This illustration has been created by AI to use only in this article.
In the aftermath of World War II, Europe had a death toll of approximately 36.5 million, catalyzing tensions into fully-fledged volatile relationships across the globe. The U.S. and the Soviet Union (USSR) rose as global superpowers and rivals at this time – the former championing democracy over the latter’s communism. As a facilitator in the years after the war ended, mounting distrust and instability across Europe were key to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) not only to boost political amalgamation and inhibit Soviet enlargement during the Cold War but also to ensure that nationalist militarism did not revitalize throughout Europe.
On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed between 12 nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Conceived as a peacetime military alliance, NATO has upheld its original commitment to provide collective security and military cooperation across Europe and North America. As the first NATO Sec. Gen. Hastings Ismay asserted, its aim was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” As a response to West Germany joining the alliance in 1955, the Warsaw Pact was formed the same year by the USSR, with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania joining.
The agreement sought to counterbalance NATO, along with bolstering Soviet control over its satellite states and introducing international diplomacy in hopes of a future East-West collective security pact. From the Cold War to now, NATO has increased its membership to 32 states (Allies), plus more than 40 non-member countries and international organizations referred to as NATO partners. This, along with a newfound concentration on political and military concerns ranging from terrorism to climate change, has led NATO to garner support from members and non-members alike. Since 1990, advocates of NATO’s existence have asserted that, as the world continues to evolve, so should the alliance. With its primary objectives of providing defense, stability, arms control, and the encouragement of political reform, it has been claimed that NATO is needed in the ever-changing realm of international politics.
Yet, the primary issue is that NATO has remained oriented toward Europe and North America, overlooking many allies worldwide. As the War in Ukraine continues and political unrest rises exponentially, NATO looks to immerse itself as a multidimensional security organization. Leaders within NATO believe that the alliance’s “Russia strategy,” in addition to its role as a potential global security actor, must be evaluated alongside its original commitment. However, the re-emergence of ‘legacy threats’—China, North Korea, and Russia—poses new challenges.
From Europe to Everywhere
From 1949 until the end of the Cold War in 1991, the primary intent behind NATO’s foundation was straightforward: to respond to any aggression by the USSR and its satellite states under the Warsaw Pact against NATO members and Europe in its entirety. The founding countries of the alliance held that the core function of NATO was to provide collective defense against a prospective Soviet attack – as Article 5 declares, “an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all allies.”
I
n the aftermath of World War II, Europe had a death toll of approximately 36.5 million, catalyzing tensions into fully-fledged volatile relationships across the globe. The U.S. and the Soviet Union (USSR) rose as global superpowers and rivals at this time – the former championing democracy over the latter’s communism. As a facilitator in the years after the war ended, mounting distrust and instability across Europe were key to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) not only to boost political amalgamation and inhibit Soviet enlargement during the Cold War but also to ensure that nationalist militarism did not revitalize throughout Europe.
On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed between 12 nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Conceived as a peacetime military alliance, NATO has upheld its original commitment to provide collective security and military cooperation across Europe and North America. As the first NATO Sec. Gen. Hastings Ismay asserted, its aim was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” As a response to West Germany joining the alliance in 1955, the Warsaw Pact was formed the same year by the USSR, with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania joining.
The agreement sought to counterbalance NATO, along with bolstering Soviet control over its satellite states and introducing international diplomacy in hopes of a future East-West collective security pact. From the Cold War to now, NATO has increased its membership to 32 states (Allies), plus more than 40 non-member countries and international organizations referred to as NATO partners. This, along with a newfound concentration on political and military concerns ranging from terrorism to climate change, has led NATO to garner support from members and non-members alike. Since 1990, advocates of NATO’s existence have asserted that, as the world continues to evolve, so should the alliance. With its primary objectives of providing defense, stability, arms control, and the encouragement of political reform, it has been claimed that NATO is needed in the ever-changing realm of international politics.
Yet, the primary issue is that NATO has remained oriented toward Europe and North America, overlooking many allies worldwide. As the War in Ukraine continues and political unrest rises exponentially, NATO looks to immerse itself as a multidimensional security organization. Leaders within NATO believe that the alliance’s “Russia strategy,” in addition to its role as a potential global security actor, must be evaluated alongside its original commitment. However, the re-emergence of ‘legacy threats’—China, North Korea, and Russia—poses new challenges.
From Europe to Everywhere
From 1949 until the end of the Cold War in 1991, the primary intent behind NATO’s foundation was straightforward: to respond to any aggression by the USSR and its satellite states under the Warsaw Pact against NATO members and Europe in its entirety. The founding countries of the alliance held that the core function of NATO was to provide collective defense against a prospective Soviet attack – as Article 5 declares, “an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all allies.”
Bassirou Diomaye Faye, 44, triumphs in Senegal’s elections, promising transformative economic reforms and renewed sovereignty after a landmark victory post-prison.
China’s rapid expansion into nuclear power raises questions between the allure of clean energy and the shadows of past disasters.
In June 1950, a year after the establishment of NATO, North Korea led an invasion of South Korea, headed by Communist leader Kim Il Sung and backed by the USSR. Thus began the Korean War, sparking fear among NATO members of a communist takeover. While NATO forces did not get involved in the war, it was the start of NATO’s contemplation on strengthening its commitment to Western Europe. Two years later, Greece and Türkiye became NATO members in response to facing civil wars and a communist rebellion concurrently. At the same time, the U.S. looked to promote the European Defense Community, which would have included a rearmed West Germany. This was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954. On May 9, 1955, West Germany was admitted to NATO; its immediate effect was the USSR’s creation of the Warsaw Pact just five days later. Throughout the Cold War, the configuration of NATO remained the same.
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the nuclear tactic of Massive Retaliation, which meant that NATO members could go from peace to complete nuclear war in response to an attack, was transformed into a more advantageous defense strategy. Flexible Response, which came to also be known as détente, meant the easing of hostilities and strained relationships. According to the U.S., using an assortment of diplomatic, economic, and military alternatives would allow for a more open exchange among East and West Europe. In 1979, the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan and use of ballistic missiles led to a suspension of détente. NATO constructed an offensive strategy positioned around deploying nuclear capabilities and ground missiles if a peaceful end was not reached soon. Until 1985, with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet Premier, the potential deployment of the missiles loomed until the U.S. and the USSR signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987.
This continued until the late 1980s when the Soviet Premier instituted a widespread series of reforms in the USSR. Gorbachev presented a new openness toward arms control, which led to a substantial reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Suspicious of his intentions and aware of a possible reversal of these reforms in the future, policymakers in the West cautiously responded to Gorbachev and his calls for a “common European home.” NATO’s first official response to global security efforts came in July 1990, with the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.. Acknowledging the changes to the USSR, leaders of NATO agreed on alterations to the structure of NATO’s forces, emphasized the crucial role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and instructed the alliance to formulate a new strategic concept and complementary defense strategy.
NATO was reconceptualized as a cooperative security organization with two key objectives: fostering dialogue and cooperation with former Warsaw Pact adversaries and managing conflicts on Europe’s periphery. The subsequent breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany appeared to have ended the threat of a Soviet-led invasion that had been NATO’s core concern since its inception. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the alliance and its member states were forced to adapt to a new security environment. This global shift in Europe’s security landscape led historians and scholars to question NATO’s necessity, prompting the alliance to reassess its role in providing multilateral collective defense in the 21st century. Many U.S. officials believed that NATO’s post–Cold War vision should extend beyond its core defense commitments and focus on addressing challenges outside its membership.
NATO enlargement was still widely debated throughout the mid-1990s, as policymakers and analysts investigated its implications, costs, and results. The United States held a general belief at the time that NATO was becoming obsolete, as U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar stated in a 1993 speech that the “common denominator of all the new security problems in Europe is that they all lie beyond NATO’s current borders.” On the other hand, the United Kingdom feared that the expansion of the alliance would dilute the alliance, while France believed it would give NATO, most notably the United States, excessive influence. The principal unease shared by most member states was centered around the effect of enlargement on Russia, with fears that the expansion of NATO to the East could threaten its fragile democracy and prospective cooperation between Russia and Western democracies. During this time, Europe and North America remained at the top of the alliance’s security priorities.
In June 1950, a year after the establishment of NATO, North Korea led an invasion of South Korea, headed by Communist leader Kim Il Sung and backed by the USSR. Thus began the Korean War, sparking fear among NATO members of a communist takeover. While NATO forces did not get involved in the war, it was the start of NATO’s contemplation on strengthening its commitment to Western Europe. Two years later, Greece and Türkiye became NATO members in response to facing civil wars and a communist rebellion concurrently. At the same time, the U.S. looked to promote the European Defense Community, which would have included a rearmed West Germany. This was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954. On May 9, 1955, West Germany was admitted to NATO; its immediate effect was the USSR’s creation of the Warsaw Pact just five days later. Throughout the Cold War, the configuration of NATO remained the same.
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the nuclear tactic of Massive Retaliation, which meant that NATO members could go from peace to complete nuclear war in response to an attack, was transformed into a more advantageous defense strategy. Flexible Response, which came to also be known as détente, meant the easing of hostilities and strained relationships. According to the U.S., using an assortment of diplomatic, economic, and military alternatives would allow for a more open exchange among East and West Europe. In 1979, the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan and use of ballistic missiles led to a suspension of détente. NATO constructed an offensive strategy positioned around deploying nuclear capabilities and ground missiles if a peaceful end was not reached soon. Until 1985, with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet Premier, the potential deployment of the missiles loomed until the U.S. and the USSR signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987.
This continued until the late 1980s when the Soviet Premier instituted a widespread series of reforms in the USSR. Gorbachev presented a new openness toward arms control, which led to a substantial reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Suspicious of his intentions and aware of a possible reversal of these reforms in the future, policymakers in the West cautiously responded to Gorbachev and his calls for a “common European home.” NATO’s first official response to global security efforts came in July 1990, with the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.. Acknowledging the changes to the USSR, leaders of NATO agreed on alterations to the structure of NATO’s forces, emphasized the crucial role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and instructed the alliance to formulate a new strategic concept and complementary defense strategy.
NATO was reconceptualized as a cooperative security organization with two key objectives: fostering dialogue and cooperation with former Warsaw Pact adversaries and managing conflicts on Europe’s periphery. The subsequent breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany appeared to have ended the threat of a Soviet-led invasion that had been NATO’s core concern since its inception. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the alliance and its member states were forced to adapt to a new security environment. This global shift in Europe’s security landscape led historians and scholars to question NATO’s necessity, prompting the alliance to reassess its role in providing multilateral collective defense in the 21st century. Many U.S. officials believed that NATO’s post–Cold War vision should extend beyond its core defense commitments and focus on addressing challenges outside its membership.
NATO enlargement was still widely debated throughout the mid-1990s, as policymakers and analysts investigated its implications, costs, and results. The United States held a general belief at the time that NATO was becoming obsolete, as U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar stated in a 1993 speech that the “common denominator of all the new security problems in Europe is that they all lie beyond NATO’s current borders.” On the other hand, the United Kingdom feared that the expansion of the alliance would dilute the alliance, while France believed it would give NATO, most notably the United States, excessive influence. The principal unease shared by most member states was centered around the effect of enlargement on Russia, with fears that the expansion of NATO to the East could threaten its fragile democracy and prospective cooperation between Russia and Western democracies. During this time, Europe and North America remained at the top of the alliance’s security priorities.
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council – replaced by the all-encompassing Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997 – provided an open environment for discussion between NATO and non-NATO members on political and security matters, as well as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, which was created to enhance European security and stability through joint military training exercises with NATO and non-NATO states, including former Warsaw Pact members. Then, in 1995, the alliance published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement, which measured hypothetical advantages of admitting new members and how they should be incorporated.
The study held that the post-Cold War era offered a rare opportunity for the alliance to develop enhanced security measures across the entire Euro-Atlantic and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all. NATO invited Czechia, Hungary, and Poland to begin the accession process at the 1997 Summit – these were the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999. At the 1999 Summit, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched to help other hopeful countries prepare for membership. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the alliance’s summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004.
Concrete expansion into transnational security operations literally began the day after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. On September 12, 2001, NATO met in an impromptu session and, for the first and only time in its history, invoked Article 5. All 18 of the United States’ allies pledged support for their response to the attacks. In addition to a review of the alliance’s intelligence structures, several initial support measures were agreed upon at the request of the United States, such as enhanced intelligence-sharing on terrorism, assistance to allies and other states facing increased terrorist threats due to their support for the counterterrorism campaign, blanket overflight clearances for military flights related to counterterrorism operations, access to ports and airfields for such operations, and the deployment of NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean.
In addition, a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit was set up to improve intelligence-sharing and analysis on terrorism, using civilian and military intelligence from both the alliance and its partner states to provide assessments to NATO’s Council and staff. From 2001 until 2021, troops from NATO allies fought together with American soldiers in Afghanistan. The alliance developed a consistent policy concerning terrorism, which included the forceful condemnation of all terrorist acts, a commitment to unity and solidarity with its members, and a determination to combat terrorism. NATO additionally launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) as an offer to engage in real-world security cooperation activities with the Broader Middle East.
In 2002, NATO leaders and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a declaration on NATO-Russia Relations, which established the NATO-Russia Council as a consensus-based body of equal members. The NATO-Russia Council led to collaboration in counterterrorism, crisis management, arms control, and theatre missile defense. NATO and Russia also cooperated in supporting efforts in Afghanistan—including Russia’s provision of transit routes for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), counter-narcotics training for officers from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan, and assistance for the Afghan helicopter fleet.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the alliance and its member states were forced to adapt to a new security environment.
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the alliance’s summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004. At the 2008 Summit, NATO leaders made significant strides related to the opportunity for alliance enlargement—viewing the integration of Western Balkan countries as essential to guaranteeing long-term, self-sustaining stability and security. NATO had been heavily engaged in peace-support operations in the Western Balkans since the mid-1990s, culminating in the NATO membership of Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and the Republic of North Macedonia in 2020. NATO had also agreed that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already in Intensified Dialogues with the alliance, would eventually become members at the 2008 Summit. Later that year, NATO leaders decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in their efforts to meet membership requirements through the NATO-Ukraine Commission—now the NATO-Ukraine Council—and the NATO-Georgia Commission.
Russia’s Red Line
Whether it’s the Soviet Union or Russia, the Eastern European nation has had a cyclical relationship with NATO, reinstating itself as an international security concern from the alliance’s start to the present day. Throughout its history, Moscow has always chosen to be close to either North Korea or China—but never at the same time. Since his election in 1999, Putin’s aggression against NATO has steadily increased. The alliance promised Ukraine and Georgia, both former Soviet republics, that they could one day join; the eastward growth of NATO has angered Moscow, which has periodically issued warnings that attempts to expand to its borders are a “direct threat.” Putin’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shattered Europe’s contemporary security framework, prompted a major reevaluation of the foreign policies and defense commitments of NATO members, and produced the greatest tensions between Russia and NATO in the post-Cold War era.
Under Putin’s rule, Moscow has systematically challenged international norms and undermined regional stability. Since the early 1990s, Russia has illegally occupied Moldova’s Transnistria region, maintaining a military presence despite international opposition. In 2008, it invaded Georgia, occupying parts of the country to this day while exerting political influence over its governance. In 2014, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine, illegally annexing Crimea, and in 2022, it escalated the conflict further with a full-scale war. Meanwhile, Moscow has aggressively militarized the Arctic, reopening Soviet-era bases and constructing new military installations to reinforce its territorial claims in the Arctic and even Antarctica.
Beyond direct military aggression, Russia has employed economic coercion, using embargoes and trade restrictions to intimidate its European neighbors. It has also engaged in a broad spectrum of “gray zone” operations—subversive activities that fall short of open warfare—including election interference, cyberattacks, targeted assassinations, GPS jamming, and even the weaponization of migration to destabilize NATO allies and partners. At the same time, Russia has significantly expanded both its conventional and nuclear military capabilities while systematically violating, suspending, or withdrawing from key international arms control treaties, including the New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Open Skies Agreement.
Beijing and Pyongyang
Unease over Indo-Pacific security has grown significantly as NATO has garnered an interest in global defense and deterrence. NATO’s ability to address traditional and unconventional threats in Europe has now become intertwined with the alliance’s security interests concerning China and North Korea. The People’s Republic of China’s goals and “assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to alliance security,” as it has been accused of employing “coercive policies,” modernizing its armed forces, and working to undermine the global order through disinformation.
NATO is not a neutral or impartial organization, as the objective of NATO is to defend its member states.
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council – replaced by the all-encompassing Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997 – provided an open environment for discussion between NATO and non-NATO members on political and security matters, as well as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, which was created to enhance European security and stability through joint military training exercises with NATO and non-NATO states, including former Warsaw Pact members. Then, in 1995, the alliance published the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement, which measured hypothetical advantages of admitting new members and how they should be incorporated.
The study held that the post-Cold War era offered a rare opportunity for the alliance to develop enhanced security measures across the entire Euro-Atlantic and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all. NATO invited Czechia, Hungary, and Poland to begin the accession process at the 1997 Summit – these were the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999. At the 1999 Summit, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched to help other hopeful countries prepare for membership. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the alliance’s summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004.
Concrete expansion into transnational security operations literally began the day after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. On September 12, 2001, NATO met in an impromptu session and, for the first and only time in its history, invoked Article 5. All 18 of the United States’ allies pledged support for their response to the attacks. In addition to a review of the alliance’s intelligence structures, several initial support measures were agreed upon at the request of the United States, such as enhanced intelligence-sharing on terrorism, assistance to allies and other states facing increased terrorist threats due to their support for the counterterrorism campaign, blanket overflight clearances for military flights related to counterterrorism operations, access to ports and airfields for such operations, and the deployment of NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean.
In addition, a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit was set up to improve intelligence-sharing and analysis on terrorism, using civilian and military intelligence from both the alliance and its partner states to provide assessments to NATO’s Council and staff. From 2001 until 2021, troops from NATO allies fought together with American soldiers in Afghanistan. The alliance developed a consistent policy concerning terrorism, which included the forceful condemnation of all terrorist acts, a commitment to unity and solidarity with its members, and a determination to combat terrorism. NATO additionally launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) as an offer to engage in real-world security cooperation activities with the Broader Middle East.
In 2002, NATO leaders and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a declaration on NATO-Russia Relations, which established the NATO-Russia Council as a consensus-based body of equal members. The NATO-Russia Council led to collaboration in counterterrorism, crisis management, arms control, and theatre missile defense. NATO and Russia also cooperated in supporting efforts in Afghanistan—including Russia’s provision of transit routes for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), counter-narcotics training for officers from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan, and assistance for the Afghan helicopter fleet.
Presently, China does not pose a direct military threat to NATO and its members—unlike Russia, North Korea, or terrorist organizations—yet Beijing’s international economic and diplomatic vigor is certain to have major implications for the transatlantic economy and security. China was first recognized as an important topic at the 2019 Summit when NATO leaders argued that its “growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an alliance.
It took Chinese behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, diplomatic and economic coercion across Europe, territorial disputes over Bhutan, India, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the South China Sea, and enhanced security ties with Russia for China to be perceived as a security concern. Ironically, for both China and NATO, one of the predominant concerns is exactly how to tackle North Korea’s nuclear and missile proliferation. NATO leaders have expressed concern over North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and violations of arms control rules. NATO has called on North Korea to cease its provocative actions and return to dialogue to achieve sustainable peace and the complete and attested denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Last month, North Korea denounced Japan’s recent opening of a new diplomatic mission for military cooperation with NATO, accusing the country of “dangerously escalating… military tension in the region… pursuant to the United States’ strategy for world domination to expand NATO’s sphere of influence into the Asia-Pacific region.” In addition, Sino-North Korean relations have theoretically been consistent, as they have had a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty calling for mutual assistance if either is attacked since 1961. However, with a defense pact between North Korea and Russia, a rare alignment has emerged for the United States and China to work together for stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Digital Battlefront
In the same vein, the Alliance’s mission for transatlantic peace and stability has been consistently thwarted by cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and more. None of these challenges are new to NATO but moving from a traditional military collective defense to a more comprehensive security framework has required a similar change in strategies to counter the threats.
NATO has been adapting to information threats since its creation, but in recent years, it has faced a sharp increase in hostile information operations, foreign interference in critical infrastructure, and disinformation linked to contemporary terrorism. Adversaries such as China, North Korea, and Russia have integrated cyberattacks and disinformation into their standard warfare tactics, exploiting the digitalized and interconnected world to undermine democratic institutions, destabilize societies, and erode public trust.
By taking advantage of open networks, these actors target civilian values and security, often using proxies to amplify their impact. Their goal is not only to disrupt but also to create division and uncertainty within societies. In response, NATO has strengthened its approach to countering information threats by enhancing its understanding of the information environment, preventing the spread and impact of disinformation, mitigating and containing incidents as they arise, and continuously learning from past experiences to build resilience. Through proactive communication and strategic adaptation, NATO remains committed to safeguarding democratic principles and the security of its member states in an evolving information landscape.
Legal Authority vs. Military Power
Both founded in the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization given legal status and is often responsible for making international laws focused on maintaining peace, security, and cooperation around the world. Due to its goal of being instituted as an international body of global nations, there are no geographical restrictions on members joining the UN. NATO, on the other hand, is a transnational military alliance that exists to protect its members, partners, and territories through defensive and, if attacked, offensive measures. Although both were formed to preserve peace and security in their respective regions, the UN and NATO did not directly collaborate until the 1990s. Relations between the UN and NATO have remained a sensitive topic, as both organizations “have overlapping yet distinctly different histories, tasks, and memberships.”
The key difference between the two is that the UN acts as an international arbitrator and must be as neutral as possible, acting impartially in conflicts, disputes, and disagreements. NATO is not a neutral or impartial organization, as the objective of NATO is to defend its member states. In “troubled regions” such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Darfur, Iraq, Somalia, and more, the UN Security Council Resolutions have provided mandates for missions in these locations, while NATO has provided support to UN-sponsored operations. In 2008, the first agreement was passed for broadened consultations and cooperation; a modified Joint Declaration setting out plans for future cooperation between NATO and the UN was signed a decade later. NATO’s Strategic Concept, the alliance’s core policy document published in 2022, commits NATO to prevent crises, manage conflicts, and ensure stability for fragile states by reinforcing coordination and cooperation with the UN and the European Union.
Beyond the Transatlantic Alliance
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and NATO is similar. As the EU is a supranational economic and political coalition, it pursues its own foreign policy based on consensus, as members cede some authority and sovereignty to the group and equip it with defensive and crisis management tools. It is important to note that NATO is not a supranational organization, as it allows members to meet and make collective decisions, enabling them to achieve national security objectives through a communal effort. The two organizations share common values, strategic interests, and a majority of member countries. The EU and NATO have aligned joint efforts in addressing strategic challenges posed by Russia and China, the security situation in the Western Balkans and the Middle East, cyber and hybrid threats, and fighting disinformation.
Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both organizations have demonstrated their political unity and efforts in solidarity. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since late 2005, while an EU Cell was set up at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in March 2006. Cooperation has significantly expanded in recent years, building on three Joint Declarations (2016, 2018, and 2023), as well as the NATO Strategic Concept and EU Strategic Compass in 2022. NATO and the EU currently have 23 members in common; the predominant claim held is that, for the development of the partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU allies’ fullest involvement in EU defense efforts is vital in the coming years.
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the alliance’s summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004. At the 2008 Summit, NATO leaders made significant strides related to the opportunity for alliance enlargement—viewing the integration of Western Balkan countries as
essential to guaranteeing long-term, self-sustaining stability and security. NATO had been heavily engaged in peace-support operations in the Western Balkans since the mid-1990s, culminating in the NATO membership of Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and the Republic of North Macedonia in 2020. NATO had also agreed that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already in Intensified Dialogues with the alliance, would eventually become members at the 2008 Summit. Later that year, NATO leaders decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in their efforts to meet membership requirements through the NATO-Ukraine Commission—now the NATO-Ukraine Council—and the NATO-Georgia Commission.
Russia’s Red Line
Whether it’s the Soviet Union or Russia, the Eastern European nation has had a cyclical relationship with NATO, reinstating itself as an international security concern from the alliance’s start to the present day. Throughout its history, Moscow has always chosen to be close to either North Korea or China—but never at the same time. Since his election in 1999, Putin’s aggression against NATO has steadily increased. The alliance promised Ukraine and Georgia, both former Soviet republics, that they could one day join; the eastward growth of NATO has angered Moscow, which has periodically issued warnings that attempts to expand to its borders are a “direct threat.” Putin’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shattered Europe’s contemporary security framework, prompted a major reevaluation of the foreign policies and defense commitments of NATO members, and produced the greatest tensions between Russia and NATO in the post-Cold War era.
Under Putin’s rule, Moscow has systematically challenged international norms and undermined regional stability. Since the early 1990s, Russia has illegally occupied Moldova’s Transnistria region, maintaining a military presence despite international opposition. In 2008, it invaded Georgia, occupying parts of the country to this day while exerting political influence over its governance. In 2014, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine, illegally annexing Crimea, and in 2022, it escalated the conflict further with a full-scale war. Meanwhile, Moscow has aggressively militarized the Arctic, reopening Soviet-era bases and constructing new military installations to reinforce its territorial claims in the Arctic and even Antarctica.
Beyond direct military aggression, Russia has employed economic coercion, using embargoes and trade restrictions to intimidate its European neighbors. It has also engaged in a broad spectrum of “gray zone” operations—subversive activities that fall short of open warfare—including election interference, cyberattacks, targeted assassinations, GPS jamming, and even the weaponization of migration to destabilize NATO allies and partners. At the same time, Russia has significantly expanded both its conventional and nuclear military capabilities while systematically violating, suspending, or withdrawing from key international arms control treaties, including the New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Open Skies Agreement.
Beijing and Pyongyang
Unease over Indo-Pacific security has grown significantly as NATO has garnered an interest in global defense and deterrence. NATO’s ability to address traditional and unconventional threats in Europe has now become intertwined with the alliance’s security interests concerning China and North Korea. The People’s Republic of China’s goals and “assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to alliance security,” as it has been accused of employing “coercive policies,” modernizing its armed forces, and working to undermine the global order through disinformation.
Presently, China does not pose a direct military threat to NATO and its members—unlike Russia, North Korea, or terrorist organizations—yet Beijing’s international economic and diplomatic vigor is certain to have major implications for the transatlantic economy and security. China was first recognized as an important topic at the 2019 Summit when NATO leaders argued that its “growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an alliance.”
It took Chinese behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, diplomatic and economic coercion across Europe, territorial disputes over Bhutan, India, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the South China Sea, and enhanced security ties with Russia for China to be perceived as a security concern. Ironically, for both China and NATO, one of the predominant concerns is exactly how to tackle North Korea’s nuclear and missile proliferation. NATO leaders have expressed concern over North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and violations of arms control rules. NATO has called on North Korea to cease its provocative actions and return to dialogue to achieve sustainable peace and the complete and attested denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Last month, North Korea denounced Japan’s recent opening of a new diplomatic mission for military cooperation with NATO, accusing the country of “dangerously escalating… military tension in the region… pursuant to the United States’ strategy for world domination to expand NATO’s sphere of influence into the Asia-Pacific region.” In addition, Sino-North Korean relations have theoretically been consistent, as they have had a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty calling for mutual assistance if either is attacked since 1961. However, with a defense pact between North Korea and Russia, a rare alignment has emerged for the United States and China to work together for stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Digital Battlefront
In the same vein, the Alliance’s mission for transatlantic peace and stability has been consistently thwarted by cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and more. None of these challenges are new to NATO but moving from a traditional military collective defense to a more comprehensive security framework has required a similar change in strategies to counter the threats.
NATO has been adapting to information threats since its creation, but in recent years, it has faced a sharp increase in hostile information operations, foreign interference in critical infrastructure, and disinformation linked to contemporary terrorism. Adversaries such as China, North Korea, and Russia have integrated cyberattacks and disinformation into their standard warfare tactics, exploiting the digitalized and interconnected world to undermine democratic institutions, destabilize societies, and erode public trust.
By taking advantage of open networks, these actors target civilian values and security, often using proxies to amplify their impact. Their goal is not only to disrupt but also to create division and uncertainty within societies. In response, NATO has strengthened its approach to countering information threats by enhancing its understanding of the information environment, preventing the spread and impact of disinformation, mitigating and containing incidents as they arise, and continuously learning from past experiences to build resilience. Through proactive communication and strategic adaptation, NATO remains committed to safeguarding democratic principles and the security of its member states in an evolving information landscape.
Legal Authority vs. Military Power
Both founded in the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization given legal status and is often responsible for making international laws focused on maintaining peace, security, and cooperation around the world. Due to its goal of being instituted as an international body of global nations, there are no geographical restrictions on members joining the UN. NATO, on the other hand, is a transnational military alliance that exists to protect its members, partners, and territories through defensive and, if attacked, offensive measures. Although both were formed to preserve peace and security in their respective regions, the UN and NATO did not directly collaborate until the 1990s. Relations between the UN and NATO have remained a sensitive topic, as both organizations “have overlapping yet distinctly different histories, tasks, and memberships.”
The key difference between the two is that the UN acts as an international arbitrator and must be as neutral as possible, acting impartially in conflicts, disputes, and disagreements. NATO is not a neutral or impartial organization, as the objective of NATO is to defend its member states. In “troubled regions” such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Darfur, Iraq, Somalia, and more, the UN Security Council Resolutions have provided mandates for missions in these locations, while NATO has provided support to UN-sponsored operations. In 2008, the first agreement was passed for broadened consultations and cooperation; a modified Joint Declaration setting out plans for future cooperation between NATO and the UN was signed a decade later. NATO’s Strategic Concept, the alliance’s core policy document published in 2022, commits NATO to prevent crises, manage conflicts, and ensure stability for fragile states by reinforcing coordination and cooperation with the UN and the European Union.
Beyond the Transatlantic Alliance
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and NATO is similar. As the EU is a supranational economic and political coalition, it pursues its own foreign policy based on consensus, as members cede some authority and sovereignty to the group and equip it with defensive and crisis management tools. It is important to note that NATO is not a supranational organization, as it allows members to meet and make collective decisions, enabling them to achieve national security objectives through a communal effort. The two organizations share common values, strategic interests, and a majority of member countries. The EU and NATO have aligned joint efforts in addressing strategic challenges posed by Russia and China, the security situation in the Western Balkans and the Middle East, cyber and hybrid threats, and fighting disinformation.
Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both organizations have demonstrated their political unity and efforts in solidarity. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since late 2005, while an EU Cell was set up at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in March 2006. Cooperation has significantly expanded in recent years, building on three Joint Declarations (2016, 2018, and 2023), as well as the NATO Strategic Concept and EU Strategic Compass in 2022. NATO and the EU currently have 23 members in common; the predominant claim held is that, for the development of the partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU allies’ fullest involvement in EU defense efforts is vital in the coming years.
IP4 & NATO
NATO has been focusing on strengthening dialogue and cooperation with its four main partners in the Indo-Pacific region—Australia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea and New Zealand. In today’s complex security environment, NATO’s relations with like-minded partners are increasingly important for addressing advanced security issues and global challenges. Cultivating a mutual relationship with the Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4) is important for the alliance, as developments in the region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. NATO and the IP4 have built partnerships over common strategic concerns and are working together to uphold the rules-based international order.
At this time, NATO’s focus on the Indo-Pacific is quite limited. As NATO undertook missions outside of its European area of focus—such as efforts in Afghanistan, counter-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean, or supporting Ukraine in its defensive efforts—having countries to partner with in the Indo-Pacific area who were also outside of the European area was seen as a major advantage but almost unattainable. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, strong partnerships in the Indo-Pacific have come to the forefront of NATO; each of the IP4 countries has signed Individually Tailored Partnership Programs (ITPPs) to identify similar areas of mutual bilateral interest for potential cooperation and has assisted in at least one NATO mission.
NATO’s American Dilemma
At a time when global partnerships are at the height of NATO members’ and its partners’ concerns, uncertainty surrounding the United States’ commitment to NATO has grown exponentially in recent years. United States officials insinuated at the 2025 Munich Security Conference that European allies continue to underinvest in their militaries and rely disproportionately on American security guarantees; in total, U.S. leaders have begun to claim that Europe must do more for its own defense. NATO leaders in Canada and across Europe have now contemplated the reliability of American leadership, the extent to which Europe can or must stand on its own, and the implications of a world in which the security guarantees of the United States can no longer be taken for granted.
Concurrently, the second Trump administration has been standing behind its departure from traditional United States diplomacy with its isolationist “America First” policies. As the West’s foremost defense organization, NATO has come under fire as the United States’ president has often criticized its members for not meeting defense spending commitments and questioned the value of long-standing international institutions. At the same time, American hegemony is being contested in a multipolar world. The fundamental reasoning behind the United States’ leadership in the alliance no longer holds, as today’s geopolitical realities have little in common with the past NATO was built to secure.
The United States’ present strategic challenge is global, as the growing alliance between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has presented itself as both a security concern and a strategic dilemma for the Trump administration. NATO leaders are concerned that the Trump administration will pull back from alliances reinstated by former President Biden or potentially withdraw military and economic support in adversarial regions where China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are involved.
Without the United States, NATO would face significant challenges, as it has played a critical role in the alliance’s ability to provide deterrence and defense. The alliance heavily relies on the United States as a nuclear umbrella and for its key capabilities in operational intelligence, air-to-air refueling, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and more. NATO’s ability to sustain a long-term fight and act as a transnational security actor would be tested, as Europe would have to depend on Canada, France, and the United Kingdom—all of which are unable to provide comprehensive coverage equivalent to the United States’ nuclear arsenal.
Differences in strategic priorities do not come from just the United States. Several Alliance members and partners have raised questions about NATO’s agenda taking a more defensive stance against China, worried it could sever political and economic cooperation with Beijing. Many aligned with NATO rely heavily on trading and investment from China, neglecting dependencies and opportunities for Chinese coercion that the economic ties created. These Allies also insist that the Alliance should focus solely on its mission of Euro-Atlantic security and refrain from expanding to the Indo-Pacific. The evolving dynamics of transatlantic cooperation in China highlight the urgent need for updated and coordinated strategies from the United States and Europe.
Adapting to a Multipolar World
In recent years, NATO has taken several actions to strengthen its defense and deterrence. Due to the war in Ukraine, NATO has resumed its more traditional defensive strategies (without U.S. forces), as alliance forces in the East have increased significantly, along with its ability to reinforce any ally that comes under threat. A new generation of regional defense plans was agreed upon at the 2023 Summit, which will significantly improve the coherence of NATO’s collective defense planning with the allies’ national forces, posture, capabilities, and command and control. In addition, a new NATO Force Model was introduced to expand high-readiness forces, along with the Strategic Space Situational Awareness System (3SAS), a structure designed to better understand space events and their effects.
With the new NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge in 2024, members of the alliance will increase defense spending (at least 2% of GDP on defense, and at least 20% of defense expenditures for new major equipment spending, including research and development). Allies will also assist in restocking NATO arsenals while simultaneously supporting Ukraine through the foundation of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). Five new multinational cooperation initiatives were also launched in the same year, in which allies introduced projects to enhance interoperability, including new Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). NATO also initiated Baltic Sentry, a military activity to protect critical undersea infrastructure, at the start of 2025.
NATO has taken significant strides in the cyber realm with the Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC), the NATO Integrated Cyber Defense Centre, an AI Strategy, and the development of an Autonomy Implementation Plan. All of this is to say that, with the spread of Islamist extremism, Russian exceptionalism, renewed ethnic conflicts, the proliferation of weapons, widespread poverty, transnational organized crime, and a rise in nationalist rhetoric around the world, NATO is on course to fundamentally alter transatlantic relations as it shapes itself into an all-encompassing global security actor.
However, a range of security concerns—from the United States’ internal policies to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; from climate change to trade embargoes; and from cyberwarfare to Chinese, Russian, and North Korean provocation—could lead to NATO members and partners clashing repeatedly. That is, unless the core mission of NATO is transformed from a purely military alliance into a multidimensional diplomatic, defensive, and economic organization. The Alliance must prove and reinforce itself as a transnational security framework without the guarantee of U.S. support. Overarching policies that govern relations within the liberal international order must be anchored in principled values and designed to defend the liberal international order.
In contrast, executive relations and policies between international orders must prioritize rules-based cooperation in areas of shared interests instead of imposing liberal democracy. For NATO, dedicated members and partners should acknowledge the importance of the past while also adapting to the new global order—a multipolar one that diminishes the importance of the alliance—which requires NATO to differentiate between the global rules-based order and the liberal international order, of which NATO is viewed as a key institution. From the Cold War to the War in Afghanistan, NATO has accomplished much in its time, but this is not to say that it will not struggle in the future.
After 30 years, NATO is returning to an era of great power competition as the influence of the liberal international order dwindles. To act as a transnational security organization, the alliance will have to continue its path of change, specifically through strategic partnerships. Neither the NATO 2030 Initiative nor the 2022 Strategic Concept has spurred a revision of the programs, agreements, and procedures designed to assist partners in implementing global security objectives. NATO partnerships should enhance, complement, and extend the effects of allied policies—especially toward the Indo-Pacific Four and third-party countries—while remaining cognizant of potential conflicts.
Relying on outdated structures and mechanisms to strengthen the alliance’s resilience against existing and imminent security threats is no way for the world to progress when the international order is repeating itself. To uphold the instrumental value of partnerships for allies, NATO must remain a steadfast and efficient actor in its international security efforts. Throughout the alliance’s history, transformation has been the root cause of its ability to do what it has done best since 1949: deliver security where and when it matters. Though efforts have been made in cybersecurity and the modernization of NATO’s force structure—such as the three-tiered Allied Reaction Force (ARF)—there is still work that needs to be done for NATO to become a fully capable global security framework. In the wise words of former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO has changed as the world has changed,” so one can only wait to see what the future will bring.
IP4 & NATO
NATO has been focusing on strengthening dialogue and cooperation with its four main partners in the Indo-Pacific region—Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. In today’s complex security environment, NATO’s relations with like-minded partners are increasingly important for addressing advanced security issues and global challenges. Cultivating a mutual relationship with the Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4) is important for the alliance, as developments in the region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. NATO and the IP4 have built partnerships over common strategic concerns and are working together to uphold the rules-based international order.
At this time, NATO’s focus on the Indo-Pacific is quite limited. As NATO undertook missions outside of its European area of focus—such as efforts in Afghanistan, counter-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean, or supporting Ukraine in its defensive efforts—having countries to partner with in the Indo-Pacific area who were also outside of the European area was seen as a major advantage but almost unattainable. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, strong partnerships in the Indo-Pacific have come to the forefront of NATO; each of the IP4 countries has signed Individually Tailored Partnership Programs (ITPPs) to identify similar areas of mutual bilateral interest for potential cooperation and has assisted in at least one NATO mission.
NATO’s American Dilemma
At a time when global partnerships are at the height of NATO members’ and its partners’ concerns, uncertainty surrounding the United States’ commitment to NATO has grown exponentially in recent years. United States officials insinuated at the 2025 Munich Security Conference that European allies continue to underinvest in their militaries and rely disproportionately on American security guarantees; in total, U.S. leaders have begun to claim that Europe must do more for its own defense. NATO leaders in Canada and across Europe have now contemplated the reliability of American leadership, the extent to which Europe can or must stand on its own, and the implications of a world in which the security guarantees of the United States can no longer be taken for granted.
Concurrently, the second Trump administration has been standing behind its departure from traditional United States diplomacy with its isolationist “America First” policies. As the West’s foremost defense organization, NATO has come under fire as the United States’ president has often criticized its members for not meeting defense spending commitments and questioned the value of long-standing international institutions. At the same time, American hegemony is being contested in a multipolar world. The fundamental reasoning behind the United States’ leadership in the alliance no longer holds, as today’s geopolitical realities have little in common with the past NATO was built to secure.
The United States’ present strategic challenge is global, as the growing alliance between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has presented itself as both a security concern and a strategic dilemma for the Trump administration. NATO leaders are concerned that the Trump administration will pull back from alliances reinstated by former President Biden or potentially withdraw military and economic support in adversarial regions where China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are involved.
Without the United States, NATO would face significant challenges, as it has played a critical role in the alliance’s ability to provide deterrence and defense. The alliance heavily relies on the United States as a nuclear umbrella and for its key capabilities in operational intelligence, air-to-air refueling, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and more. NATO’s ability to sustain a long-term fight and act as a transnational security actor would be tested, as Europe would have to depend on Canada, France, and the United Kingdom—all of which are unable to provide comprehensive coverage equivalent to the United States’ nuclear arsenal.
Differences in strategic priorities do not come from just the United States. Several Alliance members and partners have raised questions about NATO’s agenda taking a more defensive stance against China, worried it could sever political and economic cooperation with Beijing. Many aligned with NATO rely heavily on trading and investment from China, neglecting dependencies and opportunities for Chinese coercion that the economic ties created. These Allies also insist that the Alliance should focus solely on its mission of Euro-Atlantic security and refrain from expanding to the Indo-Pacific. The evolving dynamics of transatlantic cooperation in China highlight the urgent need for updated and coordinated strategies from the United States and Europe.
Adapting to a Multipolar World
In recent years, NATO has taken several actions to strengthen its defense and deterrence. Due to the war in Ukraine, NATO has resumed its more traditional defensive strategies (without U.S. forces), as alliance forces in the East have increased significantly, along with its ability to reinforce any ally that comes under threat. A new generation of regional defense plans was agreed upon at the 2023 Summit, which will significantly improve the coherence of NATO’s collective defense planning with the allies’ national forces, posture, capabilities, and command and control. In addition, a new NATO Force Model was introduced to expand high-readiness forces, along with the Strategic Space Situational Awareness System (3SAS), a structure designed to better understand space events and their effects.
With the new NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge in 2024, members of the alliance will increase defense spending (at least 2% of GDP on defense, and at least 20% of defense expenditures for new major equipment spending, including research and development). Allies will also assist in restocking NATO arsenals while simultaneously supporting Ukraine through the foundation of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). Five new multinational cooperation initiatives were also launched in the same year, in which allies introduced projects to enhance interoperability, including new Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). NATO also initiated Baltic Sentry, a military activity to protect critical undersea infrastructure, at the start of 2025.
NATO has taken significant strides in the cyber realm with the Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC), the NATO Integrated Cyber Defense Centre, an AI Strategy, and the development of an Autonomy Implementation Plan. All of this is to say that, with the spread of Islamist extremism, Russian exceptionalism, renewed ethnic conflicts, the proliferation of weapons, widespread poverty, transnational organized crime, and a rise in nationalist rhetoric around the world, NATO is on course to fundamentally alter transatlantic relations as it shapes itself into an all-encompassing global security actor.
However, a range of security concerns—from the United States’ internal policies to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; from climate change to trade embargoes; and from cyberwarfare to Chinese, Russian, and North Korean provocation—could lead to NATO members and partners clashing repeatedly. That is, unless the core mission of NATO is transformed from a purely military alliance into a multidimensional diplomatic, defensive, and economic organization. The Alliance must prove and reinforce itself as a transnational security framework without the guarantee of U.S. support. Overarching policies that govern relations within the liberal international order must be anchored in principled values and designed to defend the liberal international order.
In contrast, executive relations and policies between international orders must prioritize rules-based cooperation in areas of shared interests instead of imposing liberal democracy. For NATO, dedicated members and partners should acknowledge the importance of the past while also adapting to the new global order—a multipolar one that diminishes the importance of the alliance—which requires NATO to differentiate between the global rules-based order and the liberal international order, of which NATO is viewed as a key institution. From the Cold War to the War in Afghanistan, NATO has accomplished much in its time, but this is not to say that it will not struggle in the future.
After 30 years, NATO is returning to an era of great power competition as the influence of the liberal international order dwindles. To act as a transnational security organization, the alliance will have to continue its path of change, specifically through strategic partnerships. Neither the NATO 2030 Initiative nor the 2022 Strategic Concept has spurred a revision of the programs, agreements, and procedures designed to assist partners in implementing global security objectives. NATO partnerships should enhance, complement, and extend the effects of allied policies—especially toward the Indo-Pacific Four and third-party countries—while remaining cognizant of potential conflicts.
Relying on outdated structures and mechanisms to strengthen the alliance’s resilience against existing and imminent security threats is no way for the world to progress when the international order is repeating itself. To uphold the instrumental value of partnerships for allies, NATO must remain a steadfast and efficient actor in its international security efforts. Throughout the alliance’s history, transformation has been the root cause of its ability to do what it has done best since 1949: deliver security where and when it matters. Though efforts have been made in cybersecurity and the modernization of NATO’s force structure—such as the three-tiered Allied Reaction Force (ARF)—there is still work that needs to be done for NATO to become a fully capable global security framework. In the wise words of former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO has changed as the world has changed,” so one can only wait to see what the future will bring.
Kerry Shea, MA graduate from the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago. Her areas of interest include nationalism, democratic backsliding, and securitization in addition to US-Russia relations.
