As Kamala Harris emerges as the new Democratic nominee and Trump faces unprecedented challenges, China remains notably silent, hinting at a strategic shift in how Beijing views the unfolding U.S. election drama.
Recent developments in the U.S. presidential election have been particularly noteworthy. Events such as an assassination attempt on Donald Trump, Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the race, and Kamala Harris’s emergence as the new Democratic nominee have made the election a global focal point. Amidst these occurrences, one notable aspect is China’s reticence. As the world’s second-largest economy, China has historically been a significant subject of discussion, particularly in the context of the Thucydides Trap. Given its growing global economic influence, China’s policies have long been central to U.S. presidential elections.
However, China’s silence on the matter has become a new trend. This highlights a broader concept of human adaptability, exemplified by East Asian travelers who have adjusted to longer flight times when avoiding Russian airspace en route to Europe. This ‘new normal’ has seamlessly integrated into their travel routines. Travelers may no longer recall that the flight duration between Beijing and Warsaw was once nine hours before Russia closed its airspace. The readiness of passengers to accept a journey of more than 11 hours reflects their adaptability to changing circumstances. Similarly, the impact of the U.S. presidential election on Chinese elites and the general population is a subject of considerable interest in international relations. It is plausible that individuals are recalibrating their perspectives in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape.
This phenomenon is exemplified by the collaborative efforts between Beijing and Washington in 2003 to curtail Chen Shui-bian’s referendum, which aimed to formalize Taiwan’s separation from China by establishing a new constitution. Additionally, the East Asia Strategy of U.S. President Barack Obama (2008–2016), known as the Pivot to Asia, sparked extensive policy discussions and academic debates in China, underscoring the significance of U.S. policies for both Chinese elites and the general public. However, Beijing’s shift in approach did not occur abruptly. The initiation of a trade dispute by Donald Trump in 2018, marked by the imposition of tariffs and other trade barriers on China, created apprehension among Chinese policymakers and the public. This unease can be partly attributed to the experiences of the current Chinese generation (born between the 1950s and 1990s), who grew up during a period of normalized U.S.-China relations since 1972. The idea of the U.S. once again targeting China was hardly considered conceivable, given the prevailing ideological discourse in China, which had shifted towards comparisons of national economic capabilities and living standards with those of the Western world.
Professor Zhang Weiwei, a prominent Chinese scholar of international relations at Fudan University, offers an interesting perspective. He emphasizes the “superiority of the China model” and describes the Belt and Road Initiative as “an unprecedented change in five thousand years.” His views reflect the sentiments of Chinese scholars born after the 1950s and are respected by political elites in Beijing. Zhang advocates for China’s political and economic system, encouraging Chinese citizens to be confident and see themselves as equals to the West, based on China’s unique governance experience and the rise of the middle class, rather than focusing on ideological confrontation. During the initial three years of the China-U.S. trade war (2018-2021), China actively sought to resolve the trade dispute with the U.S. through negotiations.
This was evidenced by the dispatch of negotiation teams, including President Xi Jinping’s special envoy, to Washington for consultations on multiple occasions. Notably, Chinese CCTV News consistently focused on the China-U.S. trade war in its international coverage prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of 2019. These instances collectively suggest that Chinese elites and the public initially struggled to adapt to the trade restrictions imposed by the U.S. The global political landscape has undergone significant developments over the past five years, marked by increasingly strained relations between China and several Western nations. This tension has been exacerbated by the global pandemic, the continuation of tariffs on Chinese imports by the Biden administration, and Western concerns over China’s reluctance to impose sanctions on Russia.
These multifaceted factors have subtly influenced Chinese attitudes toward interactions with the West and the pursuit of reconciliation. The impact of these complex geopolitical dynamics on the perspectives of Chinese political decision-makers and the general populace is evident. Educator and writer Jiang Xueqin, based in China, has highlighted the indifference of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people toward the U.S. presidential election, a sentiment that reportedly intensified in 2020. Xueqin has emphasized the long-term struggle between the United States and China to shape the international order, asserting that both Trump and Biden were seen as key figures in initiating and institutionalizing a “Second Cold War.” This perspective reinforces the Chinese belief that the election of a new president would not significantly change U.S. policy toward China, as demonstrated by Biden’s actions during his tenure.
Currently, Chinese political leaders appear open to negotiations with the United States, despite prevailing negative attitudes among the Chinese public. This willingness was evident when Beijing hosted U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in April 2024. However, despite these diplomatic meetings, Beijing has consistently maintained a firm stance toward Washington. Chinese officials have responded to unfriendly statements from Yellen and Blinken with strong rhetoric, particularly concerning geopolitical and trade disputes between China and the U.S. Furthermore, China’s lack of interest in the 2024 U.S. presidential elections reflects the prevailing public sentiment in China, indicating diminished concern about U.S. policies targeting China. Meanwhile, disruptions in bilateral people-to-people communication have emerged for various reasons.
Some notable examples include the cessation of NBA game broadcasts on China’s CCTV Sports Channel since 2020 and a sharp decline in the number of U.S. students in China, dropping from 12,000 to fewer than 1,000 over the past five years. In an analysis dated August 7, 2024, Ian Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group, a leading geopolitical risk advisory firm, highlighted China’s perception of a bipartisan consensus in the United States to impede its natural growth and expansion of influence. Bremmer suggested that Chinese leaders view the differences between the two major political parties as revolving around the choice of economic and political tools, as well as the timing and manner of their implementation, rather than their fundamental objectives. This outlook reflects the Chinese leadership’s strategic approach to foreign policy, particularly in the context of its relations with the United States.
A Bloomberg perspective, aligning with the analysis presented by Ian Bremmer, suggests that neither candidate in the U.S. presidential election represents an ideal choice for China. This viewpoint was articulated by a former Chinese diplomat, who once served as a translator for the late leader Deng Xiaoping. The diplomat opined that one candidate is inclined to push the world toward conflict through Cold War logic, while the other is likely to enforce sanctions and tariffs on China, in line with an America-first agenda. He emphasized that, regardless of the election outcome, China should engage with the elected leader as they are, without harboring unrealistic expectations. Notably, Chinese officials have been advised to refrain from discussing the U.S. election or are permitted to express their views only on condition of anonymity, in adherence to the prescribed conduct for party cadres.
The Chinese leadership is expected to pursue foreign policy agendas that reflect long-term considerations, particularly in their interactions with the United States. However, the emphasis of the aforementioned discourse centers on the public perspective, highlighting the limited understanding of international politics among the Chinese public. This limitation is attributed to a lack of exposure to political participation and elections, leading to a simplified view of Western political dynamics. For instance, the Chinese public often categorizes political parties and candidates as either pro-China or anti-China, hindering their ability to grasp the nuanced intricacies of political systems and electoral processes in other countries. This, in turn, may foster a perception that Western politicians are uniformly hostile toward China.
Moreover, China’s long-term foreign policy considerations are not solely focused on the potential easing of trade tensions with the United States. The adaptability of the Chinese leadership plays a crucial role in shaping their strategic thinking. Over the past five years, their strategies have been influenced by the possibility of China facing complete isolation by the West, particularly regarding strategic reserves. This adaptability is a response to risks perceived during events such as the trade war initiated by Donald Trump, the extradition case of Meng Wanzhou, and the comprehensive sanctions imposed by Western countries against Russia.
The concept of “a small yard and high fence” has gained prominence in China’s official documents and academic analyses. This phrase reflects Beijing’s recognition that Chinese technological and foreign policies should prioritize self-reliance and security. It also informs China’s stance on multilateral cooperation, including the potential enlargement of BRICS and a closer examination of Global South dynamics. From the U.S. perspective, the upcoming debates between presidential candidates are expected to highlight their respective China policies. However, it is also crucial to consider the prevailing public sentiment regarding Sino-U.S. relations. This analysis aims to provide a fresh perspective by focusing on the mental states of the Chinese leadership and the public, and how these influence the China-U.S. relationship.
As Kamala Harris emerges as the new Democratic nominee and Trump faces unprecedented challenges, China remains notably silent, hinting at a strategic shift in how Beijing views the unfolding U.S. election drama.
Recent developments in the U.S. presidential election have been particularly noteworthy. Events such as an assassination attempt on Donald Trump, Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the race, and Kamala Harris’s emergence as the new Democratic nominee have made the election a global focal point. Amidst these occurrences, one notable aspect is China’s reticence. As the world’s second-largest economy, China has historically been a significant subject of discussion, particularly in the context of the Thucydides Trap. Given its growing global economic influence, China’s policies have long been central to U.S. presidential elections.
However, China’s silence on the matter has become a new trend. This highlights a broader concept of human adaptability, exemplified by East Asian travelers who have adjusted to longer flight times when avoiding Russian airspace en route to Europe. This ‘new normal’ has seamlessly integrated into their travel routines. Travelers may no longer recall that the flight duration between Beijing and Warsaw was once nine hours before Russia closed its airspace. The readiness of passengers to accept a journey of more than 11 hours reflects their adaptability to changing circumstances. Similarly, the impact of the U.S. presidential election on Chinese elites and the general population is a subject of considerable interest in international relations. It is plausible that individuals are recalibrating their perspectives in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape.
This phenomenon is exemplified by the collaborative efforts between Beijing and Washington in 2003 to curtail Chen Shui-bian’s referendum, which aimed to formalize Taiwan’s separation from China by establishing a new constitution. Additionally, the East Asia Strategy of U.S. President Barack Obama (2008–2016), known as the Pivot to Asia, sparked extensive policy discussions and academic debates in China, underscoring the significance of U.S. policies for both Chinese elites and the general public. However, Beijing’s shift in approach did not occur abruptly. The initiation of a trade dispute by Donald Trump in 2018, marked by the imposition of tariffs and other trade barriers on China, created apprehension among Chinese policymakers and the public. This unease can be partly attributed to the experiences of the current Chinese generation (born between the 1950s and 1990s), who grew up during a period of normalized U.S.-China relations since 1972. The idea of the U.S. once again targeting China was hardly considered conceivable, given the prevailing ideological discourse in China, which had shifted towards comparisons of national economic capabilities and living standards with those of the Western world.
Professor Zhang Weiwei, a prominent Chinese scholar of international relations at Fudan University, offers an interesting perspective. He emphasizes the “superiority of the China model” and describes the Belt and Road Initiative as “an unprecedented change in five thousand years.” His views reflect the sentiments of Chinese scholars born after the 1950s and are respected by political elites in Beijing. Zhang advocates for China’s political and economic system, encouraging Chinese citizens to be confident and see themselves as equals to the West, based on China’s unique governance experience and the rise of the middle class, rather than focusing on ideological confrontation. During the initial three years of the China-U.S. trade war (2018-2021), China actively sought to resolve the trade dispute with the U.S. through negotiations.
This was evidenced by the dispatch of negotiation teams, including President Xi Jinping’s special envoy, to Washington for consultations on multiple occasions. Notably, Chinese CCTV News consistently focused on the China-U.S. trade war in its international coverage prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of 2019. These instances collectively suggest that Chinese elites and the public initially struggled to adapt to the trade restrictions imposed by the U.S. The global political landscape has undergone significant developments over the past five years, marked by increasingly strained relations between China and several Western nations. This tension has been exacerbated by the global pandemic, the continuation of tariffs on Chinese imports by the Biden administration, and Western concerns over China’s reluctance to impose sanctions on Russia.
These multifaceted factors have subtly influenced Chinese attitudes toward interactions with the West and the pursuit of reconciliation. The impact of these complex geopolitical dynamics on the perspectives of Chinese political decision-makers and the general populace is evident. Educator and writer Jiang Xueqin, based in China, has highlighted the indifference of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people toward the U.S. presidential election, a sentiment that reportedly intensified in 2020. Xueqin has emphasized the long-term struggle between the United States and China to shape the international order, asserting that both Trump and Biden were seen as key figures in initiating and institutionalizing a “Second Cold War.” This perspective reinforces the Chinese belief that the election of a new president would not significantly change U.S. policy toward China, as demonstrated by Biden’s actions during his tenure.
Currently, Chinese political leaders appear open to negotiations with the United States, despite prevailing negative attitudes among the Chinese public. This willingness was evident when Beijing hosted U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in April 2024. However, despite these diplomatic meetings, Beijing has consistently maintained a firm stance toward Washington. Chinese officials have responded to unfriendly statements from Yellen and Blinken with strong rhetoric, particularly concerning geopolitical and trade disputes between China and the U.S. Furthermore, China’s lack of interest in the 2024 U.S. presidential elections reflects the prevailing public sentiment in China, indicating diminished concern about U.S. policies targeting China. Meanwhile, disruptions in bilateral people-to-people communication have emerged for various reasons.
Some notable examples include the cessation of NBA game broadcasts on China’s CCTV Sports Channel since 2020 and a sharp decline in the number of U.S. students in China, dropping from 12,000 to fewer than 1,000 over the past five years. In an analysis dated August 7, 2024, Ian Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group, a leading geopolitical risk advisory firm, highlighted China’s perception of a bipartisan consensus in the United States to impede its natural growth and expansion of influence. Bremmer suggested that Chinese leaders view the differences between the two major political parties as revolving around the choice of economic and political tools, as well as the timing and manner of their implementation, rather than their fundamental objectives. This outlook reflects the Chinese leadership’s strategic approach to foreign policy, particularly in the context of its relations with the United States.
A Bloomberg perspective, aligning with the analysis presented by Ian Bremmer, suggests that neither candidate in the U.S. presidential election represents an ideal choice for China. This viewpoint was articulated by a former Chinese diplomat, who once served as a translator for the late leader Deng Xiaoping. The diplomat opined that one candidate is inclined to push the world toward conflict through Cold War logic, while the other is likely to enforce sanctions and tariffs on China, in line with an America-first agenda. He emphasized that, regardless of the election outcome, China should engage with the elected leader as they are, without harboring unrealistic expectations. Notably, Chinese officials have been advised to refrain from discussing the U.S. election or are permitted to express their views only on condition of anonymity, in adherence to the prescribed conduct for party cadres.
The Chinese leadership is expected to pursue foreign policy agendas that reflect long-term considerations, particularly in their interactions with the United States. However, the emphasis of the aforementioned discourse centers on the public perspective, highlighting the limited understanding of international politics among the Chinese public. This limitation is attributed to a lack of exposure to political participation and elections, leading to a simplified view of Western political dynamics. For instance, the Chinese public often categorizes political parties and candidates as either pro-China or anti-China, hindering their ability to grasp the nuanced intricacies of political systems and electoral processes in other countries. This, in turn, may foster a perception that Western politicians are uniformly hostile toward China.
Moreover, China’s long-term foreign policy considerations are not solely focused on the potential easing of trade tensions with the United States. The adaptability of the Chinese leadership plays a crucial role in shaping their strategic thinking. Over the past five years, their strategies have been influenced by the possibility of China facing complete isolation by the West, particularly regarding strategic reserves. This adaptability is a response to risks perceived during events such as the trade war initiated by Donald Trump, the extradition case of Meng Wanzhou, and the comprehensive sanctions imposed by Western countries against Russia.
The concept of “a small yard and high fence” has gained prominence in China’s official documents and academic analyses. This phrase reflects Beijing’s recognition that Chinese technological and foreign policies should prioritize self-reliance and security. It also informs China’s stance on multilateral cooperation, including the potential enlargement of BRICS and a closer examination of Global South dynamics. From the U.S. perspective, the upcoming debates between presidential candidates are expected to highlight their respective China policies. However, it is also crucial to consider the prevailing public sentiment regarding Sino-U.S. relations. This analysis aims to provide a fresh perspective by focusing on the mental states of the Chinese leadership and the public, and how these influence the China-U.S. relationship.
Shiyu Li is a PhD candidate at the School of International Studies, University of Nottingham Ningbo, China. His research interests include China's Foreign Policy, International Relations Theories, and China-CEE Relations.
