The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a pivotal role in fostering regional cooperation since its establishment on Aug. 8, 1967. Initially formed with five founding members—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—ASEAN has expanded to 10 member states. Over the decades, the organization has become a key forum for dialogue, promoting collaboration across economic, social, cultural and security sectors.

At the 57th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 25, 2024, representatives gathered alongside major global actors, including China, Japan, the United States, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and South Korea, to address emerging challenges in the Indo-Pacific. The growing geopolitical tension in the region, particularly surrounding the South China Sea (SCS) and the Taiwan Strait, has drawn heightened attention. ASEAN’s commitment to maintaining stability aligns with the broader Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision promoted by Western powers and regional allies.

The FOIP strategy, spearheaded by the United States and Japan, is grounded in three pillars: upholding the rule of law and freedom of navigation, fostering economic prosperity, and ensuring peace and stability. The region’s importance is underscored by the $3 trillion worth of annual commerce reliant on safe and open maritime routes.

ASEAN’s Strategic Role in the South China Sea

ASEAN occupies a strategic position in the Indo-Pacific, balancing strong relationships with both the U.S. and China. The South China Sea, where several ASEAN states—namely the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei—contest China’s sweeping claims, remains a focal point of regional instability. Beijing’s military activities, including naval patrols and island militarization within the Nine-Dash Line, have sparked growing alarm among ASEAN members and their Western allies.

At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, member states reaffirmed their commitment to regional peace through international norms such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, concerns over China’s increasing assertiveness continue to push ASEAN states toward deeper engagement with the U.S. and its allies.

Following the ASEAN meeting, defense dialogues among key stakeholders reflected shared priorities for maintaining a rules-based order. The U.S., Japan, Australia and India—the Quad—held follow-up meetings to discuss regional security. Notably, Canada’s naval frigate, HMCS Montréal, passed through the Taiwan Strait days later, drawing sharp condemnation from China. Beijing accused Canada of destabilizing the region, underscoring its sensitivity to increased Western presence in the Indo-Pacific.

In recent years, the U.S. has deepened its military cooperation with Southeast Asian nations. The Philippines, a treaty ally, plays a critical role in this effort. Between Sept. 17 and 23, 2024, the Philippine Navy reported a record 251 Chinese vessels operating in the West Philippine Sea, a section of the SCS within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The incident heightened concerns about China’s maritime strategy and its impact on regional security.

The U.S. and the Philippines responded with their third Maritime Dialogue, held in October 2024, emphasizing joint efforts to strengthen maritime law enforcement, counter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUUF), and address climate-related challenges in the SCS. The dialogue underscored a shared commitment to upholding UNCLOS and safeguarding freedom of navigation.

ASEAN’s Relations with China

While security tensions dominate the discourse, ASEAN’s relationship with China extends beyond disputes in the South China Sea. China has been an official ASEAN Dialogue Partner since 1996, and both parties have fostered substantial economic and development cooperation. At the 27th ASEAN-China Summit in October 2024, leaders reaffirmed their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) and emphasized mutual efforts to maintain a “peaceful, safe and secure” Indo-Pacific.

The Plan of Action (POA) for ASEAN-China cooperation, set to conclude in 2025, aims to renew for the 2026-2030 period. Central to this partnership are initiatives such as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI). These efforts aim to support the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, particularly the goal of building an integrated and resilient economic framework.

China’s investments in Southeast Asia have bolstered economic development, but they have also deepened regional dependencies. For countries like Laos and Myanmar, China is a primary economic partner, financing infrastructure projects critical to domestic growth. Laos, for example, relies heavily on BRI-backed developments, including the Vientiane-Boten railway—described as the “backbone” of its transport and logistics system. As of 2024, China holds half of Laos’ $10.5 billion external debt, highlighting its economic influence.

Sri Lanka offers another example of China’s reach. In July 2024, the country restructured $12 billion of its external debt, with China—Sri Lanka’s largest creditor—contributing $5.52 billion to the agreement. Such deals ensure Chinese influence over Sri Lanka’s strategic ports, particularly Hambantota, which Beijing acquired in 2017.

ASEAN Divisions and Hedging Strategies

Despite ASEAN’s unified rhetoric on regional peace and security, internal divisions pose challenges to achieving consensus on China’s role in the Indo-Pacific. Member states’ responses to the U.S.-China rivalry vary based on their strategic interests and economic ties. Broadly, ASEAN countries can be grouped into three categories including counterbalancers nations such as the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam which maintain robust partnerships with the U.S. and advocate for a greater Western presence to offset China’s influence; Hedgers like countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand which adopt a neutral stance, seeking to maximize benefits while avoiding entanglement in power rivalries; and Chinese-dependent states which Nations like Laos and Myanmar rely heavily on Chinese investment and tend to avoid actions that might jeopardize these economic ties.

The Philippines’ shifting policies illustrate the complexity of balancing these relationships. While the current administration prioritizes U.S. security ties, former President Rodrigo Duterte (2016-2022) leaned toward China, citing the need for economic stability. Duterte’s approach was influenced by China’s decision to lift export bans and the U.S.’s perceived retreat under the Trump administration, which withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

ASEAN’s non-claimant states, including Cambodia and Laos, often show reluctance to challenge China’s maritime ambitions, preferring to focus on domestic development and bilateral economic cooperation. This dynamic complicates regional efforts to present a united front on South China Sea disputes.

The Future of the Indo-Pacific

The next five years are likely to see intensified competition between China and the U.S. for influence in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s continued military expansion and territorial claims will remain a significant concern for ASEAN and its allies.

The outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election adds further uncertainty. A potential return to isolationist policies under a Trump administration could reduce U.S. engagement in the region, emboldening China to pursue its goals with less restraint. However, partnerships forged under the Biden administration—including alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines—are expected to provide a degree of deterrence against Chinese aggression.

For ASEAN, the challenge lies in balancing its economic reliance on China with its commitment to regional stability and sovereignty. Should tensions de-escalate, ASEAN members may revert to their traditional hedging strategies, leveraging relationships with both powers to maximize national interests.

ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific reflects its ability to navigate a complex geopolitical landscape. While China’s economic dominance and military assertiveness pose challenges, ASEAN’s partnerships with the U.S. and other allies are crucial to maintaining a rules-based order in the region.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy aligns with ASEAN’s vision for peace, stability and economic prosperity. However, divisions among member states, shaped by varying levels of economic dependency and strategic priorities, complicate efforts to present a unified response to regional challenges.

As the geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific continue to evolve, ASEAN’s ability to maintain its centrality and adapt to external pressures will determine its success in shaping a stable and prosperous future for the region.