Britain and the US frequently talk about the “special relationship” that exists between the two great English-speaking nations. Yet, a strong case can be made that the U.S.’s “most special” relationship isn’t with No. 10 Downing St., but with Balfour House.

Clearly, the United States is willing to accept more economic harm or damage to its international standing as a result of its support for this country than any other. The extreme example is provided by the Nixon administration, which in most respects was the creator of the most brutally “realistic” foreign policy of any recent US presidency. But in 1973, US leaders knew full well the catastrophic economic cost – an OPEC oil embargo with an overnight tripling of gasoline prices – yet still proceeded with an “all-in” resupply effort of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, even pulling brand-new Abrams tanks off the front line in Germany and flying them to Tel Aviv, where they immediately went into battle.

This support is odd coming from a country where casual anti-Semitism is deeply engrained in the culture: where, until recently, the most prestigious private clubs, country clubs, prep schools, and universities openly barred Jewish members, a country that largely closed its doors to Jewish refugees in the 1930s unless they were nuclear physicists or symphony orchestra conductors. But the propaganda image of “Exodus” and a thousand bad Chuck Norris “Islamic terrorist” action movies is burned deep in the U.S. national consciousness. The image of the plucky Haganah freedom fighter and the idealistic kibbutz dweller is as simplistic – yet as durable – as the equally simplistic “Arab terrorist” stereotype, and for many Americans those stereotypes about define the depth of their thinking on the matter.

A second factor has recently influenced some supporters of Israel. Some Christian evangelicals see the present situation in the Middle East as a literal fulfillment of Biblical prophecy and view worsening Arab-Israeli confrontation as hastening the Biblical Battle of Armageddon and the End of Times.

Through perhaps the Clinton administration (1993-2001), Israeli-Palestinian issues were front and center. But until the Hamas attacks of October 7 and the Israeli counter-attacks, it had probably been at least 20 years since the Israeli and Palestinian issue had registered as an important national security issue for the United States. Since 2001, Middle  East policy for the U.S. has been dominated by loathing of a succession of “enemies,” first Al Qaeda, then the Islamic state, recently Iran. In such an environment, the important part of the bilateral relationship inevitably will be Israel’s intelligence capabilities.

The Trump administration briefly made a priority of pursuing agreements between Israel and the Gulf States, but this was mainly motivated by a desire of Trump officials, notably son-in-law Jared Kushner and Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin for commercial arrangements with MBS or Qatar. In Israel, US policy under Trump involved granting the Netanyahu government longstanding items on the ultranationalist wish list (for example, moving the Embassy to Jerusalem) without asking anything in return.

Several broad longterm trends may be starting to weaken Israel’s unique status with Uncle Sam, if only so slightly.  First is the fact that the left of the Democratic party, and especially younger people, have a stronger identification than older generations and mainstream Democrats with the Palestinian cause. This may be more important than it sounds. The Democratic Party campaign apparatus has widely recognized that the main reason the 2022 elections weren’t a total disaster for Democrats (40+ seat loss in the House, loss of Senate control, etc.) is that young voters showed up and voted for Democrats in record numbers. Biden’s campaign knows that if young people stay home in 2024, he probably loses. The anger of young people about Israel’s scorched earth campaign in Gaza will inevitably put pressure on the Biden administration to do more than urge Israel to allow supplies in.

Second, many Democratic politicians were angered as long ago as 2011, when Netanyahu abandoned the traditional nonpartisan approach of his predecessors and openly aligned his administration with the right wing of the Republican party. At this point, President Obama should have had what diplomats refer to as a “free and frank exchange of views,” but the arms kept flowing. But Netanyahu’s aggressive settlement activity further alienated Americans who see a two state solution as “part of the deal” for US support.

But, most important, the current war has been the breaking point for many Americans. Recent polls have showed that roughly 60% of Americans – and 70%+ of Democrats – support not the halfway measures advocated by the Biden administration  but a full, permanent ceasefire. While support for Israel is much higher among elected officials, this shifting opinion inevitably will affect policymakers. Elected officials certainly pay attention to lobbyists and major donors, but when their constituents back home start writing and asking questions at their town hall meetings, that affects congressional opinion.

A final point. While their posture in no way rivals the Washington muscle of the pro-Israel lobby, the Palestinian people have developed a much stronger presence in Washington in the past few years. Speaking bluntly, Arafat and his spokesmen always looked to American eyes like terrorists  and Abbas has the manner of a funeral home director. Palestinian spokesmen appearing on TV and shouting about the Zionist state were never going to make progress, no matter how just their cause. Within the past few years, the Palestinians seem to have learned how to advocate effectively to American audiences and this is no small part of their current advantage in the war for American public opinion. While the United States outwardly remains Israel’s strongest supporter and enabler, this support is much weaker and subject to conditions than ever before. The early months of 2024 may see important changes in US policy.