Turkish President Erdogan’s prolonged tenure is attributed to his adeptness at forming political alliances and shaping Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policies. Alas, his leadership has been criticized for undemocratic practices, including suppressing dissent and straining relations with the West.
MAY 06, 2024
Recep Tayyip Erdogan shaped Turkish political approaches to both domestic and foreign policies for more than twenty years. Since his rise to power in 2003, Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (JDP) actively changing course in both domestic and foreign policy of Türkiye. Despite this him and his party managed to stay in power for more than twenty years. For most of the people outside of Türkiye it is a point of discussion how him and his party has managed to stay in power for so long. Understanding policy decisions taken under his rule and their reflection on the people in Türkiye and his personal talent of forming political alliances are key to solving the puzzle of long rule.
From 2003 to 2007 were the years of great promise for Turkish people as with newly elected Erdogan and Justice and Development Party. Per with their promises of social and political freedoms and economic development people were expecting relative prosperity after more than ten years of political and economic turmoil along with rising terror in eastern provinces. They have provided on all of their promises as Türkiye saw rapid rise in statute in international arena. In addition, Türkiye has managed to take a breath from various conflicts as Erdogan and his government took steps for reproachment with conflicted states. Finally, Türkiye took great steps towards realising its dream of European Union membership by rapidly closing tittles in EU harmonisation process.
Alas, these events cannot be explained solely with the actions of JDP government. Between 2002-2008 USA and the EU provided developing countries with cheap credits and saw the opportunity for expansion of spheres of influence in the developing world. In addition, Türkiye’s rejection of participating invasion of Iraq in 2003 produced intended results in the EU. On the domestic front Erdogan has managed to gather support from wide range of political affiliations. Liberals, social democrats and Islamists followed Erdogan for his rise of power. As these groups harshly or softly repressed by former political establishments, they willingly joined Erdogan, and this coalition helped Erdogan to quickly gather public support.
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Between 2007-2011 Türkiye’s prosperity under Erdogan’s rule continued. However, due to developments in international arena such as Eurozone Crisis in 2010 and Global Financial Crisis in 2008 financial inflow towards Türkiye slowed down. Despite these developments, Erdogan and his government has managed to keep Türkiye afloat unlike Greece. In addition, Erdogan’s spurt in Davos in 2009 against president of state of Israel Shimon Peres has raised his stature in both domestic and international arena. Nationalist and Islamist sections of Turkish society and Arab nationalist and Muslim states in Middle East supported him on this issue. This support has helped him and his government for generating legitimacy in both domestic and international arena.
One of the key aspects of his third term liberals and social democrats-socialists began moving away from JDP cadres. Despite his aggressive move for dealing with military domination with Balyoz and Ergenekon trials for the 1980 coup d’etat and 28 February memorandum, which elated liberals, as the financial benefits coming from the west decreased, he began to seek new alliances. As this search for allies began Erdogan has turned to Kurds and Islamists. 2011-2015 was the beginning of transformation both JDP and Erdogan. Former liberal and social democrat cadres have been replaced with more conservative members of political establishment and gradual repression of these segments of society began. In addition, reproachment process with the Kurds abruptly ended towards the end of this term.
Finally, despite still being afloat Turkish economy, especially Turkish Lira, began losing its steam. This term was the harbinger of what is to come for Türkiye. First signs of polarisation, economic crisis and repression began emerging between these years. Despite beginning calmly during this term first signs have begun with Gezi Protests. In 2013, people organised series of protests against JDP government over the topic of destruction Gezi Square in Taksim and construction of a mall in the shape of Taksim Military Barracks. However, this was the last straw for more secular and liberal sections of society as JDP governments interventions in public and private lives of Turkish people increased. Violent attempts of repression of these protests brought a breaking point in Turkish society.
Erdogan declared protestors as terrorists instead of trying to calm the storm he chose to consolidate his support base. On international front emerging protests in MENA, which were named Arab Spring, shocked the relatively stable region. While these protests have wide range of reasons, one of main breaking point was Islamist movements rose to leadership against long lasting Arab nationalist political establishment. Reflecting his domestic turn, Erdogan chose to support Islamist movements in these regions such as Muslim Brothers. This decision, despite contradicting his minister of foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero problem with neighbour’s”, diminished Türkiye’s position both regionally and internationally. His hopes and support for establishment of more Islamist governments in broke the relations with Middle East and both authoritarian and Islamist moves in domestic and foreign policies put Türkiye further from the West.
Despite all these Erdogan has managed to consolidate his support base and carried onto next term. The fourth term of Erdogan has witnessed even greater breaking points. As the honeymoon between the Kurds and Erdoğan abruptly ended at the end of the third term, there was also a new challenger for power in Turkish political sphere. As Erdogan’s greatest political ally between 2011-2015, Fetullah Gülen and his religious group ”Nurcular” (it is a Turkish word and means that Nur movement) were now demanding more from him. First signs of crisis began with 17-25 December embezzlement operations. During these operations large number of illegally obtained tapes, documents and recordings serviced to media by the members of this group and many JDP members, including Erdogan himself, became the topic of scrutiny for judiciary. Following securitisation from Erdogan and JDP government this group tried to organise a coup on July 15 in 2016, however; they failed. With their failure Erdogan’s tone and actions became even more strict.
Following the coup Erdogan moved to further consolidate power with referendum in 2017. The topic of this proposal was moving to presidential system from parliamentary system. With this system head of state now had the executive powers with statutory degrees leaving parliament with legislative powers. On international front, Türkiye faced with further isolation and conflicts. Crisis such as detainment of Bishop Branson, S-400 crisis, intervention in Syria pushed Türkiye into era of isolation international arena. Following flight of Gülen to USA, Erdogan began moving away from the west, especially from the US, and turned to East. As a result of this turn Türkiye finalised purchase of S-400 missile systems from Russia which created another crisis.Despite domestic support and valid reasons such as rising terrorism in the south from both ISIS and PKK, members of NATO especially the US began enacting sanctions on Turkish officials. In addition, Türkiye’s unilateral intervention in Northern Syria and disagreements over this intervention with other NATO members further deepened the crisis with the west.
Finally, this intervention also ended process of reproachment with Syria and resulted in inflow of irregular migration. Despite all of this anti-western position, at least discourse helped Erdogan to gather enough support for another turn thanks to long lasting anti-US sentiments in Türkiye. From 2018 onwards Türkiye swings from one crisis to another. Depreciation of Turkish Lira, inflation, polarisation and migration occupies Turkish political discourse. In addition, internationally Türkiye still tries to figure a way out of crises such as intervention in Northern Syria and isolation in Eastern Mediterranean. Despite all of these Erdogan still stands strong with his ability to form political alliances and setting a discourse within Turkish society while using already existing fault lines among Turkish society.
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