Trump’s second term threatens Europe’s security, economy, and climate policies with radical changes. The 2024 election could fundamentally reshape Europe’s future.
In 2024 nearly half of the global population has been eligible to vote for an election. From the European Union parliament’s elections to Taiwan’s presidential elections, this year has witnessed dramatic changes in national establishments and nearly half of the people of the world have had the opportunity to express their thoughts. Americans will be no exception, and the November 2024 election is likely to have dramatic impacts on the world regardless of the outcome. For example, it is expected that Donald Trump, were he to be elected, will pursue a protectionist economic policy with tariffs, while Kamala Harris presents a more balanced approach to foreign policy. Keeping this mind, and waiting impatiently for the outcome of this election, this article aims to analyse the effects of a second Trump administration over European security and economy. Firstly, I shall critically analyse the effects of the first Trump administration over these issues to then build up a prediction of the effects of a second term. In these regards, it is to be said that experts consider a second trump presidency to be more radical and with tangible effects on the rest of the world compared with his first term for a number of reasons, which will be highlighted in this article.
The 2016 American presidential elections were held during a political turmoil characterized by a perception of loss of control over migration flows by political elites and a subsequent lack of trust from the electoral base in the entire Western world. In addition, looking at the international sphere, Brexit seriously questioned the existence of a European community, and China’s economy was predicted to overtake the U.S.’s in almost a decade. Meanwhile, governments in the West were facing increasing contestation during an election period. In this setting, Donald Trump’s campaign showed the world how voters can be emotional when things do not go as planned, and he managed to win the elections with the famous slogan “Make America Great Again” (MAGA).
He promised an isolationist foreign policy based on the idea that the United States should give up its role as a global supplier of security, particularly to those states that, Donald Trump said, were free-riding on shared obligations. On the economic side, Donald Trump promised protectionism. He firmly criticized free trade agreements, particularly those with Pacific nations through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), claiming that these were fundamentally opposed to the interests of the American manufacturing sector. Additionally, he promised a 45% tariff on all goods imported from China. Europe was not exempt from this process either, as Donald Trump once mentioned that the EU is “worse than China, just smaller.” Thus, when he took office, he dismantled the TPP and imposed tariffs on foreign goods like solar panels, steel, and washing machines in the hope of protecting American firms from competition. He also placed tariffs on all goods imported from China and initiated an inflammatory trade war between the two countries without any cooperation or coordination from allies.
This lack of coordination left Europe in an inconvenient position. On one hand, the European market remained open to Chinese imports, while on the other, European manufacturers faced increased hurdles in their exports to the United States. While this process has not necessarily resulted in a shift in European politics towards China, significant steps were undertaken by national governments in the hope of fostering better trade relationships with Beijing. The Italian government, for example, signed up for the New Silk Road initiative alongside some Eastern European countries. However, this does not mean that Europe has become a China-dependent economy, as Europe has managed to find other markets for exports thanks to its single market, which provides it with a strong position in the world economy.
At the same time, Trump’s promise to end Washington’s supply of security worldwide was a false one. Instead, he pursued a Reagan-style “peace through strength” approach, which views military power as a necessity for peace. Thus, Donald Trump did not end the U.S.’s role as a global power, but his approach was not without consequences for Europe. First and foremost, the unpredictability of his decisions raised questions about the solidity of European security. Secondly, in line with Obama’s “pivot to China,” Trump’s foreign policy was primarily directed towards China.
This move has left Europeans facing a much less secure future in the event of major aggression, as EU leaders could no longer count on the U.S. to fulfill its international obligations through NATO’s Article V. However, Europeans responded firmly to this sense of insecurity by reinvigorating the seemingly “brain-dead” Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), leading to further EU integration through military mobility and a common fund for research. To sum up, Donald Trump’s first administration was characterized by unilateralism in both the international economic order and the international security order. While the first macro-area directly affected European nations through tariffs, in the second macro-area, although nothing substantial happened, everything was marked by unpredictability.
Nonetheless, Europe seemed to have passed the test, as the consequences of the Trump tariffs did not lead to a crisis in Europe due to the deep level of European integration in the area. This integration prevented the EU from becoming a Chinese-dependent market. Moreover, Trump has had the unintended effect of uniting Europeans towards a long-term project of common defense, as the supply of security from the other side of the Atlantic has been questioned, though NATO still exists and played a central role in supporting Ukraine in 2022. However, it is important to note that scholars and experts of American foreign policy have observed that Trump’s first term was not as radical as it could have been due to internal resistance in the bureaucracy, particularly from the Pentagon.
As a matter of fact, Donald Trump went after the first line of permanent executives in the Departments of State and Defense, which might signal that fierce disagreement and even sabotage were directed towards the president’s directives. Experts suggest this will not be the case should Trump be elected again, as he managed to replace most of the antagonists, and it is not clear whether four years of Biden have fully restored the previous establishment. Thus, should Trump enter the White House in January 2025, the expectation is to see the most radical administration and policies in the history of the United States. The next section will present different possible scenarios for a second Trump presidency.
As mentioned in the previous section, experts believe that a new Trump administration would be much more radical than the previous one because he has more experience in office and has targeted everyone who disagreed with him. Additionally, the decision to have a radical right-wing populist like J.D. Vance as his running mate signals that he is ready to go all in. This is bad news for Europe, as Mr. Vance has expressed fierce criticism of U.S. involvement in European security issues, such as U.S. military aid to Ukraine. Furthermore, as outlined in Agenda 47, the official electoral program of the Trump-Vance ticket, they plan to ensure that American allies will pay their share in the global security system.
For Europe, this means contributing more to NATO, which, however, is difficult to do in the short term due to the high level of public debt that European countries have accumulated over the years. Countries like Italy or France are far above the threshold of 100% of their GDP in debt, which means they are trapped in a vicious cycle of creating new debt to pay off the existing one. In this scenario, a further increase in military expenditures would be politically difficult, especially after years of welfare cuts. If Europeans fail to contribute their fair share, a new scenario could emerge. While campaigning, Trump said that he would encourage Putin to “do whatever the hell he wanted with such countries.” Besides Trump’s characteristic rhetoric, the message for Europeans is clear: Donald Trump will not defend you if you don’t pay. It may sound concerning at first glance, and after almost 80 years of NATO, it would be natural to feel threatened; however, this situation may lead to a better long-term outcome for Europeans, as this insecurity could foster integration in defense and make military expenditures more cost-efficient and less politically painful.
However, in the short term, halting support for Ukraine and pushing for peace talks would seriously compromise European security, as it would legitimize territorial aggression and annexation by Russia. As it stands, should Ukraine be forced into peace talks, it would likely have to give up most of the occupied provinces; otherwise, Putin would hardly accept any agreement. Although much can happen between now and January 2025, Ukraine is unlikely to retain possession of all the occupied provinces and therefore would not be in the most favorable position at the negotiating table, which would compromise the EU’s legitimacy and the path towards Ukraine’s accession. Thus, while there may be some medium-term benefits, a Trump administration could put the continent into serious trouble.
On the other hand, speaking about European manufacturers, a Trump administration would not be good news, as he aims to impose a blanket tariff on all imports from abroad. Considering that the U.S. consumer market is of vital importance for Europeans, this will surely have consequences for the wealth of European small and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs), which have been hit in the past two years by soaring inflation and energy prices. Secondly, unlike during the last Trump presidency, China does not present the same market opportunities, particularly for the tech sector, for several reasons. Firstly, the war in Ukraine has damaged business with China, as European airlines face an embargo on Russian airspace, leading to increased transportation costs to the Far East. Secondly, Xi Jinping is subsidizing China’s internal tech market to make China a leader in innovation, effectively compromising market freedom.
European SMEs, which largely rely on excellence as a market strategy and target affluent consumers, thus face unfair competition from the two biggest consumer markets and the two richest economies in the world. Whether this will result in rising unemployment and economic recession depends on the European Commission and the businesses themselves, which must find either new markets or new strategies to compete with giants who are not adhering to the rules of market economies. Climate change policies and diplomacy are likely to be impacted as well, as both Mr. Trump and Mr. Vance believe there is no climate emergency. The first Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement and advocated for the continued use of fossil fuels. In Agenda 47, it is reported that the Trump-Vance administration aims to “stop the electric vehicle mandate and cancel burdensome climate regulations.”
Although all of this is linked with the potential trade war with China, which currently holds a semi-monopoly on green technologies and rare materials necessary for electric engines, this will be a problem for Europe as well. Given that the Commission has imposed a ban on the production of fuel and petrol-based engines for all car manufacturers within the EU single market, the U.S. market is likely to be vital for European manufacturers. However, if Donald Trump does not impose the same ban on sales of such cars, then European car makers will be harmed, as they will lose a significant portion of their market to Asian or American manufacturers. This may lead to different outcomes as discussed previously, as EU manufacturers could either move to other markets or relocate production outside of the EU to continue making fuel-based cars.
Thus, to sum up, a second Trump administration is likely to have effects on European defense both in the short and medium term. In the short term, Trump may harm European security by pushing Ukraine into peace negotiations from an unfavorable position and legitimizing aggression to pursue objectives. However, in the medium to long term, Trump’s rhetoric and demands for increased military spending may foster integration towards a common security and defense policy. Looking at his economic policy, a blanket tariff on all imports from abroad would seriously harm European businesses, especially considering that China is now pursuing a similar policy. Therefore, if Trump is elected, Europe may find itself in the uncomfortable position of having the two biggest and richest markets closed off. The same applies to the car sector, which is linked to climate change, as the Commission has imposed a ban on the production and sales of petrol and fuel-based vehicles, while Donald Trump aims to stop this mandate, with potentially disastrous consequences for climate change.
American voters have the ball now. November 2024 will surely be an election to watch. The two candidates represent the two souls of America, with Kamala Harris embodying the American dream—the idea that all citizens have equal opportunities to succeed—and Donald Trump representing the disillusionment of a nation that no longer believes in this dream. American voters will now have the power to decide which country they want to live in, and Pennsylvania is likely to be the state that will determine the outcome. As for Europeans, the difference between the two administrations is likely to spur some disagreements, and Trump certainly does not prioritize Europe. However, whatever the result, Europeans must now learn to stand on their own, because the MAGA movement is not a characteristic of Donald Trump alone; it is an entire movement likely to influence American politics in the next decade regardless of who sits in the White House, and Europe must be ready to face it.
Trump’s second term threatens Europe’s security, economy, and climate policies with radical changes. The 2024 election could fundamentally reshape Europe’s future.
In 2024 nearly half of the global population has been eligible to vote for an election. From the European Union parliament’s elections to Taiwan’s presidential elections, this year has witnessed dramatic changes in national establishments and nearly half of the people of the world have had the opportunity to express their thoughts. Americans will be no exception, and the November 2024 election is likely to have dramatic impacts on the world regardless of the outcome. For example, it is expected that Donald Trump, were he to be elected, will pursue a protectionist economic policy with tariffs, while Kamala Harris presents a more balanced approach to foreign policy. Keeping this mind, and waiting impatiently for the outcome of this election, this article aims to analyse the effects of a second Trump administration over European security and economy. Firstly, I shall critically analyse the effects of the first Trump administration over these issues to then build up a prediction of the effects of a second term. In these regards, it is to be said that experts consider a second trump presidency to be more radical and with tangible effects on the rest of the world compared with his first term for a number of reasons, which will be highlighted in this article.
The 2016 American presidential elections were held during a political turmoil characterized by a perception of loss of control over migration flows by political elites and a subsequent lack of trust from the electoral base in the entire Western world. In addition, looking at the international sphere, Brexit seriously questioned the existence of a European community, and China’s economy was predicted to overtake the U.S.’s in almost a decade. Meanwhile, governments in the West were facing increasing contestation during an election period. In this setting, Donald Trump’s campaign showed the world how voters can be emotional when things do not go as planned, and he managed to win the elections with the famous slogan “Make America Great Again” (MAGA).
He promised an isolationist foreign policy based on the idea that the United States should give up its role as a global supplier of security, particularly to those states that, Donald Trump said, were free-riding on shared obligations. On the economic side, Donald Trump promised protectionism. He firmly criticized free trade agreements, particularly those with Pacific nations through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), claiming that these were fundamentally opposed to the interests of the American manufacturing sector. Additionally, he promised a 45% tariff on all goods imported from China. Europe was not exempt from this process either, as Donald Trump once mentioned that the EU is “worse than China, just smaller.” Thus, when he took office, he dismantled the TPP and imposed tariffs on foreign goods like solar panels, steel, and washing machines in the hope of protecting American firms from competition. He also placed tariffs on all goods imported from China and initiated an inflammatory trade war between the two countries without any cooperation or coordination from allies.
This lack of coordination left Europe in an inconvenient position. On one hand, the European market remained open to Chinese imports, while on the other, European manufacturers faced increased hurdles in their exports to the United States. While this process has not necessarily resulted in a shift in European politics towards China, significant steps were undertaken by national governments in the hope of fostering better trade relationships with Beijing. The Italian government, for example, signed up for the New Silk Road initiative alongside some Eastern European countries. However, this does not mean that Europe has become a China-dependent economy, as Europe has managed to find other markets for exports thanks to its single market, which provides it with a strong position in the world economy.
At the same time, Trump’s promise to end Washington’s supply of security worldwide was a false one. Instead, he pursued a Reagan-style “peace through strength” approach, which views military power as a necessity for peace. Thus, Donald Trump did not end the U.S.’s role as a global power, but his approach was not without consequences for Europe. First and foremost, the unpredictability of his decisions raised questions about the solidity of European security. Secondly, in line with Obama’s “pivot to China,” Trump’s foreign policy was primarily directed towards China.
This move has left Europeans facing a much less secure future in the event of major aggression, as EU leaders could no longer count on the U.S. to fulfill its international obligations through NATO’s Article V. However, Europeans responded firmly to this sense of insecurity by reinvigorating the seemingly “brain-dead” Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), leading to further EU integration through military mobility and a common fund for research. To sum up, Donald Trump’s first administration was characterized by unilateralism in both the international economic order and the international security order. While the first macro-area directly affected European nations through tariffs, in the second macro-area, although nothing substantial happened, everything was marked by unpredictability.
Nonetheless, Europe seemed to have passed the test, as the consequences of the Trump tariffs did not lead to a crisis in Europe due to the deep level of European integration in the area. This integration prevented the EU from becoming a Chinese-dependent market. Moreover, Trump has had the unintended effect of uniting Europeans towards a long-term project of common defense, as the supply of security from the other side of the Atlantic has been questioned, though NATO still exists and played a central role in supporting Ukraine in 2022. However, it is important to note that scholars and experts of American foreign policy have observed that Trump’s first term was not as radical as it could have been due to internal resistance in the bureaucracy, particularly from the Pentagon.
As a matter of fact, Donald Trump went after the first line of permanent executives in the Departments of State and Defense, which might signal that fierce disagreement and even sabotage were directed towards the president’s directives. Experts suggest this will not be the case should Trump be elected again, as he managed to replace most of the antagonists, and it is not clear whether four years of Biden have fully restored the previous establishment. Thus, should Trump enter the White House in January 2025, the expectation is to see the most radical administration and policies in the history of the United States. The next section will present different possible scenarios for a second Trump presidency.
As mentioned in the previous section, experts believe that a new Trump administration would be much more radical than the previous one because he has more experience in office and has targeted everyone who disagreed with him. Additionally, the decision to have a radical right-wing populist like J.D. Vance as his running mate signals that he is ready to go all in. This is bad news for Europe, as Mr. Vance has expressed fierce criticism of U.S. involvement in European security issues, such as U.S. military aid to Ukraine. Furthermore, as outlined in Agenda 47, the official electoral program of the Trump-Vance ticket, they plan to ensure that American allies will pay their share in the global security system.
For Europe, this means contributing more to NATO, which, however, is difficult to do in the short term due to the high level of public debt that European countries have accumulated over the years. Countries like Italy or France are far above the threshold of 100% of their GDP in debt, which means they are trapped in a vicious cycle of creating new debt to pay off the existing one. In this scenario, a further increase in military expenditures would be politically difficult, especially after years of welfare cuts. If Europeans fail to contribute their fair share, a new scenario could emerge. While campaigning, Trump said that he would encourage Putin to “do whatever the hell he wanted with such countries.” Besides Trump’s characteristic rhetoric, the message for Europeans is clear: Donald Trump will not defend you if you don’t pay. It may sound concerning at first glance, and after almost 80 years of NATO, it would be natural to feel threatened; however, this situation may lead to a better long-term outcome for Europeans, as this insecurity could foster integration in defense and make military expenditures more cost-efficient and less politically painful.
However, in the short term, halting support for Ukraine and pushing for peace talks would seriously compromise European security, as it would legitimize territorial aggression and annexation by Russia. As it stands, should Ukraine be forced into peace talks, it would likely have to give up most of the occupied provinces; otherwise, Putin would hardly accept any agreement. Although much can happen between now and January 2025, Ukraine is unlikely to retain possession of all the occupied provinces and therefore would not be in the most favorable position at the negotiating table, which would compromise the EU’s legitimacy and the path towards Ukraine’s accession. Thus, while there may be some medium-term benefits, a Trump administration could put the continent into serious trouble.
On the other hand, speaking about European manufacturers, a Trump administration would not be good news, as he aims to impose a blanket tariff on all imports from abroad. Considering that the U.S. consumer market is of vital importance for Europeans, this will surely have consequences for the wealth of European small and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs), which have been hit in the past two years by soaring inflation and energy prices. Secondly, unlike during the last Trump presidency, China does not present the same market opportunities, particularly for the tech sector, for several reasons. Firstly, the war in Ukraine has damaged business with China, as European airlines face an embargo on Russian airspace, leading to increased transportation costs to the Far East. Secondly, Xi Jinping is subsidizing China’s internal tech market to make China a leader in innovation, effectively compromising market freedom.
European SMEs, which largely rely on excellence as a market strategy and target affluent consumers, thus face unfair competition from the two biggest consumer markets and the two richest economies in the world. Whether this will result in rising unemployment and economic recession depends on the European Commission and the businesses themselves, which must find either new markets or new strategies to compete with giants who are not adhering to the rules of market economies. Climate change policies and diplomacy are likely to be impacted as well, as both Mr. Trump and Mr. Vance believe there is no climate emergency. The first Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement and advocated for the continued use of fossil fuels. In Agenda 47, it is reported that the Trump-Vance administration aims to “stop the electric vehicle mandate and cancel burdensome climate regulations.”
Although all of this is linked with the potential trade war with China, which currently holds a semi-monopoly on green technologies and rare materials necessary for electric engines, this will be a problem for Europe as well. Given that the Commission has imposed a ban on the production of fuel and petrol-based engines for all car manufacturers within the EU single market, the U.S. market is likely to be vital for European manufacturers. However, if Donald Trump does not impose the same ban on sales of such cars, then European car makers will be harmed, as they will lose a significant portion of their market to Asian or American manufacturers. This may lead to different outcomes as discussed previously, as EU manufacturers could either move to other markets or relocate production outside of the EU to continue making fuel-based cars.
!! Thus, to sum up, a second Trump administration is likely to have effects on European defense both in the short and medium term. In the short term, Trump may harm European security by pushing Ukraine into peace negotiations from an unfavorable position and legitimizing aggression to pursue objectives. However, in the medium to long term, Trump’s rhetoric and demands for increased military spending may foster integration towards a common security and defense policy. Looking at his economic policy, a blanket tariff on all imports from abroad would seriously harm European businesses, especially considering that China is now pursuing a similar policy. Therefore, if Trump is elected, Europe may find itself in the uncomfortable position of having the two biggest and richest markets closed off. The same applies to the car sector, which is linked to climate change, as the Commission has imposed a ban on the production and sales of petrol and fuel-based vehicles, while Donald Trump aims to stop this mandate, with potentially disastrous consequences for climate change.
American voters have the ball now. November 2024 will surely be an election to watch. The two candidates represent the two souls of America, with Kamala Harris embodying the American dream—the idea that all citizens have equal opportunities to succeed—and Donald Trump representing the disillusionment of a nation that no longer believes in this dream. American voters will now have the power to decide which country they want to live in, and Pennsylvania is likely to be the state that will determine the outcome. As for Europeans, the difference between the two administrations is likely to spur some disagreements, and Trump certainly does not prioritize Europe. However, whatever the result, Europeans must now learn to stand on their own, because the MAGA movement is not a characteristic of Donald Trump alone; it is an entire movement likely to influence American politics in the next decade regardless of who sits in the White House, and Europe must be ready to face it.
Lorenzo Izzi is a Master of Arts in International Relations at the London School of Economics. His main areas of expertise are contemporary US foreign policy and European Union foreign policy.
