This illustration has been created by AI to use only use in this article.
The end of the Cold War in 1991, along with the subsequent developments, have profoundly shaped the international order and the powers within the system. During the Cold War, the calculation was straightforward; the global system was bipolar, and it was colloquially known as the First World (the U.S.-led Western Bloc), the Second World (the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc), and the Third World (non-aligned countries). The end of the Cold War blurred these distinctions and paved the way for a U.S.-led neoliberal system, with the strongest actor being the United States of America (USA) until 2008. Some referred to this U.S.-led system as unipolar, although there was much debate surrounding this. Some political scientists even asserted that we were on the verge of witnessing the end of history, as the claim suggested that there was no ideology to challenge liberal democracy. Thus, this meant an overwhelming victory for liberal democracy, which might lead to the world domination of this idea.
However, the claim of ‘the end of history’ was proven incorrect in 2008, a year commonly regarded as the year of the crisis of neoliberalism. The early 2000s were marked by chaos and instability, leading to a significant shift in U.S. attitudes towards the international system, which triggered a paradigm shift in the global context. We will refer to this international order, characterized by the gradual decline of the U.S.’s relative power and influence, as the “post-American world” throughout this article. The term “post-American world” was popularized by Fareed Zakaria’s book of the same title in 2008. He argues that although the U.S. remains a dominant world power, the world is shifting towards a multipolar order with other major rising powers such as China, India, Indonesia, Türkiye, Brazil, and so on. This article will primarily focus on Europe and the European Union (EU), as the effects of an increasingly multipolar world on Europe could be profound in this era of shifting global dynamics.
Europe After U.S. Dominance
The beginning of the 2000s witnessed a series of disturbing developments that proved to be highly detrimental to the international system. After the terrorist attacks in New York, U.S., on 11 September 2001, the U.S., under the auspices of NATO, invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the famous collective-defense clause, and garnered support and a coalition to retaliate against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The rift between transatlantic partners became apparent when the neoconservatives who were in power decided to follow a preemptive war doctrine, which would compel U.S. decision-makers and U.S. military power to strike the suspected counterpart before an imminent attack from that counterpart could reach the U.S. Therefore, the purpose was to strike the enemy before it gained an advantage over the U.S., and this decision alienated the U.S. from its transatlantic partners like France and Germany.
The U.S. decided to create a “coalition of the willing” to follow its preemptive war doctrine and achieve its objectives by intervening in and invading Iraq with a coalition in which some EU members like the UK, Poland, and Hungary also participated. The crisis we are facing today, especially after the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, is similar to the one at the beginning of the 2000s, which we will further elaborate on. In American foreign policy, isolationism and detaching from the rest of the world are not new concepts but merely recurrences of history and the traumas of Americans since the beginning of the 1800s. After gaining independence from Britain in 1776 and the end of the American Revolutionary War in 1783, the U.S. consolidated its power in North America. Like all other newly independent states in history, the U.S. needed a purpose to stay dynamic and survive, as well as a common ideal that might unite the American people. This ideal was patriotism and anti-colonialism.
This idea of anti-colonialism shaped the American political mindset until the end of World War II. During the nation-building process and the establishment of the United States’ institutional framework, Americans adopted a distinct approach to global events and developments. They believed that distancing themselves from, or expelling, colonial powers from the continent would be an effective strategy—a belief that held true until it no longer did. In the 1930s, the devastated international order, the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations, and economic problems led the world into chaos, and the Old Continent once again became a scene of massacre against Jews, Romani people, disabled people, and other ethnic and religious minorities. The U.S.’s principle of nonintervention in Europe, the functioning of the international order, and its policy of isolationism can be seen as a continuation of the American political mindset that was put forward with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and can be considered as contributing factors to the outbreak of the deadliest war in human history.
The end of the Cold War in 1991, along with the subsequent developments, have profoundly shaped the international order and the powers within the system. During the Cold War, the calculation was straightforward; the global system was bipolar, and it was colloquially known as the First World (the U.S.-led Western Bloc), the Second World (the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc), and the Third World (non-aligned countries). The end of the Cold War blurred these distinctions and paved the way for a U.S.-led neoliberal system, with the strongest actor being the United States of America (USA) until 2008. Some referred to this U.S.-led system as unipolar, although there was much debate surrounding this. Some political scientists even asserted that we were on the verge of witnessing the end of history, as the claim suggested that there was no ideology to challenge liberal democracy. Thus, this meant an overwhelming victory for liberal democracy, which might lead to the world domination of this idea.
However, the claim of ‘the end of history’ was proven incorrect in 2008, a year commonly regarded as the year of the crisis of neoliberalism. The early 2000s were marked by chaos and instability, leading to a significant shift in U.S. attitudes towards the international system, which triggered a paradigm shift in the global context. We will refer to this international order, characterized by the gradual decline of the U.S.’s relative power and influence, as the “post-American world” throughout this article. The term “post-American world” was popularized by Fareed Zakaria’s book of the same title in 2008. He argues that although the U.S. remains a dominant world power, the world is shifting towards a multipolar order with other major rising powers such as China, India, Indonesia, Türkiye, Brazil, and so on. This article will primarily focus on Europe and the European Union (EU), as the effects of an increasingly multipolar world on Europe could be profound in this era of shifting global dynamics.
Europe After U.S. Dominance
The beginning of the 2000s witnessed a series of disturbing developments that proved to be highly detrimental to the international system. After the terrorist attacks in New York, U.S., on 11 September 2001, the U.S., under the auspices of NATO, invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the famous collective-defense clause, and garnered support and a coalition to retaliate against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The rift between transatlantic partners became apparent when the neoconservatives who were in power decided to follow a preemptive war doctrine, which would compel U.S. decision-makers and U.S. military power to strike the suspected counterpart before an imminent attack from that counterpart could reach the U.S. Therefore, the purpose was to strike the enemy before it gained an advantage over the U.S., and this decision alienated the U.S. from its transatlantic partners like France and Germany.
The U.S. decided to create a “coalition of the willing” to follow its preemptive war doctrine and achieve its objectives by intervening in and invading Iraq with a coalition in which some EU members like the UK, Poland, and Hungary also participated. The crisis we are facing today, especially after the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, is similar to the one at the beginning of the 2000s, which we will further elaborate on. In American foreign policy, isolationism and detaching from the rest of the world are not new concepts but merely recurrences of history and the traumas of Americans since the beginning of the 1800s. After gaining independence from Britain in 1776 and the end of the American Revolutionary War in 1783, the U.S. consolidated its power in North America. Like all other newly independent states in history, the U.S. needed a purpose to stay dynamic and survive, as well as a common ideal that might unite the American people. This ideal was patriotism and anti-colonialism.
This idea of anti-colonialism shaped the American political mindset until the end of World War II. During the nation-building process and the establishment of the United States’ institutional framework, Americans adopted a distinct approach to global events and developments. They believed that distancing themselves from, or expelling, colonial powers from the continent would be an effective strategy—a belief that held true until it no longer did. In the 1930s, the devastated international order, the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations, and economic problems led the world into chaos, and the Old Continent once again became a scene of massacre against Jews, Romani people, disabled people, and other ethnic and religious minorities. The U.S.’s principle of nonintervention in Europe, the functioning of the international order, and its policy of isolationism can be seen as a continuation of the American political mindset that was put forward with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and can be considered as contributing factors to the outbreak of the deadliest war in human history.
In the face of both regional and geopolitical challenges, Japan has shifted towards a more activist and security-oriented foreign policy—and adopted values-based language to justify this shift.
The U.S.-China rivalry signals a looming showdown, upending global power dynamics across economic and military spheres.
The ineffectiveness of American domestic politics and systemic challenges hindered the United States from integrating into the global international order and organizations like the League of Nations. Furthermore, the country’s policy of isolationism only emboldened imperial powers such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, contributing to the deterioration of the international system. This downward spiral ultimately led to immense losses, widespread casualties, and one of history’s most devastating wars and genocides.
Today, the declining influence of the U.S. in global political affairs, coupled with the world’s transition from a predominantly unipolar system to a more multilateral post-American world, disrupts the international order and has far-reaching consequences. These impacts are evident in ongoing conflicts, such as those in Gaza and Ukraine, and it seems that the shift of power in the international order further destabilizes already fragile areas and countries, especially considering the declining influence of the U.S. in the international order and the rise of other powers and regional players.
In 2008, the global economic crisis and its severe repercussions had a profound impact worldwide, particularly in the Western world, which is closely tied to the U.S. Facing its worst consequences, the crisis ultimately upended the neoliberal system. After 2008, when the neoliberal system was shaken to its core, new ideas and perspectives gained momentum and popularity, as well as other crucial players like China, which could propose strong counter-ideologies to neoliberalism in the Western world. The Chinese system and the correlation between liberal democracy and economic development have long been debated using China as an example, and it has been proven otherwise—that for a successfully functioning economy, liberal democracy is not a prerequisite.
After the crisis, heavily impacted countries and other emerging powers in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa strived to find other approaches to deal with the crisis and other allies to align with. In this regard, the bloc of BRIC (later BRICS) emerged as a platform where traditionally non-aligned or non-Western countries can engage in dialogue and economic or political cooperation. The term BRIC was coined by British economist Jim O’Neill and was used frequently by Goldman Sachs in 2001 to refer to the emerging players and markets in the international order. The tension and polarization between the U.S. and Europe since the year 2000 have now reached their peak with the election of the 47th U.S. President Donald Trump. Previously, in 2003, due to the Iraq War and the U.S.’s decision to intervene unilaterally without a specific United Nations resolution, tensions between transatlantic partners increased.
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even classified the European countries who aided and supported the U.S. in its Iraq War as ‘New Europe’ and those who did not aid the U.S. as ‘Old Europe’. Therefore, the early 2000s saw a high level of polarization and an era of narratives ranging from conservatism to the idea of ‘America First,’ which President Donald Trump championed during his presidential term. Europe and EU bureaucrats worked well with the U.S. when there was a Democratic president such as Barack Obama or Joe Biden. However, Republican presidents such as George W. Bush and Donald Trump made things difficult for Europeans and triggered a quest for autonomy from the security umbrella of NATO and the U.S. After 2017, with the election victory of Donald Trump as the 45th U.S. President, the EU started to consider a strategic autonomy concept that would make Europe independent from the U.S. in terms of security and defense matters, as European leaders frequently expressed their mistrust and concerns about the U.S. government after 2017.
The ineffectiveness of American domestic politics and systemic challenges hindered the United States from integrating into the global international order and organizations like the League of Nations. Furthermore, the country’s policy of isolationism only emboldened imperial powers such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, contributing to the deterioration of the international system. This downward spiral ultimately led to immense losses, widespread casualties, and one of history’s most devastating wars and genocides.
Today, the declining influence of the U.S. in global political affairs, coupled with the world’s transition from a predominantly unipolar system to a more multilateral post-American world, disrupts the international order and has far-reaching consequences. These impacts are evident in ongoing conflicts, such as those in Gaza and Ukraine, and it seems that the shift of power in the international order further destabilizes already fragile areas and countries, especially considering the declining influence of the U.S. in the international order and the rise of other powers and regional players.
In 2008, the global economic crisis and its severe repercussions had a profound impact worldwide, particularly in the Western world, which is closely tied to the U.S. Facing its worst consequences, the crisis ultimately upended the neoliberal system. After 2008, when the neoliberal system was shaken to its core, new ideas and perspectives gained momentum and popularity, as well as other crucial players like China, which could propose strong counter-ideologies to neoliberalism in the Western world. The Chinese system and the correlation between liberal democracy and economic development have long been debated using China as an example, and it has been proven otherwise—that for a successfully functioning economy, liberal democracy is not a prerequisite.
After the crisis, heavily impacted countries and other emerging powers in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa strived to find other approaches to deal with the crisis and other allies to align with. In this regard, the bloc of BRIC (later BRICS) emerged as a platform where traditionally non-aligned or non-Western countries can engage in dialogue and economic or political cooperation. The term BRIC was coined by British economist Jim O’Neill and was used frequently by Goldman Sachs in 2001 to refer to the emerging players and markets in the international order. The tension and polarization between the U.S. and Europe since the year 2000 have now reached their peak with the election of the 47th U.S. President Donald Trump. Previously, in 2003, due to the Iraq War and the U.S.’s decision to intervene unilaterally without a specific United Nations resolution, tensions between transatlantic partners increased.
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even classified the European countries who aided and supported the U.S. in its Iraq War as ‘New Europe’ and those who did not aid the U.S. as ‘Old Europe’. Therefore, the early 2000s saw a high level of polarization and an era of narratives ranging from conservatism to the idea of ‘America First,’ which President Donald Trump championed during his presidential term. Europe and EU bureaucrats worked well with the U.S. when there was a Democratic president such as Barack Obama or Joe Biden. However, Republican presidents such as George W. Bush and Donald Trump made things difficult for Europeans and triggered a quest for autonomy from the security umbrella of NATO and the U.S. After 2017, with the election victory of Donald Trump as the 45th U.S. President, the EU started to consider a strategic autonomy concept that would make Europe independent from the U.S. in terms of security and defense matters, as European leaders frequently expressed their mistrust and concerns about the U.S. government after 2017.
For this purpose, EU leaders and state leaders finalized and launched a long-awaited scheme: the Strategic Compass for the EU in May 2022. In the face of challenges like Russian aggression against Ukraine, the crisis and war in the Middle East, conflicts and instability in the Sahel region, and the rapid decline of trust in the new U.S. government among Europeans, they have now realized that they must be self-sufficient in terms of security, defense, technology, and energy. This new, bold post-American world, in which all actors act for themselves, is now a multilateral one with a few great powers as well as regional aspiring powers across the world. Recently, we have been discussing the Global South, the ‘Third World,’ and aspiring powers more frequently, with an aim to decentralize the international order and to understand the rapid ascension of BRICS and China as major global powers.
EU at a Crossroads
Since its foundation in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Union has remained one of the most important blocs and actors in the international order. Until the 1960s and 1970s, apart from the U.S. and USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the **ECSC—or the European Economic Community (EEC), as it was known at that time—**was one of the major powers in the international order, although the wave of decolonization made some European nations weaker in terms of wealth and access to resources compared to before. The 1970s marked the era of détente, during which the Western world sought to engage with and reconcile with the USSR through closer cooperation, shared prosperity, and the pursuit of a stable peace environment.
This effort was formalized under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which later evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Subsequently, initiatives like the “Common European Home,” introduced by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, further strengthened Europe’s and the European Union’s role in the international order. The beginning of the 1980s also witnessed the rise of a neoliberal approach, first initiated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher—a predominant economic ideology that would last and dominate most of the world until 2008.
Furthermore, the period of strong collaboration among European nations and the participation of new countries in the bloc, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and later on in the 2000s, the membership of nearly all Central and Eastern European countries strengthened the bloc and improved its capacity, as well as its responses and measures to tackle the challenges of globalization, further crises in the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans, and asymmetric threats such as terrorism. On the other hand, the rift between Europe and the U.S. reemerged after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. due to the U.S.’s unilateral actions and decisions, such as its War on Terror and its goal of eradicating all those responsible, no matter what the consequences might be. All these factors, in fact, pulled transatlantic partners away from each other and paved the way for country-based or continent-based solutions such as “America First” and “European Strategic Autonomy.”
Meanwhile, the EU still continues to be one of the biggest economic and political actors in the international arena, as well as the world’s biggest soft power in terms of human rights, justice, regulations, democracy, and the rule of law. It is a known fact that the EU, in its near neighborhood, has imposed conditionality to influence non-EU members who have an EU membership perspective, using its soft power instruments. Countries like Türkiye, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ukraine are some of the EU candidate countries, and the EU is known to have a significant impact over these countries in terms of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in exchange for commitments from these countries. The EU’s foreign policy is also based on shared values, and it views the world through a values-based perspective, which could be challenging due to the fact that other countries or blocs might not share the exact same values as the EU.
This new, bold post-American world, in which all actors act for themselves, is now a multilateral one with a few great powers as well as regional aspiring powers across the world.
For this purpose, EU leaders and state leaders finalized and launched a long-awaited scheme: the Strategic Compass for the EU in May 2022. In the face of challenges like Russian aggression against Ukraine, the crisis and war in the Middle East, conflicts and instability in the Sahel region, and the rapid decline of trust in the new U.S. government among Europeans, they have now realized that they must be self-sufficient in terms of security, defense, technology, and energy. This new, bold post-American world, in which all actors act for themselves, is now a multilateral one with a few great powers as well as regional aspiring powers across the world. Recently, we have been discussing the Global South, the ‘Third World,’ and aspiring powers more frequently, with an aim to decentralize the international order and to understand the rapid ascension of BRICS and China as major global powers.
EU at a Crossroads
Since its foundation in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Union has remained one of the most important blocs and actors in the international order. Until the 1960s and 1970s, apart from the U.S. and USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the **ECSC—or the European Economic Community (EEC), as it was known at that time—**was one of the major powers in the international order, although the wave of decolonization made some European nations weaker in terms of wealth and access to resources compared to before. The 1970s marked the era of détente, during which the Western world sought to engage with and reconcile with the USSR through closer cooperation, shared prosperity, and the pursuit of a stable peace environment.
This effort was formalized under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which later evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Subsequently, initiatives like the “Common European Home,” introduced by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, further strengthened Europe’s and the European Union’s role in the international order. The beginning of the 1980s also witnessed the rise of a neoliberal approach, first initiated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher—a predominant economic ideology that would last and dominate most of the world until 2008.
Furthermore, the period of strong collaboration among European nations and the participation of new countries in the bloc, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and later on in the 2000s, the membership of nearly all Central and Eastern European countries strengthened the bloc and improved its capacity, as well as its responses and measures to tackle the challenges of globalization, further crises in the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans, and asymmetric threats such as terrorism. On the other hand, the rift between Europe and the U.S. reemerged after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. due to the U.S.’s unilateral actions and decisions, such as its War on Terror and its goal of eradicating all those responsible, no matter what the consequences might be. All these factors, in fact, pulled transatlantic partners away from each other and paved the way for country-based or continent-based solutions such as “America First” and “European Strategic Autonomy.”
Meanwhile, the EU still continues to be one of the biggest economic and political actors in the international arena, as well as the world’s biggest soft power in terms of human rights, justice, regulations, democracy, and the rule of law. It is a known fact that the EU, in its near neighborhood, has imposed conditionality to influence non-EU members who have an EU membership perspective, using its soft power instruments. Countries like Türkiye, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ukraine are some of the EU candidate countries, and the EU is known to have a significant impact over these countries in terms of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in exchange for commitments from these countries. The EU’s foreign policy is also based on shared values, and it views the world through a values-based perspective, which could be challenging due to the fact that other countries or blocs might not share the exact same values as the EU.
Today, one of the biggest challenges with the EU’s foreign policy seems to be its incapacity to renew and recreate itself in the face of the changing international and geopolitical context. Currently, the EU’s relationships with the U.S., China, and other third actors like India and Türkiye can be challenging in times of crises and differing perspectives. Furthermore, one might argue that the EU’s conditionality toward its neighbors as well as the U.S. worked well in times of peace and in an international order based on shared values.
However, today, the international system is swiftly changing into a significantly different one, in which national characteristics and the sovereignty of states are seen as the utmost important elements, and states are racing to the bottom in terms of trade, financial matters, and even military aspects. Consequently, this race to the bottom intensifies competition among nations, driving them to prioritize profits and trade surpluses above all else. This is apparent in the recent additional tariffs imposed by former U.S. President Donald Trump on China and Europe.
Europe in the Age of Strategic Uncertainty
Despite all the challenges in its internal affairs, bureaucracy, and the crises of unstable European governments—including in key countries like France and Germany—the EU seems to be staying together, except for a few states with their noncompliant behaviors. Since 2022, in the face of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the EU has stayed strong and worked with the U.S. under President Joe Biden, imposing more than 15 sanctions packages against Russia in the hope of deterring it from its invasion and operations in Ukraine. The effectiveness and consequences of these sanctions remain debatable, but the West’s unity has empowered the position of European decision-makers—at least until 2025. The EU has many commitments and good relations with third countries and still has ongoing projects, operations, peacekeeping missions, and strong trade relations with both nations and trade blocs across the world.
In the year 2000, the U.S. was a dominant power in trade. Except for a few countries in Asia and Africa, the U.S. was the largest trading partner of many nations. However, as of 2024, except for a few countries in Latin America, Mexico, Canada, and a few U.S. allies like France, the UK, and Germany, nearly all countries now have China as their largest trading partner. This shift may very well be one of the reasons why the U.S. is now opposing the rules of the international order and advocating a tariff regime that entails isolationism for the U.S., consequently leading to a post-American world in which the U.S. no longer wishes to be the world’s police. The EU, on the other hand, does not follow isolationism and continues its humanitarian operations and missions in Africa and other fragile zones in the world. As of today, the EU has 21 ongoing Common Security and Defense Policy missions and operations across the globe.
The EU’s strong collaboration with trading blocs and regional platforms such as Mercosur (The Southern Common Market), BRICS, the African Union, and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) also reflects its ongoing economic power and its soft power mechanism through trade, bilateral economic relations, and close political cooperation — either in a bilateral format or under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). The EU also continues its peacekeeping missions and operations in fragile regions in Africa, alongside UN operations and missions. The EU’s ongoing commitment to Africa and its recognition of the African Union as a strong platform for African countries is also commendable. However, the EU faces numerous strategic challenges and pressing issues, especially in the post-2011 Arab Spring period.
As of 2025, five pressing issues and challenges can be identified for Europe and the EU: Europe’s lack of military power and assertiveness, energy dependency on different powers such as Russia and the U.S., internal divisions within the EU, lack of leadership and a strong steering power within the EU, and, last but not least, the decline of the current liberal world order. First, the issue of European autonomy and the efforts to create a strong European army independent from the U.S. and NATO have long been discussed by European politicians since the end of the Cold War, but the desire to do so has never been this real and tangible, especially after U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term in 2017.
Since 2017, both French President Emmanuel Macron, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and EU bureaucrats have stated on different occasions that Europe should be self-sufficient and that there should be a military power to complement the EU’s undeniable economic power. Thus, the initiative for a European army was reborn—this time with tangible actions such as Strategic Autonomy, the European Army Project, and the Strategic Compass Initiative. Second, Europe has been dependent on other powers and states for its own energy consumption. Although energy dependency on non-EU countries varies greatly between EU states, the average energy import dependency rate was 63% in 2022. There is no exact number demonstrating that the EU’s dependency on energy from non-EU countries has declined.
As frequently pointed out by the European Commission, the EU’s imports from Russia have indeed declined; however, this gap was quickly filled by other non-EU countries like Norway, the U.S., Egypt, Israel, and Azerbaijan. Moreover, it is suggested that Russian natural gas continues to be an important resource for some European countries due to the internal conflicts that some EU member states are having with the supranational administration in Brussels. Taking all these developments into account, one may argue that the EU has achieved some success in reducing its reliance on Russian energy. However, it remains dependent on other major suppliers, such as the United States, which the EU and its politicians themselves have labeled an unreliable partner following President Trump’s election victory. Third, internal divisions and conflicts within the EU pose a significant challenge to the bloc.
As is well known, the EU derives its strength from its unity in facing other blocs or global powers, so a display of dissatisfaction or disobedience toward common EU policies or decisions puts the whole bloc in jeopardy. In recent years, countries like Hungary, Poland, and, from time to time, Italy and Slovakia have followed a different path from Brussels or have not joined common policies in areas such as energy, foreign policy, and migration. Furthermore, there still seem to be major differences between Western and Eastern European countries in terms of economic development, financial stability, humanitarian progress, and the status of the rule of law in these countries. In fact, the Iron Curtain, once thought to have divided the two camps at the start of the Cold War, may still persist in ideology, development, economy, and the way Western and Eastern European countries perceive Russia: as a threat or as an inevitable partner.
Fourth, today, there is a lack of leadership even at the highest ranks of EU bureaucracy. The leaders of the most important EU institutions do not come into office through a direct election by the public but rather through selection by heads of state or formal appointment procedures. This not only signifies that there is still a democratic deficit—meaning that people have yet to be fully integrated into the system—but also that one competence (for instance, foreign policy or representing the union abroad) may be shared between two or more officials in power. This, in turn, may further trigger leadership discussions within the EU.
The desire to create a strong European army independent from the U.S. and NATO has never been this real and tangible, especially after U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term in 2017.
Moreover, in addition to the three or four most important EU leaders—such as Ursula von der Leyen (European Commission), António Costa (European Council), Roberta Metsola (European Parliament), and Kaja Kallas (High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)—there are also the leaders of nation-states who chair meetings held in the Council of the EU. For instance, whenever agriculture ministers of EU member states gather in Brussels, the minister of the country holding the rotating presidency of the Union for six months leads and presides over that meeting.
The EU’s foreign policy is another area where leadership appears inconsistent at times of distress and crises. While Kaja Kallas holds this position, she is occasionally overruled by national leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron or German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and at times by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who frequently asserts influence beyond her official responsibilities. In this regard, there is no clear task-sharing mechanism, as the European Commission and nation-states also have the right to represent or intervene in the affairs of the High Representative and its agency, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Last but not least, the decline of the current liberal world order after 2008 has profoundly affected the U.S., as well as Europe and its ability to tackle the challenges of the new international order. After 2008, the world has gradually become more isolationist, bringing survivalism and nationalism back onto the agenda—nearly 60 years after the end of the Second World War.
Today, countries tend to become more isolationist and nationalistic to avoid the costly transactions of free trade or to promote their own agendas, as seen in the example of the U.S. The system that was created after the horrors of the Second World War had the U.S. as the dominant and balancing power, which meant that the U.S. took on the role of the world’s police. This role, played by the U.S., worked in times of crises during the Cold War and between 1991 and 2008. However, after the so-called crisis of the neoliberal system, there was a paradigm shift, and it became obvious that every nation was for itself. Although the EU and regional players across the world remain committed to the international rules-based order and multilateral frameworks, the U.S.’s declining trust in the UN and multilateral institutions has gravely weakened and undermined the international order.
During the first term of President Donald Trump, the first signs of deterioration in the current international order emerged. President Trump unilaterally chose to leave the Paris Climate Agreement, pulled the U.S. out of several international funds and aid programs, as well as the World Health Organization. Moreover, there was no other power—including the EU and China—that was able to fill the financial gap left by the U.S. At the same time, the EU, although there had been discussions in the past regarding European independence and autonomy from the U.S. and NATO, especially after 2017, initiated formal procedures and initiatives that could make Europe an independent force less dependent on the U.S. and NATO in this post-American world.
Initiatives such as the concept of a Common European Army, the EU’s Strategic Autonomy, and the EU’s Strategic Compass represent the EU’s attempts to establish its role in the evolving international order and to reduce its reliance on external powers for security, defense, energy, and foreign policy. Taking all of these into account, transatlantic relations do not seem to be progressing in a positive and constructive way, as can be observed from the latest developments even in the first months of U.S. President Donald Trump’s second inauguration in January 2025. Even the first month of President Trump’s presidency has made Europeans anxious about the future and the ongoing war on the European continent. Trump’s unilateral decisions regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, without even consulting or including Ukraine or other European powers, and his unilateral plans to turn Gaza into a Mediterranean riviera, as well as his stance on the future of the people in Gaza, seem extremely troublesome both to the countries in the region and to the EU.
Furthermore, U.S. President Trump’s aggressive statements on the Panama Canal, Canada, and Greenland have justified European concerns. President Trump’s aggressive rhetoric against NATO allies might offer some clues about the future, as it seems that transatlantic relations will be highly challenging and may never be the same as before. The decline of U.S. influence and the return of isolationist and neomercantilist policies (protective economic and trade policies aimed at strengthening one’s own economy) have, in fact, paved the way for a world order with minimal Western influence and might promote other major powers like China or regional players like India, Brazil, Türkiye, and Egypt. At the 56th Munich Security Conference in 2020, the concepts of ‘Westlessness’ and ‘the West vs. the Rest’ gained popularity, especially among Global South countries.
Moreover, in February 2025, at the 61st Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech to high-ranking European leaders and bureaucrats had a seismic impact, as he once again publicly rebuked them. His remarks further reinforced European fears that they could be left to face Russian aggression alone, raising concerns about the future of security and military dynamics in Europe and the transatlantic region. It is now evident that Europe is entering a phase of enhancing its own capacity to address military and security challenges. Meanwhile, despite growing concerns and trust issues regarding NATO and the U.S., most European nations are likely to remain committed to the alliance. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, High Representative Kaja Kallas, and European Council President António Costa have, on different occasions, expressed the need to tackle regional and global problems on their own. In this regard, the efforts initiated in the post-2017 period—such as the Common European Army and European Strategic Autonomy—seem to be progressing rapidly.
On March 6, 2025, the European Commission ratified the decision to allocate €800 billion for the rearmament of Europe. All these efforts by the EU can be considered a result of the unilateral decisions and policy actions of the U.S., as well as a European effort to fill the gap left by the U.S. in Europe’s military and security domains. The future of the European Union, particularly its security and military trajectory, as well as transatlantic relations, remains highly uncertain. It is unclear whether the EU will uphold its commitments, frameworks, and promises to the United States or any other global powers, as EU leaders such as Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa have repeatedly emphasized that the rules-based international order has weakened and that multilateralism is under severe strain, facing significant challenges.
Europe’s Path to Strategic Autonomy
Analyzing the challenges within the transatlantic bloc and emphasizing the negative impact of U.S. President Trump on these relations suggests that Europe may strive for greater self-reliance in the future. This shift would be crucial for safeguarding its long-term stability and enhancing its ability to effectively address emerging challenges. Given the ongoing power shifts and the erosion of the international rules-based order, we can anticipate that these transformations will be anything but quiet. We take an optimistic view of the future and argue that, rather than depending on other forces and non-EU countries, the EU will likely rely on itself in the future.
Having seen that many non-EU powers are assertive or uncooperative towards the EU, it has begun to shape its own destiny and has officially intensified efforts to strengthen its military and security capabilities through initiatives such as PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), a Common European Army, and Strategic Autonomy. However, the EU recognizes that, rather than deepening rifts in transatlantic relations or clashing with the U.S., it must maintain a stable relationship despite existing differences and challenges. After all, the U.S. remains—and will continue to be—Europe’s closest ally.
Today, one of the biggest challenges with the EU’s foreign policy seems to be its incapacity to renew and recreate itself in the face of the changing international and geopolitical context. Currently, the EU’s relationships with the U.S., China, and other third actors like India and Türkiye can be challenging in times of crises and differing perspectives. Furthermore,
one might argue that the EU’s conditionality toward its neighbors as well as the U.S. worked well in times of peace and in an international order based on shared values.
However, today, the international system is swiftly changing into a significantly different one, in which national characteristics and the sovereignty of states are seen as the utmost important elements, and states are racing to the bottom in terms of trade, financial matters, and even military aspects. Consequently, this race to the bottom intensifies competition among nations, driving them to prioritize profits and trade surpluses above all else. This is apparent in the recent additional tariffs imposed by former U.S. President Donald Trump on China and Europe.
Europe in the Age of Strategic Uncertainty
Despite all the challenges in its internal affairs, bureaucracy, and the crises of unstable European governments—including in key countries like France and Germany—the EU seems to be staying together, except for a few states with their noncompliant behaviors. Since 2022, in the face of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the EU has stayed strong and worked with the U.S. under President Joe Biden, imposing more than 15 sanctions packages against Russia in the hope of deterring it from its invasion and operations in Ukraine. The effectiveness and consequences of these sanctions remain debatable, but the West’s unity has empowered the position of European decision-makers—at least until 2025. The EU has many commitments and good relations with third countries and still has ongoing projects, operations, peacekeeping missions, and strong trade relations with both nations and trade blocs across the world.
In the year 2000, the U.S. was a dominant power in trade. Except for a few countries in Asia and Africa, the U.S. was the largest trading partner of many nations. However, as of 2024, except for a few countries in Latin America, Mexico, Canada, and a few U.S. allies like France, the UK, and Germany, nearly all countries now have China as their largest trading partner. This shift may very well be one of the reasons why the U.S. is now opposing the rules of the international order and advocating a tariff regime that entails isolationism for the U.S., consequently leading to a post-American world in which the U.S. no longer wishes to be the world’s police. The EU, on the other hand, does not follow isolationism and continues its humanitarian operations and missions in Africa and other fragile zones in the world. As of today, the EU has 21 ongoing Common Security and Defense Policy missions and operations across the globe.
The EU’s strong collaboration with trading blocs and regional platforms such as Mercosur (The Southern Common Market), BRICS, the African Union, and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) also reflects its ongoing economic power and its soft power mechanism through trade, bilateral economic relations, and close political cooperation — either in a bilateral format or under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). The EU also continues its peacekeeping missions and operations in fragile regions in Africa, alongside UN operations and missions. The EU’s ongoing commitment to Africa and its recognition of the African Union as a strong platform for African countries is also commendable. However, the EU faces numerous strategic challenges and pressing issues, especially in the post-2011 Arab Spring period.
As of 2025, five pressing issues and challenges can be identified for Europe and the EU: Europe’s lack of military power and assertiveness, energy dependency on different powers such as Russia and the U.S., internal divisions within the EU, lack of leadership and a strong steering power within the EU, and, last but not least, the decline of the current liberal world order. First, the issue of European autonomy and the efforts to create a strong European army independent from the U.S. and NATO have long been discussed by European politicians since the end of the Cold War, but the desire to do so has never been this real and tangible, especially after U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term in 2017.
Since 2017, both French President Emmanuel Macron, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and EU bureaucrats have stated on different occasions that Europe should be self-sufficient and that there should be a military power to complement the EU’s undeniable economic power. Thus, the initiative for a European army was reborn—this time with tangible actions such as Strategic Autonomy, the European Army Project, and the Strategic Compass Initiative. Second, Europe has been dependent on other powers and states for its own energy consumption. Although energy dependency on non-EU countries varies greatly between EU states, the average energy import dependency rate was 63% in 2022. There is no exact number demonstrating that the EU’s dependency on energy from non-EU countries has declined.
As frequently pointed out by the European Commission, the EU’s imports from Russia have indeed declined; however, this gap was quickly filled by other non-EU countries like Norway, the U.S., Egypt, Israel, and Azerbaijan. Moreover, it is suggested that Russian natural gas continues to be an important resource for some European countries due to the internal conflicts that some EU member states are having with the supranational administration in Brussels. Taking all these developments into account, one may argue that the EU has achieved some success in reducing its reliance on Russian energy. However, it remains dependent on other major suppliers, such as the United States, which the EU and its politicians themselves have labeled an unreliable partner following President Trump’s election victory. Third, internal divisions and conflicts within the EU pose a significant challenge to the bloc.
As is well known, the EU derives its strength from its unity in facing other blocs or global powers, so a display of dissatisfaction or disobedience toward common EU policies or decisions puts the whole bloc in jeopardy. In recent years, countries like Hungary, Poland, and, from time to time, Italy and Slovakia have followed a different path from Brussels or have not joined common policies in areas such as energy, foreign policy, and migration. Furthermore, there still seem to be major differences between Western and Eastern European countries in terms of economic development, financial stability, humanitarian progress, and the status of the rule of law in these countries. In fact, the Iron Curtain, once thought to have divided the two camps at the start of the Cold War, may still persist in ideology, development, economy, and the way Western and Eastern European countries perceive Russia: as a threat or as an inevitable partner.
Fourth, today, there is a lack of leadership even at the highest ranks of EU bureaucracy. The leaders of the most important EU institutions do not come into office through a direct election by the public but rather through selection by heads of state or formal appointment procedures. This not only signifies that there is still a democratic deficit—meaning that people have yet to be fully integrated into the system—but also that one competence (for instance, foreign policy or representing the union abroad) may be shared between two or more officials in power. This, in turn, may further trigger leadership discussions within the EU.
Moreover, in addition to the three or four most important EU leaders—such as Ursula von der Leyen (European Commission), António Costa (European Council), Roberta Metsola (European Parliament), and Kaja Kallas (High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)—there are also the leaders of nation-states who chair meetings held in the Council of
the EU. For instance, whenever agriculture ministers of EU member states gather in Brussels, the minister of the country holding the rotating presidency of the Union for six months leads and presides over that meeting.
The EU’s foreign policy is another area where leadership appears inconsistent at times of distress and crises. While Kaja Kallas holds this position, she is occasionally overruled by national leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron or German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and at times by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who frequently asserts influence beyond her official responsibilities. In this regard, there is no clear task-sharing mechanism, as the European Commission and nation-states also have the right to represent or intervene in the affairs of the High Representative and its agency, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Last but not least, the decline of the current liberal world order after 2008 has profoundly affected the U.S., as well as Europe and its ability to tackle the challenges of the new international order. After 2008, the world has gradually become more isolationist, bringing survivalism and nationalism back onto the agenda—nearly 60 years after the end of the Second World War.
Today, countries tend to become more isolationist and nationalistic to avoid the costly transactions of free trade or to promote their own agendas, as seen in the example of the U.S. The system that was created after the horrors of the Second World War had the U.S. as the dominant and balancing power, which meant that the U.S. took on the role of the world’s police. This role, played by the U.S., worked in times of crises during the Cold War and between 1991 and 2008. However, after the so-called crisis of the neoliberal system, there was a paradigm shift, and it became obvious that every nation was for itself. Although the EU and regional players across the world remain committed to the international rules-based order and multilateral frameworks, the U.S.’s declining trust in the UN and multilateral institutions has gravely weakened and undermined the international order.
During the first term of President Donald Trump, the first signs of deterioration in the current international order emerged. President Trump unilaterally chose to leave the Paris Climate Agreement, pulled the U.S. out of several international funds and aid programs, as well as the World Health Organization. Moreover, there was no other power—including the EU and China—that was able to fill the financial gap left by the U.S. At the same time, the EU, although there had been discussions in the past regarding European independence and autonomy from the U.S. and NATO, especially after 2017, initiated formal procedures and initiatives that could make Europe an independent force less dependent on the U.S. and NATO in this post-American world.
Initiatives such as the concept of a Common European Army, the EU’s Strategic Autonomy, and the EU’s Strategic Compass represent the EU’s attempts to establish its role in the evolving international order and to reduce its reliance on external powers for security, defense, energy, and foreign policy. Taking all of these into account, transatlantic relations do not seem to be progressing in a positive and constructive way, as can be observed from the latest developments even in the first months of U.S. President Donald Trump’s second inauguration in January 2025. Even the first month of President Trump’s presidency has made Europeans anxious about the future and the ongoing war on the European continent. Trump’s unilateral decisions regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, without even consulting or including Ukraine or other European powers, and his unilateral plans to turn Gaza into a Mediterranean riviera, as well as his stance on the future of the people in Gaza, seem extremely troublesome both to the countries in the region and to the EU.
Furthermore, U.S. President Trump’s aggressive statements on the Panama Canal, Canada, and Greenland have justified European concerns. President Trump’s aggressive rhetoric against NATO allies might offer some clues about the future, as it seems that transatlantic relations will be highly challenging and may never be the same as before. The decline of U.S. influence and the return of isolationist and neomercantilist policies (protective economic and trade policies aimed at strengthening one’s own economy) have, in fact, paved the way for a world order with minimal Western influence and might promote other major powers like China or regional players like India, Brazil, Türkiye, and Egypt. At the 56th Munich Security Conference in 2020, the concepts of ‘Westlessness’ and ‘the West vs. the Rest’ gained popularity, especially among Global South countries.
Moreover, in February 2025, at the 61st Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech to high-ranking European leaders and bureaucrats had a seismic impact, as he once again publicly rebuked them. His remarks further reinforced European fears that they could be left to face Russian aggression alone, raising concerns about the future of security and military dynamics in Europe and the transatlantic region. It is now evident that Europe is entering a phase of enhancing its own capacity to address military and security challenges. Meanwhile, despite growing concerns and trust issues regarding NATO and the U.S., most European nations are likely to remain committed to the alliance. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, High Representative Kaja Kallas, and European Council President António Costa have, on different occasions, expressed the need to tackle regional and global problems on their own. In this regard, the efforts initiated in the post-2017 period—such as the Common European Army and European Strategic Autonomy—seem to be progressing rapidly.
On March 6, 2025, the European Commission ratified the decision to allocate €800 billion for the rearmament of Europe. All these efforts by the EU can be considered a result of the unilateral decisions and policy actions of the U.S., as well as a European effort to fill the gap left by the U.S. in Europe’s military and security domains. The future of the European Union, particularly its security and military trajectory, as well as transatlantic relations, remains highly uncertain. It is unclear whether the EU will uphold its commitments, frameworks, and promises to the United States or any other global powers, as EU leaders such as Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa have repeatedly emphasized that the rules-based international order has weakened and that multilateralism is under severe strain, facing significant challenges.
Europe’s Path to Strategic Autonomy
Analyzing the challenges within the transatlantic bloc and emphasizing the negative impact of U.S. President Trump on these relations suggests that Europe may strive for greater self-reliance in the future. This shift would be crucial for safeguarding its long-term stability and enhancing its ability to effectively address emerging challenges. Given the ongoing power shifts and the erosion of the international rules-based order, we can anticipate that these transformations will be anything but quiet. We take an optimistic view of the future and argue that, rather than depending on other forces and non-EU countries, the EU will likely rely on itself in the future.
Having seen that many non-EU powers are assertive or uncooperative towards the EU, it has begun to shape its own destiny and has officially intensified efforts to strengthen its military and security capabilities through initiatives such as PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), a Common European Army, and Strategic Autonomy. However, the EU recognizes that, rather than deepening rifts in transatlantic relations or clashing with the U.S., it must maintain a stable relationship despite existing differences and challenges. After all, the U.S. remains—and will continue to be—Europe’s closest ally.
Notwithstanding this, the EU is recognizing the influence of non-EU powers in its near neighborhood, such as the UK and Türkiye, which could assist the EU in diversifying its military and security perspectives amid the declining trust of Europeans toward Americans. In the future, it may be in the EU’s best interest to recognize Türkiye as a key player in the European security framework. This would enable more effective responses
to Russian aggression, improved management of instability along its southern borders, and better handling of irregular migration from the Middle East and North Africa. Additionally, closer cooperation with Türkiye in the military and defense sectors could significantly strengthen European security, given Türkiye’s advanced military capabilities, strategic infrastructure, and technological expertise.
Moreover, in February 2025, at the 61st Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech to high-ranking European leaders and bureaucrats had a seismic impact, as he once again publicly rebuked them.
Notwithstanding this, the EU is recognizing the influence of non-EU powers in its near neighborhood, such as the UK and Türkiye, which could assist the EU in diversifying its military and security perspectives amid the declining trust of Europeans toward Americans. In the future, it may be in the EU’s best interest to recognize Türkiye as a key player in the European security framework. This would enable more effective responses to Russian aggression, improved management of instability along its southern borders, and better handling of irregular migration from the Middle East and North Africa. Additionally, closer cooperation with Türkiye in the military and defense sectors could significantly strengthen European security, given Türkiye’s advanced military capabilities, strategic infrastructure, and technological expertise.
Batuhan Gunes, is an MA graduate in European Studies from KU Leuven University. His expertise lies in European Union Common Security and Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy and NATO.
