also took a transactional approach to diplomacy, prioritizing transactional benefits as the basis for the continuity of international partnership, more so than shared political values or the long-term stability of international institutions. Joe Biden’s election to the U.S. presidency in 2020 appeared at first to signal the reversal of geopolitical changes that occurred under Trump’s first term. With the slogan “America is Back,” Biden promised renewed U.S. commitment to upholding the institutions and values of the liberal international order. However, challenges to the maintenance of such an order were exacerbated under Biden’s presidency.
Growing Crises and Disorder
The liberal order did not achieve complete international unity or stability even during its ascendancy after the end of the Cold War. There were rogue states such as North Korea, which refused to integrate into the international order. The member states, including the United States, did not consistently uphold or enforce the order’s aspired values and policies. Moreover, as during the Iraq War, there were at times contentious foreign policy divides among the key stakeholders. However, recent geopolitical crises and tensions have heightened doubts about whether today’s international system could remain unified or even “liberal.”
In complex multilateral negotiations (such as responses to climate change, standardization of labor, and regulatory standards), it became increasingly difficult to establish rules and policies perceived as fair and equitable by individual countries from the Global North and the Global South. Furthermore, a number of countries were accused of selectivity in their participation, seeking benefits from the international system while rejecting the rules and values that were contrary to their own political and economic preferences. Domestic resentment within major stakeholder states posed another source of discord.
In the West, growing segments of the populace protested the costs and burdens of supporting the liberal order. These burdens included trade losses in noncompetitive economic sectors, socioeconomic challenges in accepting foreign migrants and refugees, entrapment in overseas security conflicts and humanitarian crises, and the sacrifice of national interests for compliance with multilateral agreements and rules. Subsequently, populist politics have become prominent in a number of Western democracies, espousing distrust and resistance toward political institutions (domestic and international) perceived as “elitist” or “globalist” in their disconnection from the concerns and preferences of the domestic populace. Donald Trump’s election to the U.S. presidency in 2016 was a reflection of political shifts taking place in the West.
With the slogan “America First,” the Trump administration withdrew from international agreements and institutions, such as the Paris Climate Accord and the WHO, which Trump perceived as not fulfilling U.S. national interests. Trump also took a transactional approach to diplomacy, prioritizing transactional benefits as the basis for the continuity of international partnership, more so than shared political values or the long-term stability of international institutions. Joe Biden’s election to the U.S. presidency in 2020 appeared at first to signal the reversal of geopolitical changes that occurred under Trump’s first term. With the slogan “America is Back,” Biden promised renewed U.S. commitment to upholding the institutions and values of the liberal international order. However, challenges to the maintenance of such an order were exacerbated under Biden’s presidency.
Growing Crises and Disorder
The liberal order did not achieve complete international unity or stability even during its ascendancy after the end of the Cold War. There were rogue states such as North Korea, which refused to integrate into the international order. The member states, including the United States, did not consistently uphold or enforce the order’s aspired values and policies. Moreover, as during the Iraq War, there were at times contentious foreign policy divides among the key stakeholders. However, recent geopolitical crises and tensions have heightened doubts about whether today’s international system could remain unified or even “liberal.”
The “revisionist” countries (such as Russia and China), which have criticized the multilateral rules and institutions as “rigged” or “biased” in favor of the West, have become bolder not only in their attempts to revise the institutions but also in advancing their geopolitical objectives outside the liberal order’s framework and norms. For example, in 2022, Russia launched “special military operations” against Ukraine, starting the first major conventional warfare in Europe since the end of WWII. China has escalated territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries over the ownership of the South China Sea, threatening maritime trade in this region. The revisionist countries have also strengthened alternative strategic partnerships. Iran and North Korea have provided military support to Russia in its war with Ukraine.
Russia has defied international sanctions by sending economic and technical assistance to North Korea. The two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in 2024, bolstering North Korea’s confidence in advancing its nuclear and ICBM capabilities. The liberal order’s proponents have attempted to counter challenges from revisionist states by revitalizing “value-based” international strategic partnerships. The Biden presidency advocated for an “alliance” of democracies against autocracies. Though more restrained in rhetoric than Trump’s, the Biden presidency has regarded China as a “strategic rival” engaging in “rule-breaking” behavior and has continued the economic sanctions implemented during Trump’s first term. The West’s strategic measures, however, have revealed limitations in its capacity to decisively punish and isolate revisionist states. Western sanctions have not been successful in forcing Russia to end its war in Europe.
Many countries in the Global South have maintained neutrality and continued trade partnerships with Russia. Russia continues to have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and membership in multilateral institutions such as the G20 and BRICS. In strategic and economic disputes with China, the West has also shown measured restraint (such as continued affirmation of an official “One China” policy on Taiwan) to mitigate risks of conflict escalation. Perhaps more critically, even countries professing to defend the current international order have become “less” liberal in their policy priorities and preferences.
Encountering domestic political pressures driven by socioeconomic anxieties and political polarization, multiple Western governments have become more reserved or protectionist on issues such as trade and migration. Western governments have maintained or renewed strategic partnerships with countries (such as Saudi Arabia, India, Vietnam, Türkiye, and Hungary) that have been criticized for “illiberal” political behaviors. Several “liberal democracies” themselves have been criticized for becoming more “illiberal” in their domestic politics. With the reelection of Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2024, the trends of geopolitical disunity, conflicts, and ideological shifts are likely to continue.
Paradoxically, such geopolitical trends suggest the continuity of the ‘order’ over the increasing ‘disorder’ in the contemporary international system.
After Trump’s second inauguration, his administration withdrew the U.S. again from the Paris Climate Accord and the WHO and temporarily froze spending on foreign aid. Furthermore, Trump signaled an intention to purchase Greenland from Denmark, regain ownership over the Panama Canal, increase protectionist trade policies, and pressure U.S. allies in Europe and East Asia regarding defense spending. The policies pursued by the Trump administration’s second term are likely to result in varied reactions from other states: compliance, defiance, and hedging. In the aftermath, a realignment of the international system is likely to follow.
Realignment of International System
The existing multilateral institutions, such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and WTO, will likely continue to function in their roles in promoting international cooperation. However, their institutional authority and tasks will overlap with the emergence of alternative institutions. Countries frustrated by paralysis and divisions within existing institutions may seek opportunities within new institutions and partnerships that represent countries with similar strategic interests. For example, China-supported institutions such as the AIIB and SCO, and U.S.-supported institutions such as IPEF and QUAD, may compete for international influence.
The majority of countries in the world will likely continue to affirm support for political democracy. However, political variations among “democracies” will likely increase, even in the West. As a result, either the requirements of “liberal democracy” may become relaxed, or “illiberal democracies” may become tolerated under a broad framework of democracies versus explicit autocracies. NATO already tolerates such ideological heterogeneity, as several of its member states are viewed by others as “illiberal.”
The expansion of complexities and uncertainties within the international system may be mitigated by another factor: the strategic interests of countries in seeking geopolitical stability through strategic alignment and constraints. The Trump administration, for instance, may seek geopolitical stability in Europe and the Middle East to strategically prioritize China and the Asia-Pacific. U.S.-China strategic conflicts may be mitigated by constraints designed to prevent mutually detrimental economic and military losses.
However, the basis for strategic stability and alignment will be a transactional collaboration among countries with convergent geopolitical interests. Trump’s signaling of diplomatic overtures to Russia and North Korea may be a reflection of such a calculation: that a geopolitical order may be maintained by strategically aligned states with different political systems. The dynamics of regional and international stability may become more fluid and unpredictable, as individual countries weigh and bargain over their strategic alignment. Many countries in the Global South, for example, may engage in transactional hedging between the U.S. and China, creating fluctuations in geopolitical balance on certain international issues.
Evolution of an International Order
The geopolitical trends of competing geopolitical actors and institutions, shifting political values, and transactional strategic alignments will likely result in the transformation of the current liberal order. However, such a transformation does not assume the dismantling of the international order into chaos, but rather an evolution into a new version of the international order. One important continuity from the previous world order would be the role of the United States in asserting global influence and utilizing strategic alliances. To be sure, domestic political fatigue toward “nation-building” and “peacekeeping” projects abroad has galvanized political support behind Trump’s “America First” slogan.
Yet, Trump’s second term, far from advocating an isolationist foreign policy, appears to be committed to defending U.S. geostrategic interests in the Western Hemisphere and maintaining strategic and technological superiority over China. Many U.S. allies will likely continue their strategic alignment with the superpower. They may encounter contentious bargaining and pressures to accommodate Trump’s transactional demands. However, many U.S. allies will calculate that in turn, their transactional benefits from the alliance (even with reduced U.S. involvement in certain policy areas) will outweigh the costs and uncertainties. Skillful allies may also perceive the opportunity to attain their key objectives through quid pro quo dealmaking with the U.S.
In contrast, the alternative bloc of revisionist countries lacks sufficient capacity to dominate the international order on an equal footing with the U.S.-aligned bloc. While fighting a war in Ukraine, Russia has lost much of its regional influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Even after the war’s end, recovering from the war’s socioeconomic costs would constrain Russia’s geopolitical capability. China is falling behind in its quest to surpass the United States, hampered by economic recessions and social unrest. Despite the expansion of its international influence (through projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative), China has fallen short in consolidating strategic alliances, as countries, especially in Asia, maintain wariness toward its regional leadership.
One important continuity from the previous world order would be the role of the United States in asserting global influence and utilizing strategic alliances.
The “revisionist” countries (such as Russia and China), which have criticized the multilateral rules and institutions as “rigged” or “biased” in favor of the West, have become bolder not only in their attempts to revise the institutions but also in advancing their geopolitical objectives outside the liberal order’s framework and norms. For example, in 2022, Russia launched “special military operations” against Ukraine, starting the first major conventional warfare in Europe since the end of WWII. China has escalated territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries over the ownership of the South China Sea, threatening maritime trade in this region. The revisionist countries have also strengthened alternative strategic partnerships. Iran and North Korea have provided military support to Russia in its war with Ukraine.
Russia has defied international sanctions by sending economic and technical assistance to North Korea. The two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in 2024, bolstering North Korea’s confidence in advancing its nuclear and ICBM capabilities. The liberal order’s proponents have attempted to counter challenges from revisionist states by revitalizing “value-based” international strategic partnerships. The Biden presidency advocated for an “alliance” of democracies against autocracies. Though more restrained in rhetoric than Trump’s, the Biden presidency has regarded China as a “strategic rival” engaging in “rule-breaking” behavior and has continued the economic sanctions implemented during Trump’s first term. The West’s strategic measures, however, have revealed limitations in its capacity to decisively punish and isolate revisionist states. Western sanctions have not been successful in forcing Russia to end its war in Europe.
Many countries in the Global South have maintained neutrality and continued trade partnerships with Russia. Russia continues to have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and membership in multilateral institutions such as the G20 and BRICS. In strategic and economic disputes with China, the West has also shown measured restraint (such as continued affirmation of an official “One China” policy on Taiwan) to mitigate risks of conflict escalation. Perhaps more critically, even countries professing to defend the current international order have become “less” liberal in their policy priorities and preferences.
Encountering domestic political pressures driven by socioeconomic anxieties and political polarization, multiple Western governments have become more reserved or protectionist on issues such as trade and migration. Western governments have maintained or renewed strategic partnerships with countries (such as Saudi Arabia, India, Vietnam, Türkiye, and Hungary) that have been criticized for “illiberal” political behaviors. Several “liberal democracies” themselves have been criticized for becoming more “illiberal” in their domestic politics. With the reelection of Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2024, the trends of geopolitical disunity, conflicts, and ideological shifts are likely to continue.
Similar to the practice of realpolitik during the Cold War period, strategic interests may be more openly prioritized over strict adherence to “liberal” political principles in the evolved international order. Some countries may welcome diplomacy based on strategic interests as more authentic and credible than ostentatious value-based or moral-based diplomacy. However, a complete return to an unrestrained “illiberal” international system appears less likely. Liberal political values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law will still be practiced by multiple countries, and their governments’ (or populaces’) political sensitivity will remain a consideration in geopolitical decisions.
To conclude, I predict that the international order is currently trending toward a still largely U.S.-alliance-led system, but one that is less liberal and more restrained in its goals and aspirations. In contrast to the commonly cited “Thucydides Trap” (which predicts a declining world power being replaced by a newly rising power), the stagnation of alternative powers such as China allows the current superpower to, by default, retain superior international influence. Yet, aversion to the burdens of past decades in enforcing a “liberal” order will motivate future U.S. governments to downscale their geopolitical objectives and maintain a more limited order of international stability.
A New International Order for Better or for Worse?
In retrospect, what has been commonly described as a liberal international order has lasted for a relatively short period. Though formally established after 1945, it truly became a global system in the 1990s and lasted for about two decades before experiencing significant challenges and divisions. The potential decline of the liberal world order has evoked anxieties that international relations may return to historical periods of destructive conflicts, isolation, or domination by a few autocratic powers. While the risks of such future outcomes should be considered with prudence, there is also the prospect of less turbulent transitions in the international order.
Should the current geopolitical trends result in changes to an international system that retains the strategic superiority of a U.S.-led alignment over revisionist blocs but prioritizes mutual strategic interests and transactional benefits over shared “liberal” political principles and norms, an international order that promotes stability and cooperation may still function. Whether such an order will be more effective than a “liberal” order may be open to debate. The “less liberal” and “more transactional” world order may struggle to facilitate long-term international cooperation for the distribution of public goods.
The geopolitical stability and balance maintained primarily through shared strategic interests may be fragile and fail to deter certain levels of conflict and disorder from continuing within the international system. For those who may be disappointed by the prospects of the decline of a liberal international order, perhaps a hopeful perspective is to view changes in the international system through the lens of a swinging pendulum. In past decades, “liberal” endeavors to establish an international system have faced challenges and resistance that have caused trends toward “less liberal” geopolitical models. Yet, the limitations of such new models may, in turn, reinvigorate a new wave of geopolitical changes toward the restoration of the liberal world order.
After Trump’s second inauguration, his administration withdrew the U.S. again from the Paris Climate Accord and the WHO and temporarily froze spending on foreign aid. Furthermore, Trump signaled an intention to purchase Greenland from Denmark, regain ownership over the Panama Canal, increase protectionist trade policies,
and pressure U.S. allies in Europe and East Asia regarding defense spending. The policies pursued by the Trump administration’s second term are likely to result in varied reactions from other states: compliance, defiance, and hedging. In the aftermath, a realignment of the international system is likely to follow.
Realignment of International System
The existing multilateral institutions, such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and WTO, will likely continue to function in their roles in promoting international cooperation. However, their institutional authority and tasks will overlap with the emergence of alternative institutions. Countries frustrated by paralysis and divisions within existing institutions may seek opportunities within new institutions and partnerships that represent countries with similar strategic interests. For example, China-supported institutions such as the AIIB and SCO, and U.S.-supported institutions such as IPEF and QUAD, may compete for international influence.
The majority of countries in the world will likely continue to affirm support for political democracy. However, political variations among “democracies” will likely increase, even in the West. As a result, either the requirements of “liberal democracy” may become relaxed, or “illiberal democracies” may become tolerated under a broad framework of democracies versus explicit autocracies. NATO already tolerates such ideological heterogeneity, as several of its member states are viewed by others as “illiberal.”
The expansion of complexities and uncertainties within the international system may be mitigated by another factor: the strategic interests of countries in seeking geopolitical stability through strategic alignment and constraints. The Trump administration, for instance, may seek geopolitical stability in Europe and the Middle East to strategically prioritize China and the Asia-Pacific. U.S.-China strategic conflicts may be mitigated by constraints designed to prevent mutually detrimental economic and military losses.
However, the basis for strategic stability and alignment will be a transactional collaboration among countries with convergent geopolitical interests. Trump’s signaling of diplomatic overtures to Russia and North Korea may be a reflection of such a calculation: that a geopolitical order may be maintained by strategically aligned states with different political systems. The dynamics of regional and international stability may become more fluid and unpredictable, as individual countries weigh and bargain over their strategic alignment. Many countries in the Global South, for example, may engage in transactional hedging between the U.S. and China, creating fluctuations in geopolitical balance on certain international issues.
Evolution of an International Order
The geopolitical trends of competing geopolitical actors and institutions, shifting political values, and transactional strategic alignments will likely result in the transformation of the current liberal order. However, such a transformation does not assume the dismantling of the international order into chaos, but rather an evolution into a new version of the international order. One important continuity from the previous world order would be the role of the United States in asserting global influence and utilizing strategic alliances. To be sure, domestic political fatigue toward “nation-building” and “peacekeeping” projects abroad has galvanized political support behind Trump’s “America First” slogan.
Yet, Trump’s second term, far from advocating an isolationist foreign policy, appears to be committed to defending U.S. geostrategic interests in the Western Hemisphere and maintaining strategic and technological superiority over China. Many U.S. allies will likely continue their strategic alignment with the superpower. They may encounter contentious bargaining and pressures to accommodate Trump’s transactional demands. However, many U.S. allies will calculate that in turn, their transactional benefits from the alliance (even with reduced U.S. involvement in certain policy areas) will outweigh the costs and uncertainties. Skillful allies may also perceive the opportunity to attain their key objectives through quid pro quo dealmaking with the U.S.
In contrast, the alternative bloc of revisionist countries lacks sufficient capacity to dominate the international order on an equal footing with the U.S.-aligned bloc. While fighting a war in Ukraine, Russia has lost much of its regional influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Even after the war’s end, recovering from the war’s socioeconomic costs would constrain Russia’s geopolitical capability. China is falling behind in its quest to surpass the United States, hampered by economic recessions and social unrest. Despite the expansion of its international influence (through projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative), China has fallen short in consolidating strategic alliances, as countries, especially in Asia, maintain wariness toward its regional leadership.
Similar to the practice of realpolitik during the Cold War period, strategic interests may be more openly prioritized over strict adherence to “liberal” political principles in the evolved international order. Some countries may welcome diplomacy based on strategic interests as more authentic and credible than
ostentatious value-based or moral-based diplomacy. However, a complete return to an unrestrained “illiberal” international system appears less likely. Liberal political values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law will still be practiced by multiple countries, and their governments’ (or populaces’) political sensitivity will remain a consideration in geopolitical decisions.
To conclude, I predict that the international order is currently trending toward a still largely U.S.-alliance-led system, but one that is less liberal and more restrained in its goals and aspirations. In contrast to the commonly cited “Thucydides Trap” (which predicts a declining world power being replaced by a newly rising power), the stagnation of alternative powers such as China allows the current superpower to, by default, retain superior international influence. Yet, aversion to the burdens of past decades in enforcing a “liberal” order will motivate future U.S. governments to downscale their geopolitical objectives and maintain a more limited order of international stability.
A New International Order for Better or for Worse?
In retrospect, what has been commonly described as a liberal international order has lasted for a relatively short period. Though formally established after 1945, it truly became a global system in the 1990s and lasted for about two decades before experiencing significant challenges and divisions. The potential decline of the liberal world order has evoked anxieties that international relations may return to historical periods of destructive conflicts, isolation, or domination by a few autocratic powers. While the risks of such future outcomes should be considered with prudence, there is also the prospect of less turbulent transitions in the international order.
Should the current geopolitical trends result in changes to an international system that retains the strategic superiority of a U.S.-led alignment over revisionist blocs but prioritizes mutual strategic interests and transactional benefits over shared “liberal” political principles and norms, an international order that promotes stability and cooperation may still function. Whether such an order will be more effective than a “liberal” order may be open to debate. The “less liberal” and “more transactional” world order may struggle to facilitate long-term international cooperation for the distribution of public goods.
The geopolitical stability and balance maintained primarily through shared strategic interests may be fragile and fail to deter certain levels of conflict and disorder from continuing within the international system. For those who may be disappointed by the prospects of the decline of a liberal international order, perhaps a hopeful perspective is to view changes in the international system through the lens of a swinging pendulum. In past decades, “liberal” endeavors to establish an international system have faced challenges and resistance that have caused trends toward “less liberal” geopolitical models. Yet, the limitations of such new models may, in turn, reinvigorate a new wave of geopolitical changes toward the restoration of the liberal world order.
Jong Eun Lee, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.
