Putin’s determination to restore Russia’s great power status propels the conflict in Ukraine, intensifying the struggle for influence and challenging Western dominance.
Understanding what Russia wants is not merely an academic exercise; it is crucial to comprehend the dynamic nature of international politics. As we observe the ongoing war in Ukraine, it becomes increasingly evident that Russia’s actions are not isolated events but part of a broader strategy rooted in historical and cultural constraints. Russia’s current approach reflects its everlasting quest for status and recognition on the world stage. Over the years, Russia’s relationship with the West has gone from pragmatic cooperation to rivalry, leading to a realignment of its foreign policy towards non-Western powers, particularly China. This shift is not only reshaping regional politics but also challenging the rules-based order that the US has led. By examining the underlying motivations of Russian foreign policy, we can better understand the drivers of its current behavior and possibly forecast future actions.
To understand the motivations behind Russia’s foreign policy, it is essential to understand the historical roots of its quest for status. Russia’s desire to be seen as a great power is not new but rather a continuation of policy that dates back to its imperial period. During the time of the Tsars, Russia consistently sought to assert its influence on European politics. This can be seen following the Truce of Yam-Zapolsky when the Vatican negotiator, Antonio Possevino, did not view Ivan IV as equal to European kings or emperors. Later on, Russia would engage in wars with Türkiye and Sweden. In particular, one of the justifications for war with Sweden was that Sweden insulted Peter I’s honor. The quest to be seen as an equal among major powers intensified over the years under the Russian Empire and the early days of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was not just a geopolitical loss for Russia; it was a profound blow to its identity and prestige. This was what President Putin called a geopolitical catastrophe. Today, Russia’s actions can be seen as part of an ongoing effort to reclaim its status and recognition, influenced by both its imperial past and the legacy of the Soviet Union.
From Ivan the Terrible to Putin, Russia has felt the need to obtain great power status. In Larson and Shevchenko’s book, Russia sought status in multiple ways. As Russia focused on its foreign policy towards the West, it was not seen as being part of the European monarchies. Some Russian leaders engaged in wars to show that Russian power was comparable to European kingdoms. Others, such as Peter the Great, sought to import certain aspects of Europe, believing that if they could assimilate these elements, Russia would become more European and be welcomed into the great power club. Fast forward to the end of the Soviet Union, Russia was at its peak as a major power. The US and the USSR were two superpowers at the top of the world. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the territorialization that the Soviets implemented not only resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union but also of what used to be the Russian Empire. Not only was the Soviet Union gone, but the Russian Empire also lost territory, and Russia lost its prestige of being a great power. If we are to ask what Russia wants, it is a return to great power status, in which it is considered equal to countries such as the United States.
To comprehend Russia’s actions, we need to examine the concept of ontological security. It is a term that originates from sociology and psychology. Originally, this concept came from R.D. Laing and Anthony Giddens, which highlights the importance of stability and continuity in life. Jennifer Mitzen applies this concept to international politics. She defines ontological security as the need to experience oneself as a continuous, whole person in time, which also applies to states. For states, this means projecting and maintaining a coherent identity that aligns with their historical and cultural narratives. The Russian state that existed before Vladimir Putin continued even after he passed away.
The government must ensure that it maintains its strong sense of identity. Just like individuals, a state wants its identity to be respected and acknowledged. It seeks to project its identity in a positive light or as prestigious. To protect its identity, a state may resort to tactics that may seem irrational to outsiders but are understood and appreciated within its local community. Sometimes, a state’s sense of identity may take precedence over physical security or economic stability, leading to prolonged conflicts or hostilities. The fear of losing one’s sense of identity can cause a state to feel insecure, and it may establish routines with other states to alleviate this anxiety. However, traumatic disruptions in social interactions with other countries can lead to feelings of ontological insecurity, causing unexpected or dramatic behavior from states.
In Russia’s case, this sense of self is deeply tied to its historical role as a great power, one that has been repeatedly challenged since 1991. The fall of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance challenged Russia’s ontological security, leading to a profound identity crisis. This necessitated the need to restore Russian status and to protect it from identity erosion. This drives many Russian actions, including the invasion of Ukraine.
Suppose we apply the idea of ontological security to Russia. Throughout history, the Russian state has consistently sought the status and recognition of other major powers worldwide. Russia perceives itself as a major power, comparable to the United States and China, and views itself as the center of Eurasia, responsible for bringing enlightenment and development to the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and acting as “a guarantor of peace in the Caucasus.” This self-perception was a significant factor during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War when Russia felt compelled to defend its image as a dominant power in Eurasia. Russia’s identity as a culturally distinct and civilizational state meant that it could not tolerate former parts of the Russian Empire being integrated into the Western sphere of influence. When this identity as a major power in Eurasia was threatened, Russia sought various methods to restore its stability and status.
The application of defending this sense of self is evident in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the invasion, the Kremlin published an article by President Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” in which he referred to the two Slavic nations as “one people.” This view is not unique to Putin; other Russian leaders have historically shared this belief. For example, as documented in Vladislav M. Zubok’s Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union, other Russian decision-makers in the 1990s shared the view “that the borders of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan were the products of the Bolsheviks’ cynical manipulation of nationalism in order to construct their totalitarian empire.” The idea that Ukraine should be part of Russia has deep roots, and the 2014 Maidan Revolution, which disrupted the social interaction between Russia and Ukraine, caused profound ontological insecurity for Russia. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the invasion of Ukraine was necessary to restore its ontological security, despite the substantial costs involved.
This concept of ontological security is not unique to Russia. Other states, such as China and the United States, also deal with their own identity challenges. For instance, China’s rise is not just about economic and/or military power but also about reclaiming its historical status in Asia. “Never forget national humiliation” is one of the driving messages from the Chinese Communist Party. The humiliation of losing territory to colonial powers in the 1800s drove the quest for status. Similarly, the United States’ foreign policy often reflects its self-perception as a global leader and defender of democracy. In the 1890s, the United States was dealing with economic downturns, social issues, and reconstruction following the American Civil War. At this time, the United States experienced an identity crisis and began to become more activist on the global stage. By comparing these examples, it can be seen that the quest for ontological security is common.
While the concept of ontological security offers a compelling framework for understanding Russia’s actions, it is crucial to note that this is not the only lens through which to view Russian actions. There are significant debates in the field of political science and international relations regarding how one should interpret Russian actions. Structural realists, for instance, might argue that Russia’s behavior is less about identity and more about security concerns. For them, Russia’s actions to annex Crimea and invade Ukraine and Georgia were motivated by the need to secure its borders and maintain a strategic buffer against NATO expansion. Structural realists, such as John Mearsheimer, argue that the expansion of NATO influenced Russian behavior and that allowing nuclear weapons based in Ukraine to be returned to Russia opened the chance of war. This viewpoint interprets Russia’s actions as rationally designed to ensure its survival in an anarchic world.
However, social constructivists offer different perspectives. They focus on how the roles of identity, norms, and historical narratives shape a state’s behavior. From a constructivist viewpoint, Russian actions are not merely about material concerns like security or economics but are deeply rooted in a historical self-conception as a great power. This perspective looks at how Russia socially interacts with the world and how it develops its identity. Yet, focusing on material and non-material aspects separately provides a limited view. Integrating these scholarly perspectives allows for a more nuanced look at Russia. For instance, Deborah Welch Larson, Alexei Shevchenko, and Andrei Tsygankov have all documented the continuity of Russia’s quest for status and recognition throughout its history. They note that economic and security concerns still matter, but when paired with ontological security, one can see how Russia might interpret those concerns. By considering these different viewpoints, we gain a more comprehensive understanding of the motivations behind Russia’s actions on the global stage.
In examining the current state of affairs, it is crucial to explore Russia’s evolving social interactions and strategic partnerships with countries such as China, Iran, and Türkiye. Over the past few years, these relationships have deepened, reflecting a prominent shift in Russia’s foreign policy as it distances itself from the United States, Great Britain, and the European Union. The partnership with China has moved beyond economic cooperation to include military assistance and shared political interests in creating a multipolar world. Russia’s ties with Iran have also strengthened, driven by mutual interests in Syria and a shared opposition to U.S. policies in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Türkiye, despite its NATO membership, has increasingly cooperated with Russia, particularly in energy trade. These alliances signal a broader strategy where Russia seeks to build a multipolar world, reducing its reliance on Western powers and positioning itself as a key player in non-Western parts of the world.
Russia’s continuous quest for status is clearly demonstrated by its strategic appeal to the Global South. As Natalie Sabanadze says, “[Russia’s] aim is uncontested regional hegemony that can best be guaranteed in the multipolar world. This requires weakening the US and its allies through pressuring them in many directions simultaneously.” This strategy involves creating as many pressure points as possible for the United States and Europe. Instead of focusing solely on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its allies have to focus on the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. By spreading out over multiple fronts, the ultimate aim is to weaken Western influence. The effectiveness of this approach is evident in the fact that roughly two-thirds of the world’s population resides in countries that have chosen not to sanction Russia.
The result is that states that hold about two-thirds of the world’s population are not sanctioning Russia. Although Russia may not be respected as a power in Europe or America, it is still respected in other parts of the world. While Russia may struggle to gain respect as a power in Europe, it continues to seek respect and recognition from other parts of the world. Historically, Russia has always been driven by a desire for status and recognition. From the era of the Tsars, it sought to build an empire that would be granted membership in the club of European powers. The Soviet Union then elevated Russia to the status of a global power. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been on a quest to reclaim the status that it believes it rightly deserves.
As we look to the future, Russia’s quest to maintain or even gain more status is far from over. The state’s identity has been challenged time and again, but Russian leaders have chosen to fight to preserve their current identity. Whether through military actions, alliances, or economic moves, Russia is likely to find a way to remain a player on the chessboard of global politics. The international response to the invasion of Ukraine is going to be crucial. The actions taken now will set the tone for the future and what is tolerated. We may see shifts in alliances and strategies among powers as they respond to Russia’s persistence. Some may choose not to support sanctions because it would be too costly or because their interests have changed. In this dynamic, anarchic world, Russia’s persistence in maintaining its status will likely continue to drive its policy. Whether these efforts will restore Russia to its former glory or lead to its further isolation remains to be seen. What is clear is that Russian leaders are willing to go to great lengths to ensure that their country remains a formidable force in the world.
Putin’s determination to restore Russia’s great power status propels the conflict in Ukraine, intensifying the struggle for influence and challenging Western dominance.
Understanding what Russia wants is not merely an academic exercise; it is crucial to comprehend the dynamic nature of international politics. As we observe the ongoing war in Ukraine, it becomes increasingly evident that Russia’s actions are not isolated events but part of a broader strategy rooted in historical and cultural constraints. Russia’s current approach reflects its everlasting quest for status and recognition on the world stage. Over the years, Russia’s relationship with the West has gone from pragmatic cooperation to rivalry, leading to a realignment of its foreign policy towards non-Western powers, particularly China. This shift is not only reshaping regional politics but also challenging the rules-based order that the US has led. By examining the underlying motivations of Russian foreign policy, we can better understand the drivers of its current behavior and possibly forecast future actions.
To understand the motivations behind Russia’s foreign policy, it is essential to understand the historical roots of its quest for status. Russia’s desire to be seen as a great power is not new but rather a continuation of policy that dates back to its imperial period. During the time of the Tsars, Russia consistently sought to assert its influence on European politics. This can be seen following the Truce of Yam-Zapolsky when the Vatican negotiator, Antonio Possevino, did not view Ivan IV as equal to European kings or emperors. Later on, Russia would engage in wars with Türkiye and Sweden. In particular, one of the justifications for war with Sweden was that Sweden insulted Peter I’s honor. The quest to be seen as an equal among major powers intensified over the years under the Russian Empire and the early days of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was not just a geopolitical loss for Russia; it was a profound blow to its identity and prestige. This was what President Putin called a geopolitical catastrophe. Today, Russia’s actions can be seen as part of an ongoing effort to reclaim its status and recognition, influenced by both its imperial past and the legacy of the Soviet Union.
From Ivan the Terrible to Putin, Russia has felt the need to obtain great power status. In Larson and Shevchenko’s book, Russia sought status in multiple ways. As Russia focused on its foreign policy towards the West, it was not seen as being part of the European monarchies. Some Russian leaders engaged in wars to show that Russian power was comparable to European kingdoms. Others, such as Peter the Great, sought to import certain aspects of Europe, believing that if they could assimilate these elements, Russia would become more European and be welcomed into the great power club. Fast forward to the end of the Soviet Union, Russia was at its peak as a major power. The US and the USSR were two superpowers at the top of the world. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the territorialization that the Soviets implemented not only resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union but also of what used to be the Russian Empire. Not only was the Soviet Union gone, but the Russian Empire also lost territory, and Russia lost its prestige of being a great power. If we are to ask what Russia wants, it is a return to great power status, in which it is considered equal to countries such as the United States.
To comprehend Russia’s actions, we need to examine the concept of ontological security. It is a term that originates from sociology and psychology. Originally, this concept came from R.D. Laing and Anthony Giddens, which highlights the importance of stability and continuity in life. Jennifer Mitzen applies this concept to international politics. She defines ontological security as the need to experience oneself as a continuous, whole person in time, which also applies to states. For states, this means projecting and maintaining a coherent identity that aligns with their historical and cultural narratives. The Russian state that existed before Vladimir Putin continued even after he passed away.
The government must ensure that it maintains its strong sense of identity. Just like individuals, a state wants its identity to be respected and acknowledged. It seeks to project its identity in a positive light or as prestigious. To protect its identity, a state may resort to tactics that may seem irrational to outsiders but are understood and appreciated within its local community. Sometimes, a state’s sense of identity may take precedence over physical security or economic stability, leading to prolonged conflicts or hostilities. The fear of losing one’s sense of identity can cause a state to feel insecure, and it may establish routines with other states to alleviate this anxiety. However, traumatic disruptions in social interactions with other countries can lead to feelings of ontological insecurity, causing unexpected or dramatic behavior from states.
In Russia’s case, this sense of self is deeply tied to its historical role as a great power, one that has been repeatedly challenged since 1991. The fall of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance challenged Russia’s ontological security, leading to a profound identity crisis. This necessitated the need to restore Russian status and to protect it from identity erosion. This drives many Russian actions, including the invasion of Ukraine.
Suppose we apply the idea of ontological security to Russia. Throughout history, the Russian state has consistently sought the status and recognition of other major powers worldwide. Russia perceives itself as a major power, comparable to the United States and China, and views itself as the center of Eurasia, responsible for bringing enlightenment and development to the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and acting as “a guarantor of peace in the Caucasus.” This self-perception was a significant factor during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War when Russia felt compelled to defend its image as a dominant power in Eurasia. Russia’s identity as a culturally distinct and civilizational state meant that it could not tolerate former parts of the Russian Empire being integrated into the Western sphere of influence. When this identity as a major power in Eurasia was threatened, Russia sought various methods to restore its stability and status.
The application of defending this sense of self is evident in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the invasion, the Kremlin published an article by President Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” in which he referred to the two Slavic nations as “one people.” This view is not unique to Putin; other Russian leaders have historically shared this belief. For example, as documented in Vladislav M. Zubok’s Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union, other Russian decision-makers in the 1990s shared the view “that the borders of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan were the products of the Bolsheviks’ cynical manipulation of nationalism in order to construct their totalitarian empire.” The idea that Ukraine should be part of Russia has deep roots, and the 2014 Maidan Revolution, which disrupted the social interaction between Russia and Ukraine, caused profound ontological insecurity for Russia. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the invasion of Ukraine was necessary to restore its ontological security, despite the substantial costs involved.
This concept of ontological security is not unique to Russia. Other states, such as China and the United States, also deal with their own identity challenges. For instance, China’s rise is not just about economic and/or military power but also about reclaiming its historical status in Asia. “Never forget national humiliation” is one of the driving messages from the Chinese Communist Party. The humiliation of losing territory to colonial powers in the 1800s drove the quest for status. Similarly, the United States’ foreign policy often reflects its self-perception as a global leader and defender of democracy. In the 1890s, the United States was dealing with economic downturns, social issues, and reconstruction following the American Civil War. At this time, the United States experienced an identity crisis and began to become more activist on the global stage. By comparing these examples, it can be seen that the quest for ontological security is common.
While the concept of ontological security offers a compelling framework for understanding Russia’s actions, it is crucial to note that this is not the only lens through which to view Russian actions. There are significant debates in the field of political science and international relations regarding how one should interpret Russian actions. Structural realists, for instance, might argue that Russia’s behavior is less about identity and more about security concerns. For them, Russia’s actions to annex Crimea and invade Ukraine and Georgia were motivated by the need to secure its borders and maintain a strategic buffer against NATO expansion. Structural realists, such as John Mearsheimer, argue that the expansion of NATO influenced Russian behavior and that allowing nuclear weapons based in Ukraine to be returned to Russia opened the chance of war. This viewpoint interprets Russia’s actions as rationally designed to ensure its survival in an anarchic world.
However, social constructivists offer different perspectives. They focus on how the roles of identity, norms, and historical narratives shape a state’s behavior. From a constructivist viewpoint, Russian actions are not merely about material concerns like security or economics but are deeply rooted in a historical self-conception as a great power. This perspective looks at how Russia socially interacts with the world and how it develops its identity. Yet, focusing on material and non-material aspects separately provides a limited view. Integrating these scholarly perspectives allows for a more nuanced look at Russia. For instance, Deborah Welch Larson, Alexei Shevchenko, and Andrei Tsygankov have all documented the continuity of Russia’s quest for status and recognition throughout its history. They note that economic and security concerns still matter, but when paired with ontological security, one can see how Russia might interpret those concerns. By considering these different viewpoints, we gain a more comprehensive understanding of the motivations behind Russia’s actions on the global stage.
In examining the current state of affairs, it is crucial to explore Russia’s evolving social interactions and strategic partnerships with countries such as China, Iran, and Türkiye. Over the past few years, these relationships have deepened, reflecting a prominent shift in Russia’s foreign policy as it distances itself from the United States, Great Britain, and the European Union. The partnership with China has moved beyond economic cooperation to include military assistance and shared political interests in creating a multipolar world. Russia’s ties with Iran have also strengthened, driven by mutual interests in Syria and a shared opposition to U.S. policies in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Türkiye, despite its NATO membership, has increasingly cooperated with Russia, particularly in energy trade. These alliances signal a broader strategy where Russia seeks to build a multipolar world, reducing its reliance on Western powers and positioning itself as a key player in non-Western parts of the world.
Russia’s continuous quest for status is clearly demonstrated by its strategic appeal to the Global South. As Natalie Sabanadze says, “[Russia’s] aim is uncontested regional hegemony that can best be guaranteed in the multipolar world. This requires weakening the US and its allies through pressuring them in many directions simultaneously.” This strategy involves creating as many pressure points as possible for the United States and Europe. Instead of focusing solely on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its allies have to focus on the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. By spreading out over multiple fronts, the ultimate aim is to weaken Western influence. The effectiveness of this approach is evident in the fact that roughly two-thirds of the world’s population resides in countries that have chosen not to sanction Russia.
The result is that states that hold about two-thirds of the world’s population are not sanctioning Russia. Although Russia may not be respected as a power in Europe or America, it is still respected in other parts of the world. While Russia may struggle to gain respect as a power in Europe, it continues to seek respect and recognition from other parts of the world. Historically, Russia has always been driven by a desire for status and recognition. From the era of the Tsars, it sought to build an empire that would be granted membership in the club of European powers. The Soviet Union then elevated Russia to the status of a global power. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been on a quest to reclaim the status that it believes it rightly deserves.
As we look to the future, Russia’s quest to maintain or even gain more status is far from over. The state’s identity has been challenged time and again, but Russian leaders have chosen to fight to preserve their current identity. Whether through military actions, alliances, or economic moves, Russia is likely to find a way to remain a player on the chessboard of global politics. The international response to the invasion of Ukraine is going to be crucial. The actions taken now will set the tone for the future and what is tolerated. We may see shifts in alliances and strategies among powers as they respond to Russia’s persistence. Some may choose not to support sanctions because it would be too costly or because their interests have changed. In this dynamic, anarchic world, Russia’s persistence in maintaining its status will likely continue to drive its policy. Whether these efforts will restore Russia to its former glory or lead to its further isolation remains to be seen. What is clear is that Russian leaders are willing to go to great lengths to ensure that their country remains a formidable force in the world.
Kevin Doremus is doing his PhD at Vytautas Magnus University and teach at LCC International University. His research focuses on grand strategy and foreign policy analysis of Central and Eastern Europe, the USA and Russia.
